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Summary
The first part of the thesis investigates the characterization of asset prices
and investor’s behavior under time-inconsistent preferences. For the lat-
ter type of preferences, we assume myopia or hyperbolic-discounting (HD).
We consider an infinite horizon economy under certainty with two heteroge-
neous CRRA individuals, one good and one long-lived asset. The question
of survival in the market arises when individuals are HD maximizers or my-
opic with wrong expectations about equilibrium asset prices. We provide
sufficient conditions such that more myopic individuals dominate over less
myopic ones and also sophisticated HD maximizers with intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution (IES) equal to one, log-utilities, dominate over HD
maximizers with IES higher than one. Thus, individuals that vanish in the
long-run will not have an impact on asset prices. On the other hand, asset
prices are characterized by extreme dynamics if the economy is populated
by myopic individuals only, who have perfect foresight about equilibrium
asset prices. We show that even though the dividends of the long-lived asset
are constant over time, there exist asset price dynamics that resemble an
ever-expanding asset price bubble.
The second part of the thesis investigates the characterization of optimal
monetary policy under two different scenaria. In the first scenario we con-
sider a two-period monetary economy with inside and outside money and an
environment with fix prices and excess capacities in equilibrium. If unem-
ployment is of a keynesian nature, a Friedman rule argument characterizes
optimal monetary policy whereas if unemployment is of a more classical na-
ture, high real wages, optimal policy requires positive nominal rates. In the
second scenario we consider an economy with idiosyncratic risk and credit
frictions. Monetary policy provides missing insurance due to credit frictions
through the distribution of non-contingent seignorage transfer across states.
1
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- Chapter 1 -
Myopia, Time-Inconsistency and Financial
Markets
§ 1.1 Introduction
Experimental studies have shown that individuals tend to be more impa-
tient with respect to short-run decisions compared to decisions taken in the
distant future. Laibson (1997) formalized the trade-off between short-run
impatience vs long-run patience with discount functions that take an approx-
imately hyperbolic form. This form of discounting implies that the prefer-
ences of individuals change over time. Individuals are time-inconsistent. To
formalize the idea of time-inconsistency due to short-run impatience, we will
consider two different forms of time-inconsistent preferences. The first form
is hyperbolic discounting (HD) where individuals have discount functions
that take an approximately hyperbolic form. The second form is myopic
behavior. Individuals are myopic when they are able to plan only for finite
periods in the future. Every time they wake up in a new period they realize
another period in the future and recalculate their plan1. As a consequence,
they behave in a time-inconsistent way2.
The motivation that underlies this work is to characterize the compet-
itive equilibrium of a simple financial economy when individuals are time-
inconsistent and to argue that certain phenomena can be explained when
individual’s preferences are described by the previous two forms of time-
inconsistency. In particular, we are going to analyze the following two
1We have adopted the convention that individuals realize one more period in the future
every time they wake up in a new planning horizon. See Lovo and Polemarchakis (2010)
and Spiro (2012)
2Myopia can be thought as an extreme form of hyperbolic discounting. Individuals care
about n periods in the future and put zero weight in their intertemporal utility function
after n+ 1 periods.
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phenomena. The first relates to the idea of survival in the market when
individual’s preferences are described by the previous two forms of time-
inconsistency. In the discussion that follows we will distinguish between
non-survival and bankruptcy. The second phenomenon in question relates
to fluctuations of asset prices that are not explained by fluctuations in the
dividends of the assets. Before elaborating further on the importance of
these two phenomena, it is necessary to contrast the approach followed here
with the literature in behavioral finance. This literature argues that some
financial phenomena can be better understood using models in which some
agents are not fully rational3. Deviation from rationality means two things:
Violation of expected utility and/or violation of bayesian updating. Time-
inconsistent individuals do not violate the previous two tenets of individual
rationality. Myopic or HD individuals may not have perfect foresight of
equilibrium prices4.
The aforementioned phenomena intersect at one point: the characteri-
zation of asset prices. Fluctuations of asset prices that are not explained by
fluctuations in the dividends of the assets is a pattern well-known in the lit-
erature5. We argue that myopic behavior could6 be an explanation as to why
asset prices fluctuate more than dividends. On the other hand, the literature
on survival has analyzed the long-run dynamics of economies populated by
individuals with correct or incorrect beliefs about the true probability distri-
bution of states of nature and different rates of impatience. There is no issue
of time-inconsistency. The question of survival in the market translates into
the question of whether all individuals have an impact on asset prices in the
long-run. Asset prices reflect only the preference parameters of surviving
individuals. Blume and Easley (1992) showed that, controlling for saving
rates, individuals whose beliefs are closest to the truth and maximize the
expected logarithm of next period output7 (MEL) are going to be the most
prosperous in the market compared to ones who do not follow MEL but
have correct beliefs. Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) showed
that in dynamically complete markets, the only determinants for survival
is the accuracy of beliefs and the differences in discount factors. Attitudes
towards risk are irrelevant. Lastly, Beker and Chattopadhyay (2010) take
up the issue of survival in a dynamically incomplete market environment.
An example with one log-guy and one guy with arbitrary CRRA demon-
strates that even with homogenous beliefs and identical discount factors,
the log-guy will not survive. The issue of survival depends critically on the
3Barberis and Thaler (2002)
4Perfect foresight of equilibrium prices is not incompatible with myopic or time-
inconsistent (HD) behavior.
5The classic reference is Shiller (1981).
6The generality of the result is an issue we need to tackle.
7Individuals with log-utilities always follow the MEL rule.
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assumption of dynamically complete/incomplete markets.
In this work we argue that myopia or HD can be an explanation for the
two phenomena mentioned before. We show that under certain conditions,
myopic or HD maximizers vanish in the long-run. For myopic individuals
we consider the case of symmetric and asymmetric planning horizons. The
latter case is more closely in spirit to the survival literature because dif-
ferent planning horizons translates into differences in rates of impatience.
We provide sufficient conditions such that more myopic individuals dom-
inate over less myopic ones. For the case of hyperbolic discounting we
consider individuals with homogenous hyperbolic parameters, homogenous
rates of impatience and different instantaneous utilities. We provide condi-
tions such that even if individuals are sophisticated, they realize their time-
inconsistency problem, individuals with intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion (IES) equal to one dominate over individuals with (IES) greater than
one. This case is not entirely in the spirit of the survival literature because
individuals differ only in instantaneous utilities. The more interesting case
is to analyze economies populated by time-consistent and time-inconsistent
(HD) individuals. Going back to the literature on survival, the latter case
can be thought as the analog of an economy populated by individuals with
correct (rational guys) and incorrect (irrational guys) beliefs. We do not
pursue this interesting case in this paper. Nevertheless, there are two good
reasons why we should focus first on the case where HD individuals differ
only in instantaneous utilities. The first reason is that even in the case where
HD individuals differ only in instantaneous utilities, long-run survival in the
market is not guaranteed. We must analyze in detail this case if we want
to have a better understanding of more complicated economies populated
by time-consistent and time-inconsistent individuals. The second reason
is related to the literature on time-inconsistency and competitive equilib-
rium. Herings and Rohde (2008) analyze an economy with heterogenous
time-inconsistent individuals. They study existence of competitive equilib-
ria but do not provide any characterization. Krusell et al. (2002), Luttmer
and Mariotti (2003) characterize the competitive equilibrium of an economy
with a representative individual under time-inconsistent preferences. The
characterization of competitive equilibrium under time-inconsistent and het-
erogenous preferences has not been analyzed extensively.
To tackle the problem we focus on a simple framework. We consider an
infinite horizon economy under certainty. There are two individuals with
identical discount factors8 and heterogenous CRRA preferences. There ex-
ist a long-lived asset with a dividend pattern that produces the aggregate
output every period. Importantly, any fluctuations in the dividends of the
8Identical hyperbolic parameters in the case of HD.
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asset are deterministic and follow a stationary pattern9. We will consider
modifications to this set-up by introducing two long-lived assets.
Myopic individuals can be classified into two types depending on the def-
inition of myopic equilibrium we choose to work. Myopic individuals who
mispredict equilibrium asset prices in the future and myopic individuals who
have perfect foresight about equilibrium asset prices. For economies popu-
lated by the former types, the question of long-run survival arises whereas
for economies populated by the latter types, asset prices are characterized
by extreme dynamics. In an economy with one long-lived asset, the only
determinant for long-run survival is the saving behavior of individuals. We
provide sufficient conditions such that for symmetric myopic individuals,
the individual with IES close/or equal to one, log-utilities, will dominate
over the individual with arbitrary CRRA preferences with IES not close/or
equal to one. The sufficient condition requires enough fluctuations in the
dividends of the asset which translates into enough variability in the saving
rates. Myopic individuals with IES close/or equal to one dominate because
their saving rates fluctuate less than the saving rates of myopic individuals
with IES not close to one. Since individuals interchange roles in the asset
market, they are buyers for some periods and sellers for other periods, low
variability in the saving rate translates into higher savings intertemporally.
The crux of the argument is that individuals reoptimize every period in the
light of new information and the saving rate of one individual fluctuates
less than the saving rate of the other individual. Interestingly enough, for
economies populated by asymmetric myopic individuals, we find cases where
the more myopic individual with IES sufficiently close to one dominate over
the less myopic one with IES sufficiently far from one. The reason is similar
to the symmetric case.
Modify the previous set-up by introducing another long-lived asset. In
an economy with two long-lived assets, survival in the market depends on
saving rates and investment behavior. We construct an interesting example
in the spirit of Blume and Easley (1992). There are two extremely10 myopic
investors with identical log-utilities and homogenous discount factors. They
have identical saving rules but follow different portfolio strategies. One of
them invest only in the more productive asset every period and the other
holds a more diversified portfolio. We show that the investor which invests
only in the more productive asset will vanish in the long-run. The interesting
part is that we require both myopia and portfolio rules. In the non-myopic
9This has to be contrasted with the literature in finance, Yan (2008), Branger et al.
(2011) and the references therein, which assume that there is growth in the aggregate
endowment of the economy. As a consequence attitudes towards risk are important de-
terminants for survival under complete markets. Non-survival in the long-run is possible
even when individuals have homogeneous beliefs and equal discount factors.
10They are able to plan only for one period in the future.
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case (benchmark) the non-survival result disappears. Along these lines we
can distinguish between bankruptcy and non-survival. Following the pre-
vious case, there are two long-lived assets and two investors with arbitrary
CRRA preferences. One asset has a constant return, fix it to one for sim-
plicity, and the other asset has a returns that fluctuates every period. We
assume that the asset with constant return is traded by everybody and the
other asset is an endowment of only one investor. We allow the investor
with the extra endowment to short-sell. In the spirit of Longstaff (2009),
one investor has illiquid wealth every period and the asset that is traded
by everybody is the liquid asset. To avoid confusion, the investor with the
extra endowment can trade this endowment since he can short-sell the asset
with the constant return. We simply assume that the illiquid wealth can be
traded through short-sales of the liquid asset. The dynamics of asset trades
can make the investor with illiquid wealth in his portfolio to go bankrupt.
Bankruptcy in that set-up means that the investor hits her nonnegativity
constraint on consumption because the value of her debt in a given planning
horizon is so high and the value of her endowments is not enough to pay
back. Bankruptcy may happen in finite time.
The second phenomenon mentioned before relates to the existence of as-
set price fluctuations that are not explained by fluctuations of asset returns.
To investigate this possibility we will focus on an economy populated by
the second type of myopic individuals. In particular, we will define a per-
fect foresight myopic spot equilibrium (PFMSE). Individuals are myopic but
they have perfect foresight for the future prices they forecast in a planning
horizon. When they wake up in a new planning horizon they have already
forecasted correctly the spot price of that period and all the remaining fu-
ture prices in the planning horizon. The crucial part is that individuals
always observe one more price in the future since they realize that there
is one more period in the future. This new price is key because it is go-
ing to clear the spot market every period. PFMSE is a weak definition of
equilibrium because we require only spot market clearing in every planning
horizon. We will demonstrate that existence of equilibrium is a complicated
task. Nevertheless, we prove existence for certain cases and show that equi-
librium asset prices are strictly increasing even though the dividends of the
asset are constant over time. Asset prices explode in the long-run.
We claimed in the beginning that an economy populated by HD maxi-
mizers is characterized by complicated dynamics in the sense that there is
the possibility of non-survival in the long-run. To analyze this claim we split
HD maximizers into two main categories: naive and sophisticated individu-
als. The former do not realize that their preferences are going to change in
the future whereas the latter do realize it. Since naive individuals do not re-
alize their preference reversal we will use a similar argument as in the myopic
case to analyze non-survival in the long-run. Naive individuals are always
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surprised by realizing that their preferences have changed. They wake up
next period, face a different set of prices and reoptimize. The conclusion
is similar with myopic case. On the other hand, sophisticated individuals
behave in a completely different way. They realize that their preferences
are going to change in the future and take this into account when they
maximize today. In order to solve for the problem of sophisticated individ-
uals we split the individual into different selves indexed by the time period.
Each self chooses how much to consume today and how many units of the
asset to hold for tomorrow given the equilibrium behavior of future selves.
We construct an equilibrium where an individual with IES equal to one,
log-utilities, dominates over an individual with IES greater than one. This
argument does not require deterministic fluctuations in the dividends of the
asset since we fix the latter to one every period.
In section 2 we will analyze two illustrative examples. The first example
is the aforementioned case of two extremely myopic individuals who follow
different portfolio rules. The second example analyzes an economy of two
extremely myopic individuals with different instantaneous utilities. The
individual with IES equal to one, log-utility, dominates over the individual
with IES equal to two. In section 3 we analyze the case of myopia. Lastly,
in section 4 we move to hyperbolic-discounting and the distinction between
naive and sophisticated individuals.
§ 1.2 Two Illustrative Examples
The following examples illustrate some points that we will touch upon in
later sections. We start with the assumption that individuals are myopic
and make only finite plans for the future. The first example illustrates the
idea that myopic behavior coupled with specific investment rules drives one
individual out of the market eventually. The second example illustrates the
fact that in an economy populated by myopic individuals who follow different
saving rules, the individual with IES equal to one, log-utility, dominates over
an individual with IES equal to two, u(c) = 2
√
c.
1.2.1 Myopic behavior, Survival and Portfolio Rules
Consider an economy under certainty that extends to infinity, t = 1, 2, .....
The economy is populated by two investors with identical preferences, log-
utilities, and identical rates of impatience, β < 1. Total output every period
is produced by two long-lived assets, (z, y), with the following pattern of
dividends,
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, ....
and the aggregate output is equal to one every period. Suppose also that
each investor owns one of the assets in the beginning.
Before analyzing the case of myopia, it is important to analyze first the
benchmark case where both investors are fully farsighted. The preferences
of investors in the benchmark case are as follows,
U i =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1 log(xit)
and their budget constraint every period is as follows,
xit + q
z
t z
i
t + q
y
t y
i
t = y
i
t−1(d
y
t + q
y
t ) + z
i
t−1(d
z
t + q
z
t ), ∀t (1.1)
where dt+qt is the dividend return plus the capital value of the asset. Since
investors invest in two assets every period, the no-arbitrage condition takes
the following form,
dzt+1 + q
z
t+1
qzt
=
dyt+1 + q
y
t+1
qyt
(1.2)
which means that the two assets have equal returns. Combining (1),(2),
we can collapse the period by period constraints into an intertemporal con-
straint and maximize lifetime utility subject to the intertemporal constraint
for each investor. We are interested only in the qualitative properties of the
equilibrium in the benchmark case. In particular, since we have considered
a frictionless economy under certainty with no aggregate risk, the aggregate
output is one every period, each investor will equalize her consumption in-
tertemporally. Since each investor starts her life with positive initial wealth
and equalizes her consumption intertemporally, they will consume a posi-
tive fraction of the aggregate output every period. As a consequence, both
investors survive in the long-run. In particular, suppose individual one is
endowed with tree z in the beginning and individual two is endowed with
tree y. We can easily verify that the consumption of each investor is as
follows:
x1 =
1
3 + β
2
3
1 + β
, x2 =
2
3 + β
1
3
1 + β
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Let us move away from the benchmark case and introduce myopic be-
havior. We assume that investors are able to plan for only one period in
the future. They are extremely myopic. When they wake up in a new pe-
riod they realize one more period in the future. It is important to state the
period one problem of each investor,
max
[
log(x11) + β log(x
1
2)
]
, s.t
x11 + q
z
1z
1
1 + q
y
1y
1
1 =
1
3
+ qz1
x12 + q
z
2z
1
2 + q
y
2y
1
2 = (
1
3
+ qy2)y
1
1+
(
2
3
+ qz2)z
1
1
y12 = z
1
2 = 0
max
[
log(x21) + β log(x
2
2)
]
, s.t
x21 + q
z
1z
2
1 + q
y
1y
2
1 =
2
3
+ qy1
x22 + q
z
2z
2
2 + q
y
2y
2
2 = (
1
3
+ qy2)y
2
1+
(
2
3
+ qz2)z
2
1
z22 = y
2
2 = 0
where investor one is endowed with asset y in the beginning and investor
two is endowed with asset z. Investors start their life in period one and are
able to plan only up to period two. As a consequence we have to impose a
transversality condition at the end of period two11. From the viewpoint of
period one, equilibrium asset prices in period two are equal to zero, qz2 =
qy2 = 0. Investors wake up in period two and realize that there is another
period in the future. They realize that equilibrium asset prices, qz2 , q
y
2 , are
not zero as they expected yesterday and face a problem similar to the one
stated above. The same reasoning continues ad infinitum.
From the maximization problem of each investor in period one we realize
that we can not solve uniquely for the asset demands of investors. Using
the no-arbitrage condition (2) we can collapse the two constraints into an
intertemporal and solve for the real allocation. This leaves the asset hold-
ings indeterminate. The indeterminacy of asset holdings is the key to this
example. If we do not break this indeterminacy we can not get uniquely de-
termined asset demands and thus solve recursively for each myopic horizon.
Consider the following rule of thumb that allow us to get uniquely de-
termined dynamics in this case,
Portfolio rule. Investor one invest only in the more productive asset every
period whereas investor two holds a more diversified portfolio.
The intuition behind this rule is quite simple. Whenever investor one ob-
serves that asset z is more productive tomorrow than asset y, 23 >
1
3 , she
invests only in asset z and the opposite when asset y is more productive
11At the optimum solution to the investor’s problem the constraint should be binding
and that is why we state the transversality condition with equality.
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than asset z. Lastly, we must define the equilibrium concept that we use.
We require that investors maximize utility subject to the constraints given
qt and from the viewpoint of period t, markets clear as follows:
∑
i
xit+j = 1,
∑
i
zit+j = 1,
∑
i
yit+j = 1, ∀j, j = 0, 1
Consider following proposition,
Proposition I. Investor one will not survive in the market, x1t → 0 as
t→∞.
Proof. Investor’s one initial wealth in period one is as follows,
w11 = (
1
3
+ qz1)y
z
0
where we have assumed she is endowed with asset z initially. As discussed
before, we can use the no-arbitrage condition (2) and collapse the constraints
into an intertemporal one and maximize utility subject to the intertemporal
constraint. The optimal demand for period one is as follows:
x11 = (1− s11)w11
where s11 is the saving rate of investor one. From the assumption of log-
utilities, s11 = s
1
t = s
1 = β1+β . The portfolio of asset holdings of investor one
is as follows,
qz1z
1
1 + q
y
1y
1
1 = s
1w11 (1.3)
and since there is no uncertainty, expression (3) simply states that asset
holdings are indeterminate. Applying the investment rule discussed before
we can eliminate the indeterminacy and get uniquely determined dynamics.
In particular, investor one will invest only in asset z because it the most
productive according to the productivities in period two, qz1z
1
1 = s
1w11. The
wealth of investor one in period two can be written as follows,
w12 = r
z
2s
1w11 (1.4)
where rz2 =
2
3
+qz2
qz1
is the return of asset z. We can rewrite expression (4) for
any period t as follows,
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w1t+1 = r
H
t+1s
1w1t , ∀t (1.5)
where rHt+1 =
2
3
+qH2
qz1
, is the return of the more (High) productive asset every
period.
The problem of the second investor is similar. The optimum portfolio of
assets for the second investor is as follows,
qzt+1z
2
t+1 + q
y
t+1y
2
t+1 = s
2w2t
where s2 is the saving rate of investor two and from the assumption of log-
utilities, s2 = β1+β . According to the previous investment rule, investor two
holds a more diversified portfolio since she invests in both assets. The wealth
dynamics of investor two can be written as follows,
w2t+1 =
(
αtr
H
t+1 + (1− αt)rLt+1
)
s2w2t (1.6)
where αt+1 is the share of investor’s two initial wealth the she invests in the
more productive asset and 1 − αt+1 the share that she invests in the less
productive asset.
Expressions (4),(6) are the key relations we need in order to show that
the statement in proposition I is true. Consider the ratio of wealth levels
between investor two and investor one,
w2t+1
w1t+1
=
s2w2t
s1w1t
(
αt+1 + (1− αt+1)
rLt+1
rHt+1
)
which can be rewritten as follows,
w2t+1
w1t+1
=
w21
w11
t∏
s=1
(
αs+1 + (1− αs+1)
rLs+1
rHs+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
)
If
w2t+1
w1t+1
→ ∞ as t → ∞, then w1t+1 → 0 and as a consequence x1t → 0. In
other words, we must show that the term in the underbrace is greater than
one for all t. For the term in the underbrace to be greater than one for all
t, it is sufficient to show that
rLt+1
rHt+1
> 1 for all t.
The return on investor’s wealth at t + 1 from the viewpoint of period t
for each asset is as follows,
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rHt|t+1 =
2
3
qHt
=
2
3
β 23
=
1
β
, rLt|t+1 =
1
3
qLt
=
1
3
β 13
=
1
β
(1.7)
and the price of the asset at t + 1 from the viewpoint of period t is equal
to zero. Moreover, the equilibrium asset prices at period t are as follows:
qHt = β
2
3 , q
L
t = β
1
3 . Once investors wake up in period t + 1, they observe
that the more productive asset becomes the less productive according to the
productivities of t+ 2. The returns in (7) modify as follows,
rHt+1 =
2
3 + β
1
3
β 23
< rLt+1 =
1
3 + β
2
3
β 13
Going back to the wealth ratio, the term in the product in the right hand
side is greater than one,
rLt+1
rHt+1
=
rL
rH
> 1⇒ αt+1 + (1− αt+1) r
L
rH
> 1
and
w2t+1
w1t+1
→∞ as t→∞.
The key to the previous result is the myopic behavior of investors and
the specific investment rule we have imposed. Investor one invests only in
the more productive asset from the viewpoint of period t. When she wakes
up in t + 1 she realizes that her investment is the less productive from the
viewpoint of t + 1 and the return on wealth invested at period t is lower
than the return of the other asset. Investor two dominates in the long-run
because she invests in a portfolio with higher returns.
This example is in the spirit of Blume and Easley (1992). They show that
if investors follow the same saving rules, then an investor with log-utilities
dominates regardless of the portfolio rules used by any other investor. In
this example we showed that even in the case of identical preferences, log-
utilities, and identical saving rules, there are investment rules that dominate
the market.
1.2.2 Myopic behavior, Survival and Saving Rules
The main set-up is similar to the previous example with some modifications.
There are two individuals with different instantaneous utilities,
u1(x) = 2
√
x, u2(x) = log(x)
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and identical rates of impatience, β < 1. There is one long-lived asset with
the following pattern of dividends,
1
3
,
2
3
,
1
3
,
2
3
,
1
3
, .....
which means that aggregate output is either 13 or
2
3 .
Let us comment first on the benchmark case before moving to myopic
behavior. The preferences of individual i in the fully farsighted case are as
follows
U i =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1ui(xit)
and the period by period budget constraint is as follows
xit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(dt + qt), ∀t
We are interested in the qualitative properties of the equilibrium and not
in an explicit solution. Consider the following three facts. First, markets
are complete so that individuals maximize lifetime utility subject to the
intertemporal constraint. Second, individuals have identical rates of impa-
tience. Lastly, the dividends of the asset follow a cyclical deterministic pat-
tern. There is no growth in the aggregate output. Combining the previous
three facts we can conclude that both individuals survive in the long-run.
Consider the case of myopia. Suppose individuals are extremely myopic
and are able to plan only for one period in the future. Their preferences are
described by the following expressions,
u1t (x
1
t , x
1
t+1) = 2
√
x1t + 2β
√
x1t+1
u2t (x
2
t , x
2
t+1) = log(x
2
t ) + β log(x
2
t+1)
The following diagram describes how this economy evolves through time,
(t, t+ 1), (t+ 1, t+ 2), (t+ 2, t+ 3), (t+ 3, t+ 4), ....
At period t individuals can only perceive and plan up to period t+1. When
they wake up at period t+1, they get a surprise and realize there is another
period, t + 2. As a consequence they reoptimize. When they wake up at
t+ 2, they realize there is again another period, t+ 3 and reoptimize again.
The typical maximization problems of individuals in every sequence of
two period economies are as follows,
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maxu1t , s.t
x1t + qty
1
t = y
1
t−1(dt + qt)
x1t+1 + qt+1y
1
t+1 = (dt+1 + qt+1)y
1
t
y1t+1 > 0
maxu2t , s.t
x2t + qty
2
t = y
2
t−1(dt + qt)
x2t+1 + qt+1y
2
t+1 = (dt+1 + qt+1)y
2
t
y2t+1 > 0
At the optimum solution to the above problems, yit+1 = 0. The definition
of equilibrium is the same as in the previous example. Thus, in equilibrium
qt+1 = 0.
The optimal demands of individual one in every sequence of two period
economies are as follows,
x1t =
y1t−1(dt + qt)
1 + β2 dt+1qt
x1t+1 =
β2(
qt
dt+1
)2 y1t−1(dt + qt)
1 + β2 dt+1qt
and for individual two,
x2t =
y2t−1(dt + qt)
1 + β
x2t+1 =
β
qt
dt+1
y2t−1(dt + qt)
1 + β
From market clearing, x1t + x
2
t = dt, we compute the price of the asset, qt,
as follows,
qt =
−(dty1t−1 +
y2t−1
1+β (dt + β
2dt+1)− dt)
2(y1t−1 +
y2t−1
1+β )
+
√
(dty1t−1 +
y2t−1
1+β (dt + β
2dt+1)− dt)2 + 4(y1t−1 +
y2t−1
1+β )β
2dtdt+1(1− y
2
t−1
1+β )
2(y1t−1 +
y2t−1
1+β )
(1.8)
Assume also that β = 0.9 and individuals start with initial units of the
asset, δi = 0.5. We will show that the following proposition is true,
Proposition II. Individual one will not survive in the market, x1t → 0 as
t→∞.
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Consider first the following table which shows the dynamics of asset
prices and the dynamics of asset holdings of the log-guy,
Table 1.1: Market Dynamics
x2t qt y
2
t
0.187057 0.377517 0.445944
0.266701 0.469823 0.510895
0.19079 0.376233 0.456395
0.273331 0.471282 0.521977
0.194572 0.374911 0.467083
0.280111 0.472792 0.533214
. . .
. . .
and this table will become useful in a few paragraphs.
In order to prove proposition II, we have to analyze the savings behavior
of both individuals. Consider the asset demands of each individual
y2t = y
2
t−1
dt,k + qt
qt
β
1 + β︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2t,j
(1.9)
y1t = y
1
t−1
dt,k + qt
qt
β2
(
qt
dt+1,j
)− 1
2
1 + β2
(
qt
dt+1,j
)− 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
s1t,j
, k 6= j, k, j = H,L (1.10)
where the subscripts k, j keeps track the cyclicality of dividends. Whether it
is H or L, 23 or
1
3 respectively. Also, s
i
t,j is the saving rate of each individual.
Solving recursively (9),(10) we get
yi∞ =
1
2
∞∏
t=1
dt,k + qt
qt
dt+1,j + qt+1
qt+1
sit,ks
i
t+1,j (1.11)
and 12 are the initial units of the asset. Consider the ratio of asset holdings
of individual two over individual one,
y2∞
y1∞
=
∞∏
t=1
s2t,ks
2
t+1,j
s1t,ks
1
t+1,j
(1.12)
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To prove proposition II, we have to show that y
2∞
y1∞
→ ∞. If y2∞
y1∞
→ ∞, then
by market clearing, y1t + y
2
t = 1,∀t, y1∞ → 0 and y2∞ → 1. If y1∞ → 0 then
x1t → 0 as t→∞.
Rewritte the term in the product of the right-hand side of (12) as follows,
β2
(1 + β)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2t,ks
2
t+1,j
−
β2
(
qt
dt+1,H
)− 1
2
1 + β2
(
qt
dt+1,H
)− 1
2
β2
(
qt+1
dt+2,L
)− 1
2
1 + β2
(
qt+1
dt+2,L
)− 1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
s1t,ks
1
t+1,j
= t,t+1 (1.13)
If t,t+1 > 0,∀t, then s
2
t,ks
2
t+1,j
s1t,ks
1
t+1,j
> 1, ∀t. If we can show that the dynamics of
this economy imply that
s2t,ks
2
t+1,j
s1t,ks
1
t+1,j
> 1, ∀t, then the RHS of (12) diverges to
infinity and we will have proven proposition II.
Consider the following figure which graphs condition (13) for all values
of y2H , y
2
L
12,
12We have substituted expression (8) of equilibrium asset price in (13). The LHS of (13)
becomes a function of initial asset holdings that each individual starts each new planning
horizon, yiH , y
i
L. From market clearing,
∑
i y
i = 1, we can express the LHS of (13) as
function of initial asset holdings of individual two, y2H , y
2
L.
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Figure 1.1
where in the horizontal axis we have y2L and in the vertical y
2
H . In the shaded
light blue region, t,t+1 > 0. Go back to table 1. Consider the first two points
of asset holdings in low and high periods respectively, (0.445944, 0.510895).
We start somewhere in the middle of the box inside the shaded blue region.
Since we started from low and then high, the next period is low again. From
(13) and the figure above we know that the log-guy is going to end up with
more than 0.445944 units of the tree he had in the low period he started.
We get 0.456395. Next, consider (0.510895, 0.456395) which are the asset
holdings of high and low periods. The next period is going to be high.
Since we are inside the shaded region, the log-guy is going to end up with
more that 0.510895 units of the asset. We get 0.521977. Continuing with
this algorithm we see that the movements of asset holdings move from the
middle to the upper RHS of the box.
Although the above figure shows that in the blue region t,t+1 > 0, we
have to do more work in order to prove proposition II. In particular, we have
to show that as t→∞, t,t+1 does not converge to zero. If t,t+1 > 0 ∀t but
converges to zero, then from expression (12), y
2∞
y1∞
9∞, and both individuals
survive in the long-run. Consider the following figure,
Figure 1.2
Figure 2 depicts the contour plots of t,t+1. As we move from the LHS to
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the RHS of the box, t,t+1 increases
13. Since we start form the middle of
the box and move to the right, t,t+1 is always positive and increases. It will
never converge to zero.
The key to the above result is the saving behavior of individuals and
the time-inconsistency of optimal plans. Individual one is eliminated in the
long-run because she saves less than the log-guy. By construction, the log-
individual is a seller of the asset in planning horizons where the dividend
pattern is (t, t + 1) = (13 ,
2
3) and a buyer in planning horizons where the
dividend pattern is ((23 ,
1
3). The dominance of the log-individual over indi-
vidual two is not obvious. The important aspect is that the log-guy follows
a constant saving rule. She saves β1+β fraction of her initial wealth every
period. In the planning horizons where the log-guy is a buyer, she acquires
more units of the asset than individual one but in the horizons where she is
a seller she does not sell enough because she follows a constant saving rule.
The net effect is that
s2t,ks
2
t+1,j
s1t,ks
1
t+1,j
> 1, ∀t.
The fact that the saving behavior of individuals drives the non-survival
result is because of myopia14. Myopic behavior implies time-inconsistency
of optimal plans. Every time individuals wake up in a new planning horizon
they reoptimize. They perceive one more period in the future and they
realize that the price of the asset in the market is not zero as they thought
according to yesterday’s plan. This is the difference with the benchmark
case and that is why some saving rules may dominate over others.
1.2.3 A comment on the two examples
The previous examples illustrated two mechanisms under which some myopic
investors/individuals are eliminated in the long-run. In the first example
investors followed identical saving rules but invested in different portfolios
whereas in the second example individuals invested in the same portfolio,
one asset, but followed different saving rules. We will analyze these two
cases in the next section.
§ 1.3 Myopic Behavior
Let us analyze first myopic behavior and then proceed to the other form of
time-inconsistency which is hyperbolic discounting. Myopic individuals can
be split into two main categories: myopic individuals who have perfect fore-
sight about equilibrium and myopic individuals who make wrong forecasts
about equilibrium prices. The following tree describes the cases we analyze
in this section.
13The colors in the figure become lighter
14Extreme myopia in that case.
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Incorrect forecasts
about equilibrium
prices
Myopic Individuals
Correct forecasts
about equilibrium
prices
Heterogeneous
saving rules,
No portfolio
decisions
Heterogeneous
portfolio rules
Symmetric
myopia
Asymmetric
myopia
Symmetric
myopia
Symmetric
myopia
Heterogeneous
saving rules,
No portfolio
decisions
Figure 1.3
1.3.1 Myopic individuals with incorrect forecasts
The analysis in this section follows closely the two examples analyzed before.
In particular, we start first with the environment described in the second
example. Individuals do not have a portfolio decision to make but follow
different saving rules. We focus attention to the case when individuals have
different planning horizons, asymmetric myopia. We provide sufficient con-
ditions such that more myopic individuals dominate over less myopic ones.
Next, we go back to the first example and consider the case where two in-
vestors follow different portfolio rules. We show that certain portfolio rules
lead some investors to bankruptcy. We will compare the phenomenon of
non-survival in the long-run with that of bankruptcy.
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1.3.1.1 Myopic behavior, Survival and Saving Rules
The main set-up is similar to that of the second example. There are two
individuals with heterogenous CRRA preferences,
u1(x) =
x1−a1
1− a1
u2(x) =
x1−a2
1− a2
where a1, a2 > 0 and a1 6= a2. There is one long-lived asset with a dividend
structure, dt, t = 1, 2, .., that follows a cyclical deterministic pattern
15.
Aggregate output every period is equal to dt.
Let us analyze again the benchmark case where individuals are fully
farsighted. The lifetime utility of individuals is as follows,
U i =
∞∑
t=1
βt−1
x1−a
i
t
1− ai
and the period by period budget constraint is as follows
xit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(dt + qt), ∀t (1.14)
We can take the constraints in (14) and collapse them into an intertem-
poral constraint. Individuals maximize utility subject to the intertemporal
constraint. The FOCs of individuals are as follows,
βt−1
(
xit
)−αi
= λiRt, i = 1, 2 (1.15)
where Rt is the present-value price of the good at period t from the viewpoint
of period one,
Rt = 1× q1
d2 + q2
× q2
d3 + q3
××× qt
dt+1 + qt+1
, R1 = 1
Combine individuals FOCs as follows
(x1t )
−α1
(x2t )
−α2 =
λ1
λ2
(1.16)
15 For example, there are periods that the dividends take high values and period that
take low values and this pattern keeps repeating.
24 Chapter 1. Myopia, Time-Inconsistency and Financial Markets
and good’s market clearing is as follows
x1t + x
2
t = dt, ∀t (1.17)
Combine (16),(17) we get
x1t + (x
1
t )
α1
α2
(
λ1
λ2
) 1
α2
= dt, or (1.18)
x2t + (x
2
t )
α2
α1
(
λ2
λ1
) 1
α1
= dt (1.19)
From (18),(19) we can conclude that both individuals survive in the long-
run. Expression (18) or (19) are time-dependent only if the d′ts are time-
dependent. Since we have assumed that the d′ts follow a cyclical determin-
istic pattern, individual i will consume the same amount of the good every
time the d′s are the same.
Let us move to the case of myopia. We focus first on the case of symmet-
ric myopia in order to explain the main methodology and then we move to
the more interesting case of asymmetric myopia. Suppose both individuals
plan for T periods in the future. Every time they wake up in a new period,
they realize another period in the future and reoptimize. Individuals revise
their price forecasts that were held in the previous planning horizon and
make a different plan than the one made yesterday.
Consider the problem of each individual in every planning horizon, t→
t+ T ,
max
[
t+T∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−ais
1− ai
]
, s.t
xit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(dt + qt)
.
.
xit+T + qt+T y
i
t+T = (qt+T + dt+T )y
i
t+T−1
yit+T = 0
Individuals make a plan from the viewpoint of period t up to period t+ T .
They forecast prices up to period t + T and decide how many units of
the asset to buy in each period. The crucial assumption is the retrading
argument implicit in the maximization above. Individuals will never stick
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to the plan they make in a particular planning horizon. They wake up in
a new planning horizon and revise their consumption and asset purchases
made in the previous planning horizon.
To solve the previous problem we either consider the intertemporal con-
straint or substitute xit from the period by period constraints into the ob-
jective function. The FOC between t, t+ 1 is as follows,
qt(x
i
t)
−αi = β(dt+1 + qt+1)(xit+1)
−αi
The optimal demands from the viewpoint of period t are as follows,
xit =
yit−1(dt + qt)
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
aiR
ai−1
ai
t+j
, xit+j = x
i
t
β
j
αi
R
1/αi
t+j
, j = 1, .., T (1.20)
where Rt+j are the present-value prices from the viewpoint of t,
Rt+j = 1× qt
dt+1 + qt+1
× qt+1
dt+1 + qt+2
××× qt+j
dt+j+1 + qt+j+1
More importantly, the optimal asset holdings of each individual in every
actual period t are as follows
yit = y
i
t−1
qt + dt
qt
∑T
j=1 β
j
aiR
ai−1
ai
t+j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
aiR
ai−1
ai
t+j︸ ︷︷ ︸
sit
(1.21)
where sit is the saving rate of individual i in every actual period t.
Before moving to the main part of this section, consider the following
definition of an Incorrect Forecasts Myopic Equilibrium (IFME)
IFME. Fix a planning horizon, t → t + T . A pair ((q∗t+k)T−1k=0 , (x∗t+j)j=Tj=0 )
constitutes an Incorrect Forecasts Myopic Equilibrium if
• Individuals maxU it s.t b.c given (q∗t+k)T−1k=0
• Markets clear: ∑i xit+j = dt+j, ∑i yit+k = 1, for all j = 0, .., T , k =
0, 1, ..T − 1
The previous definition of equilibrium has an unappealing feature: individ-
uals revise their price forecasts every period. We will demonstrate that
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myopic behavior and perfect foresight requires more work for the existence
of equilibrum.
In the example of section 2.2 we proved that individual one will vanish
in the long-run because the ratio of the product of saving rates between low
and high periods tended to infinity, expression (12). To analyze the condi-
tions for non-survival we will focus on expression (21), which describes the
asset demands of each individual in every actual period t. The difficulty
with expression (21) is that it depends on asset prices. In particular, on
present-value prices. If we knew something about the behavior of equilib-
rium present-value prices, we could compare the saving rates of individuals
as in the example of section 2.2. Thus, the first issue we have to tackle is
to characterize the movements of equilibrium present-value prices for the
previous simple economy.
Consider the following claim,
Claim I. Equilibrium present value prices, from the viewpoint of period t,
belong to the following intervals,
Rt+j ∈
[
βj
(
dt
dt+j
)α−i
, βj
(
dt
dt+j
)αi]
, j = 1, ..., T
Proof. Suppose the previous economy is populated by only one of the two
individuals. We can compute the no-trade equilibrium prices, and present-
value prices, of the representative individual economy. From the optimal
demands in (20) and the good’s market clearing every period, we get that
Rit+j = β
j
(
dt
dt+j
)αi
where the subscript i in the present-value price means that we solve for the
representative individual economy with each individual i.
Let us go back to the original economy with two individuals. Suppose
an equilibrium exist in every planning horizon. Consider the good’s market
clearing in period t+ j using the optimal demands in (20),
(
x1t
)∗ β jα1(
R
1/α1
t+j
)∗ + (x2t)∗ β jα2(
R
1/α2
t+j
)∗ = dt+j (1.22)
where
(
xit
)∗
is the equilibrium consumption demand in period t and R∗t+j
is the equilibrium present-value price for consumption in t + j from the
viewpoint of period t. Rewrite (22) as follows,
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(
x1t
)∗ β jα1(
R
1/α1
t+j
)∗ + (x2t)∗ β jα2(
R
1/α2
t+j
)∗ = dt+jdt
[(
x1t
)∗
+
(
x2t
)∗
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=dt
]
(1.23)
which is an equivalent way of writing (22). Rewrite (23) as follows,
(
x1t
)∗[ β jα1(
R
1/α1
t+j
)∗ − dt+jdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
+
(
x2t
)∗[ β jα2(
R
1/α2
t+j
)∗ − dt+jdt︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
= 0 (1.24)
Consider the terms in the underbrace. Since we have assumed that an
equilibrium exist, it must be that the terms in the underbrace have different
signs. If present-value prices do not belong to the intervals mentioned in
the claim above, then (24) is not true and this contradicts equilibrium in
each planning horizon which we have assumed initially. For present-value
prices that do not belong to the intervals mentioned before, the terms in the
underbrace have the same sign.
The previous claim give us enough information to characterize the con-
sumption dynamics in this economy. Consider the saving rate of each indi-
vidual in every actual period t,
sit =
∑T
j=1 β
j
aiR
ai−1
ai
t+j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
aiR
ai−1
ai
t+j
(1.25)
Since the saving rate of each individual depends on the present-value prices,
we can exploit the fact that equilibrium present-value prices are bounded. In
particular, we can use the endpoints of the intervals in the above claim and
consider the smallest or the highest possible value that (25) can take. To
understand the usefulness of the latter statement, suppose that the dividends
of the asset follow a pattern that repeats every m+m
′
periods,
d1, d2, ..., dm︸ ︷︷ ︸
m periods
, dm+1, dm+2, ..., dm′︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′ periods
, d1, d2, ..., dm︸ ︷︷ ︸
m periods
, ...... (1.26)
We will prove that there exists an  > 0 such that the following inequality
is true,
y1
t+m+m′/y
1
t
y2
t+m+m′
/y2t
=
∏t+m+m′
t s
1
t∏t+m+m′
t s
2
t
> 1 + , ∀t (1.27)
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Since the dividend pattern repeats as in (26), each individual at period t
will face the same dividend structure at t+m+m
′
. If (27) is true and we
consider also asset market clearing, y1t + y
2
t = 1, the following is also true,
y1
t+m+m′ > y
1
t , y
2
t+m+m′ < y
2
t , ∀t (1.28)
Given the previous discussion, consider the following proposition,
Proposition III. If there exists an  > 0 such that (27) is true, then
individual 2 will vanish in the long-run.
Proof. We want to show that the ratio of actual saving rates between indi-
vidual 1 and 2 tends to infinity,
y1∞
y2∞
=
y11
y21
∞∏
t=1
s1t
s2t
→∞
and from asset market clearing, y2∞ → 0. If (27) is true, we know that the
ratio of the product of saving rates every m+m
′
periods is bounded below
by 1 +  for all t. We can rewrite the previous infinite product as follows,
s1t ××s2t+m+m′
s2t ××s2t+m+m′︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1+
s1
t+1+m+m′ ××s2t+1+2(m+m′ )
s2
t+1+m+m′
××× s2
t+1+2(m+m′ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1+
××
Since the terms that repeat every m + m
′
periods are bounded below by
1 + , then y
1∞
y2∞
→∞.
To show that (27) is true, we will take advantage of the fact that present-
value prices are bounded in any equilibrium of the above economy. Focusing
first on symmetric myopia, consider the following utility functions for both
individuals,
u1(x) = log(x), u2(x) =
x1−α2
1− a2 , α
2 > 0, α2 6= 1
Consider the dividend pattern of (26). The actual saving rate of the log-guy
every period is constant
s1t =
∑T
j=1 β
j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
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whereas the saving rate of individual two depends on present-value prices,
s2t =
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
t+j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
t+j
(1.29)
From Claim I, we can consider the highest present-value prices in any equi-
librium and compute the highest possible value that the saving rate of indi-
vidual two in (29) can take as follows,
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dt
dt+j
)αi)a2−1a2
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dt
dt+j
)αi)a2−1a2 >
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
t+j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
t+j
, ∀t, i = 1 or 2
(1.30)
where the LHS of (30) is the highest possible value that the saving rate of
individual two can take in any equilibrium and the RHS is the actual value
that the saving rate of individual two takes in any myopic equilibrium. The
next step is to compare the product of the saving rates of each individual
for m+m
′
periods,
∑T
j=1 β
j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
×××
∑T
j=1 β
j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
m+m′ times
>
m+m
′∏
k=1
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2 >
m+m
′∏
k=1
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
k+j
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2R
a2−1
a2
k+j
(1.31)
where the subscript k keeps track of the cyclical pattern of dividends whereas
the subscript j measures the length of the planning horizon. If (31) is true,
then there exists an  > 0 such that (27) is true and as a consequence
proposition III applies.
Finally, we have to find conditions such that (31) is true. Suppose first
that α2 > 1. Suppose also that there exists at least one planning horizon
where dkdk+j < 1, j = 1, .., T . This means that the dividend of the asset
today is lower that the dividends of the asset in all the future periods of
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the planning horizon from the viewpoint of today. Observe also that all the
terms in (31) enter multiplicative and the saving rate of each individual can
not exceed one. Injecting enough fluctuations in the dividend pattern of the
asset, we reduce dkdk+j as much as we want for all j in the planning horizon
in question. Thus, we can lower as much as we want the highest possible
value the saving rate of individual 2 can take in that planning horizon and
as a consequence satisfy the first inequality in (31).
Fix 0 < α2 < 1. Suppose again that there exists at least one planning
horizon where dkdk+j > 1, j = 1, .., T . This means that the dividend of the
asset today is higher that the dividends of the asset in all the future periods
of the planning horizon from the viewpoint of today. Injecting enough fluc-
tuations in the dividend pattern of the asset, we increase dkdk+j as much as we
want for all j in the planning horizon in question. The previous argument
applies in that case as well.
To sum up, suppose we have a dividend pattern that repeats as in (26).
Suppose also we have periods that the dividend returns are low followed by
periods that returns are high and periods that the returns are high followed
by periods that returns are low. This can be thought as periods where the
economy is booming and periods when the economy is in a contraction. We
can inject enough fluctuations between low and high periods and satisfy (31).
Lastly, we have assumed that individual one has log-utilities, intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) equal to one. Expression (31) holds true even
if individual one has IES not equal but close to one. The following proposi-
tion summarizes the previous discussion
Proposition IV. Consider the case of symmetric myopia. Suppose indi-
vidual one has IES close or equal to one, log-utility, and individual two has
IES different than one. If either one of the following two conditions apply:
• β is high and we inject enough fluctuations between low and high pe-
riods in the dividend pattern of the asset.
• β is low and we require more fluctuations between low and high periods
in the dividend pattern of the asset than the previous case.
then there exists an  > 0 such that (31) is true.
Let us proceed to the case of asymmetric myopia . In the previous
paragraphs we analyzed the long-run dynamics of the economy when individ-
uals have the same planning horizons. We have reduced the characterization
of equilibrium into a simple condition, expression (31). The latter approach
will prove to be useful in the case of asymmetric myopia.
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To motivate the issue of asymmetric myopia, consider the following sce-
nario:
max
t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α1s
1− α1 , s.t
x1t + qty
1
t = y
1
t−1(dt + qt)
x1t+1 + qt+1y
1
t+1 = y
1
t (dt+1 + qt+1)
y1t+1 ≥ 0
max
t+2∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α2s
1− α2 , s.t
x2t + qty
2
t = y
2
t−1(dt + qt)
x2t+1 + qt+1y
2
t+1 = y
2
t (dt+1 + qt+1)
x2t+2 + qt+2y
2
t+2 = (qt+2 + dt+2)y
2
t+1
y2t+2 ≥ 0
Individual one is extremely myopic whereas individual two plans for two
periods in the future. Before analyzing this case further, we have to comment
on the terminal conditions in the above maximization problems. The crucial
part for existence of an Incorrect Forecast Asymmetric Myopic Equilibrium
(IFAME) is the terminal condition we have imposed to the extreme myopic
individual. We do not allow individual one to die with debt at the end of
her horizon. In particular, if individual one could die with debt at the end
of every planning horizon then there could be no equilibrium. The terminal
conditions we require in the asymmetric myopic case are not different than
the transversality conditions we require in any finite horizon economy where
individuals accumulate assets every period. In the latter economy, if we do
not impose a condition which states that individuals do not die with debt,
we do not get existence of equilibrium.
Let us go back to the two maximization problems above. The terminals
conditions are binding and as a consequence qt+2 = 0 in equilibrium from
the viewpoint of t. The question that we seek to answer in that case is the
following:
Question. Do there exist parameter values which imply that individual two
will not survive in the long-run even though she is more farsighted than
individual one?
To understand why the previous question is not trivial, consider the
saving rates of each individual every actual period t,
s1t =
β
1
α1R
α1−1
α1
t+1
1 + β
1
α1R
α1−1
α1
t+1
s2t =
β
1
α2R
α2−1
α2
t+1 + β
2
α2R
α2−1
α2
t+2
1 + β
1
α2R
α2−1
α2
t+1 + β
2
α2R
α2−1
α2
t+2
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where Rt+1 =
qt
dt+1+qt+1
, Rt+2 =
qt
dt+1+qt+1
qt+1
dt+2
, are the present-value prices
from the viewpoint of period t. The saving rate of individual two reflects
the second period that she plans in the future. Thus, her saving rate has
an additional term compared to the saving rate of individual one. For this
reason, the previous question is not trivial.
Following the same argument as in claim I, the equilibrium present-value
prices from the viewpoint of period t belong to the following intervals,
Rt+1 ∈
[
β
(
dt
dt+1
)α−i
, β
(
dt
dt+1
)αi]
, Rt+2 ∈
[
0, β2
(
dt
dt+2
)α2]
, i = 1, 2
where the zero in the second interval comes from the fact that if we solve
for the representative individual economy with individual one, Rt+2 = 0
because individual one is extremely myopic. Lastly, consider the following
dividend pattern which allows explicit computations,
γ, δ, ︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
, γ
′
, δ
′
, 
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, γ, δ, ︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
, γ
′
, δ
′
, 
′︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, ....
γ
′
> δ
′
> 
′
>  > δ > γ > 0 (1.32)
The following proposition states sufficient conditions such that the more
farsighted individual will vanish in the long-run,
Proposition V. Fix α2 > α1 = 1 and β = 1. If α2 is sufficiently high and
we inject enough fluctuations across low and high periods in (32), then there
exists an ε > 0 such that the following is true∏t+5
t s
1
t∏t+5
t s
2
t
> 1 + ε, ∀t
Proof. Since the dividend pattern repeats every six periods, consider the
following expression which is analogous to (31),
1
2
××1
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
6 times
>
6∏
k=1
∑2
j=1
((
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2
1 +
∑2
j=1
((
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2 (1.33)
and suppose for k = 1 we start from γ in the dividend pattern of (32). Also,
the RHS of (32) is the maximum value that the saving rate of individual two
can potentially take. Consider the following figure which shows that (32) is
true
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Figure 1.4
where in the horizontal axis we depict α1 = 1 and in the vertical axis α2.
Also, we have considered the following values for the dividend of the asset
γ = 0.1, δ = 0.5,  = 1, γ
′
= 14, δ
′
= 11, 
′
= 9
and we can play around with the dividend pattern. In the blue region, (32)
holds true. If (32) holds true, then the RHS of (32) is always higher than
the actual equilibrium product of saving rates for any six periods in a row.
This proves the proposition.
The previous proposition implies that the more farsighted individual
vanishes in the long-run and as a consequence only the more myopic in-
dividual survives. The next step is to discuss the sufficient conditions we
imposed in proposition V. To understand the latter conditions consider the
more general formula of expression (33),
∑T ′
j=1 β
j
1 +
∑T ′
j=1 β
j
×××
∑T ′
j=1 β
j
1 +
∑T ′
j=1 β
j︸ ︷︷ ︸
m+m′ times
>
m+m
′∏
k=1
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2
1 +
∑T
j=1 β
j
a2
(
βj
(
dk
dk+j
)αi)a2−1a2
(1.34)
and T
′
< T . We have set α1 = 1 and we fix again α2 > 1. Individual
one, the log-guy, plans for T
′
periods in the future whereas individual two
plans for T periods in the future. The sufficient conditions we require such
that the more farsighted individual vanishes in the long-run are analogous
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to the ones in proposition IV with some important differences. Firstly, we
focus on the case where α2 > 1. The reason is that on the RHS of (34), we
consider the maximum value that the saving rate of individual two can take
in any period. For α2 < 1, in order to get the maximum possible value of
the RHS of (34) we have to set the present-value prices for some periods at
their smallest values they can take in any equilibrium. The smallest value
that equilibrium present-value prices could take in some periods is simply
zero. This comes from the fact that equilibrium present value prices are
bounded between the no-trade present value prices when we consider that
the economy is populated by only one of the two individuals. The following
proposition describes the sufficient conditions we require such that the more
farsighted individual will vanish in the long-run,
Proposition VI. Consider the case of asymmetric myopia. Suppose α1 = 1
and α2 > 1. If either one of the following two conditions apply:
• β is high, α2 is sufficiently high and we require more fluctuations be-
tween low and high periods in the dividend pattern of the asset than
proposition IV
• β is low, α2 is sufficiently high and we require more fluctuations be-
tween low and high periods in the dividend pattern of the asset than
the previous bullet point.
then expression (34) holds true.
1.3.1.2 Myopic behavior, Survival/Bankruptcy and Investment
Rules
In the previous section we showed that in an economy with no role for
investment in assets, heterogenous saving behavior could drive more far-
sighted individuals out of the market eventually. Although this is interest-
ing enough, the fact that individuals do not invest in various assets is a
limitation. Certain investment rules may have interesting implications for
the long-run dynamics in myopic economies as illustrated in example 2.1.
In this section we consider a similar set-up as in the example of 2.1 but we
abstract from log-utilities and consider arbitrary CRRA preferences.
Suppose there are two assets in the economy, (z, y), with the following
pattern of dividends,
y → 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, .....
z → dL, dH , dL, dH , ......
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We will state two equivalent interpretations for the set-up in example
2.1. The first interpretation follows closely the argument of the example in
section 2.1. There are two long-lived assets in the economy with the previous
pattern of returns. The maximization problem of the two investors in period
one are as follows
max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α1s
1− α1
]
, s.t
x11 + q
z
1z
1
1 + q
y
1y
1
1 = y
1
0(1 + q
y
1)
x12 + q
z
2z
1
2 + q
y
2y
1
2 = z
1
1(dH + q
z
2)+
y11(1 + q
y
2)
z12 = y
1
2 = 0
max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α2s
1− α2
]
, s.t
x21 + q
z
1z
2
1 + q
y
1y
2
1 = dL + q
z
1+
y20(1 + q
y
1)
x22 + q
z
2z
2
2 + q
y
2y
2
2 = z
2
1(dH + q
z
2)+
y21(1 + q
y
2)
z22 = y
2
2 = 0
where we have assumed that investor two starts her life with all the units
of the asset z and y20 units of asset y. Investor one starts her life with y
1
0
units of asset y. Following the same argument as in example 2.1, we need
to specify a rule to break the indeterminacy of portfolio holdings in order
to get uniquely determined dynamics. Suppose we interpret asset y as the
safe asset and asset z as the risky asset16. In this section we will analyze
the implications of the following portfolio rule
Investment Rule. Investor one invests only in the safe asset whereas in-
vestor two invests in a portfolio which includes the risky asset as well.
Given this rule, we can analyze the dynamics of the previous economy. Un-
like the example in 2.1, consider the second interpretation of the previous
economy which is given by the following maximization problems of the two
investors in period one
max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α1s
1− α1
]
, s.t
x11 + q1y
1
1 = y
1
0(1 + q1)
x12 + q2y
1
2 = y
1
1(1 + q2)
y12 = 0
max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α2s
1− α2
]
, s.t
x21 + q1y
2
1 = y
2
0(1 + q1) + dL
x22 + q2y
2
2 = y
2
1(1 + q2) + dH
y21 ≥ −dH , y22 = 0
16The distinction between safe and risky assets is sloppy because there is no risk in the
standard sense.
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The second interpretation states that there is one long-lived asset in the
economy and that investor two is endowed with extra units of the good
every period. These two economies give equivalent allocations. Consider
the first economy. The no-arbitrage condition between asset y and z is as
follows,
qzt = dkq
y
t , k = H,L
and using the no-arbitrage and the previous investment rule, we get the
intertemporal constraints of both investors in each planning horizon as fol-
lows,
x1t + q
y
t x
1
t+1 = y
1
t−1(1 + qt)
x2t + q
y
t x
2
t+1 = y
2
t−1(1 + qt) + dk + q
y
t dk′︸ ︷︷ ︸
=qzt
, k, k
′
= H,L
Consider the second economy. The intertemporal constraints, given that the
debt constraints are not binding, are as follows,
x1t + qtx
1
t+1 = y
1
t−1(1 + qt)
x2t + qtx
2
t+1 = y
2
t−1(1 + qt) + dk + qtdk′ , k, k
′
= H,L
and we immediately observe that the intertemporal constraints for the two
economies are the same. Thus, the allocations are equivalent. The previous
distinction is useful because we can justify the economy where we need an
ad hoc rule to break the indeterminacy of portfolio holdings with a simpler
economy with one asset and endowments.
For the rest of the talk in this section let us focus on the second econ-
omy. Before moving to more details, we can give another interpretation to
the previous investment rule. Suppose asset z is the illiquid asset in the
economy and asset y is the liquid asset17. The illiquid asset can be traded
only through short-sales of the liquid asset. The following results can be
interpreted under the distinction liquid/illiquid assets or risky/safe assets.
Let us rewrite the maximization problem of investors given that we focus
on the second economy,
17For instance, the liquid asset represents corporate equity whereas the illiquid asset
represent non corporate equity such as returns from privately owned firms. The distinction
between liquid and illiquid assets follows Longstaff (2009).
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max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α1s
1− α1
]
, s.t
x1t + qty
1
t = y
1
t−1(1 + qt)
x1t+1 + qt+1y
1
t+1 = y
1
t (1 + qt+1)
y1t+1 = 0
max
[ t+1∑
s=t
βs−t
x1−α2s
1− α2
]
, s.t
x2t + qty
2
t = y
2
t−1(1 + qt) + dk
x22 + qt+1y
2
2 = y
2
t (1 + qt+1) + dk′
y2t ≥ −dk′ , y2t+1 = 0
and since in equilibrium18 qt+1 = 0, the debt constraint takes the previous
form. The optimal asset demands are as follows,
y1t = y
1
t−1
1 + qt
qt
β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t
1 + β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t
(1.35)
y2t =
β
1
α2 q
α2−1
α2
t
1 + β
1
α2 q
α2−1
α2
t
[
y2t−1
1 + qt
qt
+
dk − β−
1
α2 q
1
α2
t dk′
qt
]
(1.36)
To proceed with the analysis further, we need to say something about the
characterization of equilibrium asset prices as we did before. Consider the
following claim,
Claim II. The equilibrium asset prices belong to the following intervals
qt ∈
[
β
(
1 + dk
1 + dk′
)a−i
, β
(
1 + dk
1 + dk′
)ai]
, ∀t, k, k′ = H,L (1.37)
Proof. To prove that the bounds of the intervals in (37) are the ones stated
above, consider the following thought experiment: Suppose we consider a
representative investor’s economy where the representative investor is en-
dowed with illiquid wealth, dk, and there is a liquid asset that she can invest
every period. The no-trade asset price of the liquid asset in every planning
horizon is as follows
qt = β
(
1 + dk
1 + dk′
)ai
∀t, k, k′ = H,L
18 because we have imposed that y2t+1 = 0
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Let us go back to the economy with two investors. The optimal demands
in every planning horizon are as follows
x1t =
y1t−1(1 + qt)
1 + β
1
a1 q
a1−1
a1
t
, x1t+1 = x
1
t
β
1
α1
q
1
α1
t
x2t =
y2t−1(1 + qt) + dk + qtdk′
1 + β
1
a2 q
a2−1
a2
t
, x2t+1 = x
2
t
β
1
α2
q
1
α2
t
and we have assumed that the debt constraint of investor two is not binding.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in every planning horizon. Consider
the good’s market clearing in t+ 1 for the planning horizon t→ t+ 1,
x1t
β
1
α1
q
1
α1
t
+ x2t
β
1
α2
q
1
α2
t
=
1 + dk′
1 + dk
(x1t + x
2
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1+dk
)
and it can be rewritten as follows
x1t
(
β
1
α1
q
1
α1
t
− 1 + dk′
1 + dk
)
+ x2t
(
β
1
α2
q
1
α2
t
− 1 + dk′
1 + dk
)
= 0
and for equilibrium asset prices outside the intervals in (37), the terms in
parenthesis of the above market clearing have the same sign and are different
from zero. Thus, the LHS is not equal to zero and as a consequence this
violates market clearing in every planning horizon.
Consider also the following two assumptions,
Assumption I. Individuals are enough patient, β close to one.
Assumption II. The fluctuations of the illiquid asset are low, the d′s are
small enough and the following inequalities are true,
1 > dH > dL > 0
Assumption I simplifies the analysis whereas assumption II makes the prob-
lem more interesting as we will demonstrate below. In the previous sections
we analyzed conditions where some individuals/investors vanish in the long-
run. In this section we want to analyze a phenomenon which is similar
to the one studied before. Investors become bankrupt if they accumulate
enough debt such that they can not repay back. To formalize this idea, let
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us go back to the optimal asset demands in (35),(36). Expression (36) is
complicated because investor two holds illiquid wealth in her portfolio. On
the other hand, expression (35) is very simple because investor one does not
hold illiquid wealth in her portfolio. Suppose we know that there exists an
 > 0, such that in any equilibrium the following is true,
y1t
y1t−2
> 1 + , ∀t (1.38)
and the reason we consider the ratio of asset holdings every two periods is
because the returns of the illiquid asset every two periods are the same. If
the inequality in (38) is true, then the asset holdings of investor one are
strictly increasing in every planning horizon. Suppose both investors start
with initial holdings of the liquid asset, y10 > 0, 1 − y10 > 0. If (38) is true,
then in any equilibrium, y1t +y
2
t = 1, investor two will start short-selling after
a specific planning horizon and as a consequence she will start accumulating
more and more debt. The usefulness of assumption II is to guarantee that we
do not get trivial results. If we inject enough fluctuations in the illiquid asset,
investor two is endowed with enough units of the good in some planning
horizons. She takes short positions in the market because of the difference
in her endowments today and tomorrow in a given planning horizon. On the
other hand, if the returns of the illiquid asset are less than the liquid one and
there are no fluctuations in the returns of the illiquid asset, equilibrium asset
prices equal β in every planning horizon and expression (38) equals one. In
that case after trading in one planning horizon the equilibrium is the same
in every other planning horizon. There are no dynamics. We consider small
fluctuations in the return of the illiquid asset in order to get dynamics in
the economy and also not to give a high incentive to investor two to take
short positions in the market.
The following lemma describes conditions such that there exists an  > 0
which satisfies condition (38),
Lemma I. There exists an  > 0 such that (38) is true if either one of the
following conditions is true
α2 > α1 > 1 or α1 > α2 > 1
1 > α2 > α1 >
1
2
or 1 > α1 > α2 >
1
2
and there is low heterogeneity, the difference between α1, α2 is small enough.
Proof. Consider the ratio in (38),
y1t
y1t−2
=
1 + qt
qt
1 + qt−1
qt−1
β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t
1 + β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t
β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t−1
1 + β
1
α1 q
α1−1
α1
t−1
(1.39)
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we want to show that (39) is bounded below by a number greater than
one. Consider the equilibrium asset price intervals from claim II. Make the
RHS of (39) the smallest possible by using the appropriate bounds from the
intervals in (37). If the smallest possible value of the RHS of (39) is greater
than one, then expression (38) is satisfied.
It turns that low heterogeneity is the key. Consider the following graph
which depicts the smallest value of (39) for the case where α1 > α2 > 1,
Figure 1.5
Where in the vertical axis we depict α2 and in the horizontal, α1. Also for
simplicity we have fixed, dL = 0.2, dH = 0.23, β = 1. In the dark purple
region close to the 45 degree line, the smallest value of (39) is greater than
one. For the other cases, the graph is similar to the one above.
The previous lemma showed that the asset holdings of investor one are
strictly increasing in every planning horizon. This is sufficient for the ar-
gument we want to make. Nevertheless, consider the asset demands of the
second investor in every planning horizon19. Consider the expression (36)
and also the ratio of asset holdings of investor two every two periods
19This argument is redundant.
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y2t
y2t−2
=
1 + qt
qt
1 + qt−1
qt−1
s2,t,s2,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸+
s2,t
1 + qt
qt
1
y2t−2
[
s2,t−1
et−1 − β−
1
α2 q
1
α2
t−1et
qt−1
+
et − β−
1
α2 q
1
α2
t et+1
1 + qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
(1.40)
where et is the illiquid wealth of investor two and
s2,t =
β
1
α2 q
α2−1
α2
t
1 + β
1
α2 q
α2−1
α2
t
We can show following the argument in the previous lemma that the first
term in the underbrace is always greater than one. Thus, the second term in
the underbrace must be negative and the ratio
y2t
y2t−2
must be bounded above
by a number less than one when investor two holds positive claims of the
liquid asset. When investor two holds negative claims of the liquid asset,
short-sells,
y2t
y2t−2
must be greater than one because by the previous lemma
she will accumulate more and more debt. Using the intervals in (37) we get
the following fact
q
1
α2
t,L >
dL
dH
, q
1
α2
t,H <
dH
dL
(1.41)
where the intervals were constructed under the assumption that20 α2 > α1.
We can rewritte (40) depending on the shock every period t as follows,
y2t
y2t−2
=
1 + qt,L
qt,L
1 + qt−1,H
qt−1,H
s2,t,Ls2,t−1,H−
1
y2t−2
s2,t,L
1 + qt,L
qt,L
[
dHq
1/α2
t,L − dL
1 + qt,L
− s2,t−1,H
dH − dLq1/α
2
t−1,H
qt−1,H︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
y2t
y2t−2
=
1 + qt,L
qt,L
1 + qt−1,H
qt−1,H
s2,t,Ls2,t−1,H−
1
y2t−2
s2,t,H
1 + qt,H
qt,H
[
s2,t−1,L
−dL + dHq1/α
2
t−1,L
qt−1,L
− −dLq
1/α2
t,H + dH
1 + qt,H︸ ︷︷ ︸
]
20We could consider also the case where α2 < α1 and get the same results since we focus
on the case of sufficiently low heterogeneity.
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and combining sufficiently low fluctuations of illiquid wealth, sufficiently low
heterogeneity and (41), we can show that the terms in the underbraces are
positive. In order to do this, consider the first and the second term in each
of the terms in underbraces. Given the previous conditions, we can make the
first term the smallest possible and the second the highest possible from the
intervals in (37) and show that the difference is positive. If this difference
is positive then the terms in the underbraces are always positive under the
previous conditions. Since the terms in the underbarce are positive we can
move one step further and show that,
y2t
y2t−2
< 1− , for  > 0 when investor
two holds positive claims of the liquid asset. Simply make the first term of
y2t
y2t−2
the highest possible and the second term the smallest possible. Also,
in the RHS of
y2t
y2t−2
, we have the asset holdings of period t − 2. Suppose
we treat t − 2 as the initial period and yt−2 as initial asset holdings. We
can show that under the previous conditions, sufficiently low fluctuations
of illiquid wealth, sufficiently low heterogeneity and (41),
y2t
y2t−2
< 1 − , ∀t.
Thus, investor two will sell the positive claims of the liquid asset and she
will start and accumulating debt.
Consider the following proposition
Proposition VII. Investor two will go bankrupt in finite time.
Consider first a heuristic argument. The two key concepts are the myopic
behavior of investors and the fact that the asset holdings of investor one are
strictly increasing, condition (38). Consider the following diagram which
splits the economy in separate planning horizons,
(dL, dH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
, (dH , dL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, (dL, dH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
, (dH , dL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
, .....
where the first entry is the the return of the illiquid wealth in every actual
period and the second entry is the return of the illiquid wealth tomorrow.
This diagram is informative if we combine it with condition (38). From (38)
we know that investor two will start going in debt after a certain point. Also,
from the previous diagram, we can infer something simple. The evolution of
debt is not going to be smooth. In L planning horizons individuals can hold
more debt because they expect more productive illiquid wealth tomorrow.
In the H horizons the opposite happens. From (38) we know that debt is
going to be strictly increasing. There must be a period T ∗, where investor
two enters a H horizon with so much debt from yesterdays plan such that
there can not be a well-defined equilibrium where she can consume a pos-
itive amount of the aggregate output. Lastly, when investor two wakes up
in a new planning horizon she realizes that the debt she owes increases by
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the capital value in the market which was zero from yesterdays plan. Thus,
bankruptcy is the only possibility.
Proof. Consider the asset demand of investor one at period t. It can be
written as follows,
y1t = y
1
1
t−1∏
k=1
1 + qk
qk
1 + qk+1
qk+1
s1,ks1,k+1
from (38) we know that the product term is bounded below as follows,
t−1∏
k=1
1 + qk
qk
1 + qk+1
qk+1
s1,ks1,k+1 > (1 + )
t−1
for a fixed  > 0. By market clearing we know also that y1t < 1+dL < 1+dH .
The first bound applies to H horizons where y2t ≥ −dL whereas the second
to L horizons where y2t ≥ −dH . Combining these two facts we get
(1 + )t−1 <
t−1∏
k=1
1 + qk
qk
1 + qk+1
qk+1
s1,ks1,k+1 <
1 + dL
y11
<
1 + dH
y11
but as t increases, the lower bound will increase and it will be greater than
the first upper bound, 1+dL
y11
, which is a fixed number. This will happen for
a finite t∗.
An Example with log-preferences. To get a better picture of the above
result, consider the same institutional set-up as before but endow investors
with identical preferences, log-utilities. Without repeating much of the de-
tails, the equilibrium asset demands of investors are as follows
y1t = y
1
t−1
β
1 + β
1 + et+1 + β(1 + et)
β(1 + et)
, y2t = 1− y1t
where individual one has no illiquid wealth and only individual two is en-
dowed with illiquid wealth every period.
Fix, 1 > dH > dL > 0, and d
′s are sufficiently small. Even if d′s are
sufficiently small, the following is true
y1t
y1t−2
=
β
1 + β
1 + dH + β(1 + dL)
β(1 + dL)
β
1 + β
1 + dL + β(1 + dH)
β(1 + dH)
> 1, ∀t
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which means that
y1t
y1t−2
is bounded below by a number greater than one.
From market clearing,
y2t
y2t−2
is bounded above by a number less than one.
Suppose we know that there exists a small  > 0 such that
y1t
y1t−2
< 1− , ∀t (1.42)
If (42) is true, then bankruptcy is not possible. Investor one will never hold
more than one unit of the liquid asset and as a consequence investor two will
never start short-selling. The following lemma gives sufficient conditions for
(42) to hold.
Lemma II. There exists an  > 0 such that (42) is true if either one of the
following conditions is true,
α2 > α1, α1, α2 <
1
2
, or
α1 > α2, α1, α2 <
1
2
and there is low heterogeneity, the difference between α1, α2 is small enough.
Proof. The proof is similar to the previous lemma. We consider the highest
possible value of
y1t
y1t−2
and show that it is less than one. Fix α2 ∈ [0.1, 0.5),
α1 ∈ [0.1, 0.5) and β = 1. We get a similar graph as in the previous lemma.
1.3.2 Myopic individuals with perfect foresight
In the previous sections we analyzed the case where myopic individuals have
incorrect forecast about equilibrium asset prices in every planning horizon.
We treated each planning horizon as an autonomous economy. In this section
we will introduce an alternative equilibrium concept where myopic individ-
uals have perfect foresight about equilibrium asset prices in the future. This
alternative equilibrium concept is based on Lovo and Polemarchakis (2010).
1.3.2.1 Extreme Asset Prices
Suppose again there are two individuals with CRRA preferences that can
plan up to two periods in the future21,
21Individuals have symmetric planning horizons
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xit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(dt + qt)
xit+1 + q˜t+1y
i
t+1 = y
i
t(dt+1 + q˜t+1)
xit+2 + q˜t+2y
i
t+2 = y
i
t+1(dt+2 + q˜t+2)
yit+2 = 0
where q denotes the realized price every period and q˜ denotes the individual’s
expectation about the future price. Consider the following definition of a
Perfect Foresight Myopic Spot Equilibrium (PFMSE)
PFMSE. A PFMSE is a sequence of asset prices {qt}∞t=1 such that (i)
individuals maximize utility s.t the b.c’s given qt (ii) the spot markets for
the good and the asset are in equilibrium,∑
i
xit = dt,
∑
i
yit = 1
and individual’s price expectations are correct.
We require a weaker equilibrium concept which allows market clearing
only for the spot market of every actual period. Individuals forecasts cor-
rectly q˜t+1 and believe that q˜t+2 is zero from the viewpoint of period t. They
wake up in t+1 and they already know the spot price of that period because
it was forecasted correctly yesterday. The crucial part is that the price they
thought it was zero from the viewpoint of period t, q˜t+2, it is not zero from
the viewpoint of t+ 1. From the viewpoint of t+ 1, they forecast correctly
the equilibrium price of t+ 2 and believe that the price of t+ 3 is zero. This
argument repeats ad infinitum.
For the rest of the analysis in this section fix β = 1 and dt = 1. The
optimal demands of individual i in every actual period t are as follows,
xit =
yit−1(1 + qt)
1 +
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi +
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi q
αi−1
αi
t+1
yit = y
i
t−1
1 + qt
qt
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi +
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi q
αi−1
αi
t+1
1 +
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi +
(
qt
1+qt+1
)αi−1
αi q
αi−1
αi
t+1
Consider the following example,
Parametric example. Fix
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α1 = 0.4, α2 = 0.5, y10 = 0.8, y
2
0 = 0.2 (1.43)
Consider the following result,
Extreme Asset Prices. Fix parameters as in (37). The only asset price
sequence that satisfy spot market clearing every period has the following
property: qt+1 > qt ∀t. Asset prices are strictly increasing through time.
The above result refers obviously to the specific parameters in (37). The
really interesting part of the argument is that only a strictly increasing
asset price sequence satisfies spot market clearing every period.
The dynamics of equilibrium asset prices can be visualized in the follow-
ing table
Table 1.2
qt
2.231
2.2315
2.2323
2.2343
2.2409
2.265
2.3547
2.6852
3.8924
.
If we have employed the previous equilibrium concept where both agents
mispredict the prices all the time, the equilibrium asset prices in every plan-
ning horizon would be (2, 1), (2, 1), (2, 1), (2, 1), .., where the first entry of
each vector refers to the realized price every period and the second entry
refers to the forecasted price tomorrow. The number 2 is what we will call
the myopic fundamental value of the tree when we treat each planning hori-
zon as an autonomous economy22. Trying to find appropriate initial values
in order to construct an equilibrium price sequence, all the initial values
have to be above 2.
Eventually the asset prices are going to be very large and they will
continue increasing. The economy can not reach a steady state. Nevertheless,
the allocation in that case converges as follows,
22When prices are revised all the time in order to ensure market clearing at each date
of every planning horizon.
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x1t → 0, x2t → 1
y1t → 0.865917, y2t → 0.1341
Let us try to understand the mechanism behind the previous example.
The interesting part of the previous argument was that only a strictly in-
creasing price sequence of assets could guarantee spot market clearing for
every t.
Fix CRRA preferences again with 0 < ai < 1 and suppose the dividends
of the tree are fixed to one every period. The optimal demand of individual
i at period t can be written in the following form
xit =
yit−1(1 + qt)
1 + β
1
αi
(
1+qt+1
qt
) 1−αi
αi
[
1 + β
1
αi /q
1−αi
αi
t+1
]
Before analyzing the mechanics of the previous example, it is useful to
prove the following two points
• There exist an initial condition of prices, (q1, q2), such that the markets
at date 1 clear.
• Given the initial condition, spot market equilibrium at subsequent
dates is not guaranteed.
Let us demonstrate first that there exist an initial condition of prices that
clears the markets at date 1. Let us focus on the good’s market because from
Walra’s law the asset market at date 1 clears. Market clearing at date 1 can
be written as follows,
y10(1 + q1)
1 + β
1
α1
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + β
1
α1 /q
1−α1
α1
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x11
+
y20(1 + q1)
1 + β
1
α2
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + β
1
α2 /q
1−α2
α2
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x21
= 1
Fix a positive value for q2 > 0. Then, we can always find a value for q1 that
clears the markets because of the following conditions
q1 → 0⇒ xi1 → 0
q1 →∞⇒ xi1 →∞
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and since the aggregate excess demand changes continuously with q1, there
exist q1 > 0 that clears the market at date 1.
Let us go to the second point. Given the initial condition, (q1, q2), market
clearing in period two is as follows
y11(1 + q2)
1 + β
1
α1
(
1+q3
q2
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + β
1
α1 /q
1−α1
α1
3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x12
+
y21(1 + q2)
1 + β
1
α2
(
1+q3
q2
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + β
1
α2 /q
1−α2
α2
3
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x22
= 1
and q2 is fixed because it is already known from yesterday. We need to use
the new price, q3, to equilibrate the market in period two. The following
conditions demonstrate that finding a new price that clears the market is
not obvious,
q3 → 0⇒ xi2 → 0
q3 →∞⇒ xi2 → 0
The reason why market clearing is not obvious is the following: we could
fall in a region of excess supply in the market and according to the condi-
tions above there might be no price to reduce the excess supply and clear the
market. On the other hand, if there is an excess demand, there is always a
price that clears the market.
Let us state the above conditions as a rule because it will become useful
later on,
Market Clearing Rule (MKR). Fix an initial condition of market clear-
ing prices, (qt−1, qt). The new price that individuals observe should satisfy
the conditions below,
qt+1 → 0⇒ xit → 0
qt+1 →∞⇒ xit → 0
Let us go to discuss the mechanics of the previous example and then try
to see the more general picture.
To find the initial condition we do something simple. We know that the
price combination, (q1, q2) = (2, 1), clears all the markets if we view each
planning horizon as consisting of autonomous economies every period. Fix
q2 = 1 and q1 < 2. There is an excess supply in the market for any q1 < 2.
Fix q1 < 2 and vary q2. There is still an excess supply for any q1, q2. For
q1 < 2 we have fallen in the region of excess supply for any q2. Fix q1 > 2
and q2 = 1. There is an excess demand given initial asset holdings. From
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the MKR we can either increase or decrease q2 given q1 > 2 and clear the
market. It turns out that for any q1 > 2, we need to decrease q2 below
2 in order to clear the market. This is not good because according to the
previous argument we will not be able to clear the market tomorrow with a
spot price q2 < 2. The initial condition we require is q2 > q1 > 2. In the
example above we have that (q1, q2) = (2.231, 2.2315).
Next, individuals wake up in period two and take as given q2 which they
know already from their correct forecast yesterday. In addition to that, they
see another period in the future and a new price, q3, that they could not
take into account yesterday. Given the new initial asset holdings carried
from yesterday, fix initially q2 = q3 and check whether there is an excess
supply or excess demand in the market. It turns out that in the example we
get an excess demand in the market. Reducing the price is not good because
it has to go below 2 to clear the market. The only possibility is to increase
the price above q2 to clear the market and be able to clear the spot market
when individuals wake up in a new planning horizon. The same procedure
continues ad infinitum.
The previous case constitutes only an example. Let us try to do an 
generalization of the previous case. Proving that there exist only a strictly
sequence of asset prices that is consistent with spot market clearing is not
straightforward. We can show first that there exist a strictly increasing
sequence of asset prices which is consistent with spot market clearing.
Fix β = 1, dt = 1 and 0 < α
i < 1. Consider also the following definition
of the myopic fundamental value (MFV) of the asset,
MFV. The MFV of the asset at every initial period t of each planning
horizon, qMFVt , is the price that results from treating each planning horizon
as an autonomous economy and requiring that prices clear all the markets
within the planning horizon from the viewpoint of t.
and in our simple case23, qMFVt = 2 ∀t.
The next lemma gives sufficient conditions for a date one spot market
clearing initial condition with the following property to exist: q2 > q1 >
qMFV1 = 2,
Lemma III. Fix β = 1, dt = 1 and 0 < α
i < 1. If αi is sufficiently close
to one and initial asset prices are above qMFV or if initial asset prices are
sufficiently higher than qMFV and αi are not close to one, then there
exist a date one market clearing condition with the following properties:
q2 > q1 > q
MFV
1 = 2.
Proof. Consider the date one good’s market clearing,
23For β = 1, dt = 1.
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y10(1 + q1)
1 + β
1
α1
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + β
1
α1 /q
1−α1
α1
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x11
+
y20(1 + q1)
1 + β
1
α2
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + β
1
α2 /q
1−α2
α2
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x21
= 1
and suppose individuals start with initial asset holdings as follows: y10, y
2
0
and y10 + y
2
0 = 1. Rewrite the market clearing as follows,
(1− y20)
[
(1 + q1)
1 +
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + 1/q
1−α1
α1
2
] − 1
]
+
y20
[
(1 + q1)
1 +
(
1+q2
q1
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + 1/q
1−α2
α2
2
] − 1
]
= 0
The idea of the proof is to create an excess demand in the market by
making each term in the brackets positive and then show that in order to
reduce the excess demand and clear the market we need initial prices to be
as in the statement of the lemma.
Fix initially q1 > 2 and q2 = q1 = q. Each term in the brackets is positive
if the following inequality is satisfied,
q
1
αi > (1 + q)
1−αi
αi
[
1 + 1/q
1−αi
αi
]
(1.44)
but we can easily show that given the conditions in the lemma, the above
inequality is satisfied. Consider the graph of (44),
Figure 1.6
where we have fixed αi = 0.3. In the horizontal axis we have q and in the
vertical axis expression (44).
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Since initially we required q2 = q1 = q > 2 by the MKR we know that
we can always increase q2 further, reduce the excess demand in the market
and clear the market.
Consider also the following proposition
Proposition VIII. Given the conditions of Lemma III are satisfied, there
exist a strictly increasing sequence of asset prices that clears the spot markets
every period.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Lemma III. Write again the market
clearing of period two,
(1− y21)
[
(1 + q2)
1 +
(
1+q3
q2
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + 1/q
1−α1
α1
3
] − 1
]
+
y21
[
(1 + q2)
1 +
(
1+q3
q2
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + 1/q
1−α2
α2
3
] − 1
]
= 0
and q2 we know it from yesterdays forecast. Fix again q3 = q2 = q. Again
we can make each term in the brackets positive if (44) is satisfied. But from
the graph of (44) in the previous lemma we can repeat the same argument.
The previous argument guarantees the existence of a strictly increasing
sequence of asset prices but it does not say that this is the only way to
clear the spot markets ad infinitum. Consider a simple diagrammatic argu-
ment that illustrates the previous point. Consider again the market clearing
equation,
(1− y2t−1)
[
(1 + qt)
1 +
(
1+qt+1
qt
) 1−α1
α1
[
1 + 1/q
1−α1
α1
t+1
] − 1
]
+
y2t−1
[
(1 + qt)
1 +
(
1+qt+1
qt
) 1−α2
α2
[
1 + 1/q
1−α2
α2
t+1
] − 1
]
= 0
the following graph depicts the terms in brackets in the space of (qt, qt+1)
for give values of α′s. For the following graph, fix α1 = 0.4, α2 = 0.5 and
qt, qt+1 ∈ (0, 5].
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Figure 1.7
in the horizontal axis we have qt and in the vertical axis qt+1. The area on
the right of the blue curve is the first term in brackets, individual one, and
depicts the points where the term in brackets is positive. The envelope red
curve above the blue graph is the second term in brackets, individual two,
and shows again the points where it is positive. Thus, the region on the
right of the blue curve is the aggregate excess demand region and the region
to the left of the envelope one is the region of aggregate excess supply. The
region between the two curves is the region where we should look for market
clearing prices.
From the graph we see that for qt < 2 there is no price qt+1 to reduce
the excess supply in the market and restore equilibrium. For qt > 2 we may
be able to find an equilibrium for qt+1 < 2, but we will not be able to clear
the market next period since we will fall in the excess supply region. The
idea of the previous proof can be visualized in the above graph. If we start
from a set of points on the 45 degree line and to the right of the blue graph,
then we have an aggregate excess demand in the market. It is clear form the
graph that reducing qt+1 is not an option because the price has to fall close
to zero in order to clear the market. We will not be able to clear markets
next period. The price has to increase even further. We can play with α′s
and consider various cases. The main message coming from the previous
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analysis and the above graph is unchanged.
§ 1.4 Hyperbolic Discounting and Survival in the
Market
Suppose individuals have hyperbolic discount functions and they discount
the short-run at a higher rate. Consider the following class of preferences,
U it =
x1−a
i
t
1− ai + β
x1−a
i
t+1
1− ai + ζ
∞∑
j=2
βj
x1−a
i
t+j
1− ai (1.45)
U it =
x1−a
i
t
1− ai + ζβ
x1−a
i
t+1
1− ai + ζ
∞∑
j=2
βj
x1−a
i
t+j
1− ai (1.46)
where ζ 6 1, is the hyperbolic parameter. Consider first expression (45).
For ζ = 0 we are back to the extreme myopic case and for ζ = 1 we go
back to the benchmark case. With preferences as in (45), we can make the
comparison between the case of myopia discussed before and that of hyper-
bolic discounting where individuals perceive the entire horizon. Expression
(46) represents the standard present-biased preferences considered in the
literature.
Following the previous analysis, we will split individuals into two types:
naive and sophisticated individuals. The former behave in a myopic way
and do not realize that their preferences are going to change in the future.
The latter do realize that their preferences are going to change.
1.4.1 Exponential Discounting (Benchmark Case)
The benchmark case is similar to the one in section 3.1. Let us briefly repeat
it. Consider an infinite horizon economy under certainty and two individuals
with the following instantaneous utilities,
u1(c) = log(c), u2(c) = 2
√
c
and time-separable intertemporal utilities. Individuals have identical dis-
count rates. Also there is one long-lived asset with a constant dividend
pattern equal to one across time. The budget constraint every period is as
follows
cit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(1 + qt)
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From the assumption of identical discount rates, the fact that we con-
sider an environment of certainty and most importantly aggregate output
is constant over time, it is one every period, it is not difficult to show that
in equilibrium each individual equalizes its consumption intertemporally. In
equilibrium, cit = c
i, ∀t.
The FOC for individual i between periods t, t+ 1 is as follows,
qtu
i
c(c
i
t) = β(1 + qt+1)u
i
c(c
i
t+1)
Substitute cit = c
i
t+1 in the FOC in order to get
qt
1 + qt+1
= β
and solving recursively, q = β1−β . We can easily verify that the latter is
an equilibrium price which implies that individuals consume the following
amount of the good every period,
c1 = y10, c
2 = 1− y10
where (y10, 1−y10) are their initial shares of the asset. The previous allocation
implies that individuals do not trade in equilibrium and just consume their
initial endowments. In the next section we argue that hyperbolic-discounting
modifies this no-trade result.
1.4.2 Sophisticated individuals
Following the literature on time-inconsistency24 we model each sophisticated
individuals as consisting of different selves that play a game with each other
self. The self of individual t takes as given the strategies of future selves and
simply chooses consumption and asset holdings at period t. The economy
consists of two individuals with the following instantaneous utilities,
u1(c) = log(c), u2(c) = 2
√
c
and the intertemporal utility takes the following form,
U it = u
i(ct) + ζβu
i(ct+1) + ζ
∞∑
j=2
βjui(ct+j)
24Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1996), Laibson (1997)
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where ζ ∈ (0, 1) is the quasi-hyperbolic parameter. The rest of the economy
is as before with the exception that the dividend process of the tree is
constant, dt = d = 1.
To solve the problem for each individual we will combine stuff from
Luttmer and Mariotti (2003) and Harris and Laibson (2001) to derive the
generalized Euler equation. In particular, we will use the heuristic derivation
of the generalized Euler equation from Harris and Laibson (2001).
Define the following functions,
F it (wt) = u
i(ct(wt)) + ζ
∞∑
j=1
βjui(ct+j(wt))
V it (wt) = u
i(ct(wt)) +
∞∑
j=1
βjui(ct+j(wt))
where ct+j(wt) is the implied consumption of self t + j in the subgame in
which self t starts with wealth wit. The current value function F
i
t (wt) is the
utility of the self t in the subgame where the self t starts with initial wealth
wit. The continuation value V
i
t (w
i
t) is the utility perceived by self t − 1 for
the subgame of self t. The budget constraint of period t can be written in a
more convenient form,
cit +Rt+1w
i
t+1 = w
i
t
where wit = y
i
t−1(1 + qt) and Rt+1 =
qt
1+qt+1
.
The problem of self t becomes as follows,
F it (w
i
t) = max
ct,wt+1≥0
{u(cit) + βζV it+1(wit+1)}, s.t
cit +Rt+1w
i
t+1 = w
i
t
and the above problem can be rewritten as follows,
F it (w
i
t) = max
wt+1≥0
{u(wit −Rt+1wit+1) + βζV it+1(wit+1)} (1.47)
the FOC is as follows,
Rt+1u
′
(wit −Rt+1wit+1) = βζ
dV it+1(w
i
t+1)
dwt+1
Combine the FOC with the envelope condition, assuming that we have a
solution of the form wt+1 = g(wt), we get
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dF it (w
i
t)
dwt
= u
′
(ct(wt)) (1.48)
The problem as it is stated in (47) is not recursive because the function
F and V are different. From the definition of these functions we know that
the following relation is true,
ζV it+1(wt+1) = F
i
t+1(wt+1)− (1− ζ)u(ct+1(wt+1)) (1.49)
substitute (49) into (47) to get
F it (w
i
t) = u
i(cit) + β
[
F it+1(w
i
t+1)− (1− ζ)ui(cit+1(wt+1))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸ (1.50)
and successive substitutions of F , yields the right objective function for self
t. From expression (50) we can see the difference with naive individuals.
The self t of individual i will choose consumption and assets at t taking
as given the second term in the underbrace of the RHS. Individuals are
sophisticated because they can take into account the preference reversal of
future selves, F it+1(w
i
t+1). Successive substitutions of F
i
t+1 in (50) yields the
right objective function for self t.
Finally, differentiating (49) we get,
ζ
dV it+1(w
i
t+1)
dwt+1
=
dF it+1(w
i
t+1)
dwt+1
− (1− ζ)u′(ct+1(wt+1))c′t+1(wt+1) (1.51)
Substituting (48),(51) into the FOC, we get the generalized Euler equa-
tion(GEE) as follows,
Rt+1u
′
(wit −Rt+1wit+1) = βu
′
(ct+1(wt+1))
[
1− (1− ζ)c′t+1(wt+1)
]
(1.52)
The last piece in the puzzle that we require is to say something about
ct+1(wt+1). Since we have assumed homothetic preferences, we can con-
jecture the following form for the consumption function of individuals,
cit = (1− sit)wit (1.53)
where sit is the saving rate of self t at date t. Importantly, the saving rate
does not depend on wealth.
Combining (52),(53) and the instantaneous utilities for each individual,
the generalized Euler equation for each individual can be written as follows,
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Rt+1(w
2
t −Rt+1w2t+1)−0.5 =
(
(1− s2t+1)w2t+1
)−0.5[
βζ(1− s2t+1) + βs2t+1
]
Rt+1(w
1
t −Rt+1w1t+1)−1 =
(
(1− s1t+1)w1t+1
)−1[
βζ(1− s1t+1) + βs1t+1
]
and the term in brackets is the effective discount factor for each individual
in that case.
Manipulating the Euler equations above we end up in the following for-
mula for the wealth dynamics of each individual,
wit+1 =
wit
Rt+1
sit
where
s1t =
(
βζ(1−s1t+1)+βs1t+1
)
1−s1t+1
1 +
(
βζ(1−s1t+1)+βs1t+1
)
1−s1t+1
, s2t =
R−1t+1
(
βζ(1−s2t+1)+βs2t+1
)2
1−s2t+1
1 +
R−1t+1
(
βζ(1−s2t+1)+βs2t+1
)2
1−s2t+1
(1.54)
and (54) gives the best-response functions for each individual in the subgame
that self t participates. These best-responses can be rewritten as follows,
s1t = φ(s
1
t+1), s
2
t = f(s
2
t+1)
Before advancing further, let us state the definition of an intarpersonal
and of a competitive equilibrium for this economy. The definition is adapted
from Luttmer and Mariotti (2003),
Intrapersonal and Competitve Equilibrium. An intarpersonal equilib-
rium for the subgame that self t participates is a strategy profile of con-
sumption and next period wealth, {ct, wt+1}∞t=1, that self t chooses taking
as given the sequence of prices {qt}∞t=1, and the strategies of date s selves,
s > t.
A competitive equilibrium is a strategy profile, {ct, wt+1}∞t=1, and a se-
quence of asset prices, {qt}∞t=1, such that (i) {ct, wt+1}∞t=1 is an intrapersonal
equilibrium at prices {qt}∞t=1, and (ii) good’s and asset markets clear at every
period,
2∑
i=1
cit = dt = 1,
2∑
i=1
yit = 1,∀t
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In this section we show that we can construct an equilibrium with the
following characteristics,
Non-Survival Equilibrium. Fix β = 0.99, ζ = 0.008. We will construct
an intarpersonal competitive equilibrium where the saving rate of individual
two is sufficiently low and always lower than the saving rate of individual
one. Individual two vanishes in the long-run and asset prices converge to
q → ζβ1−β = 0.792.
We construct the aforementioned equilibrium using the following four
steps,
• Step 1: Low saving Trap
• Step 2: Characteristics of the equilibrium
• Step 3: An economy with two log-individuals
• Step 4: An explicit construction
Step 1: Low saving Trap.
The crucial step in the construction of the previous equilibrium is the
best-response functions in (54). Consider the best-response of the log-guy.
We assume that the log-guy plays symmetric strategies, s1t = s
1
t+1, and saves
a constant fraction of her wealth every period,
s1 =
βζ
1− β(1− ζ) (1.55)
The analysis of the log-guy is relatively simple because her saving rate does
not depend on prices. On the other hand, the saving rate of individual two
depends on prices.
Consider the following thought experiment: Fix present-value prices,
Rt+1, and compute the fix points of the individual’s two best response func-
tion in (54), s2 = f(.., R, s2). The result is the following two expressions:
s2t =
Rt+1 + 2β
2(−1 + ζ)ζ +√Rt+1
√
Rt+1 + 4β2(−1 + ζ)ζ
2β2(−1 + ζ)2 (1.56)
s2t =
Rt+1 + 2β
2(−1 + ζ)ζ −√Rt+1
√
Rt+1 + 4β2(−1 + ζ)ζ
2β2(−1 + ζ)2 (1.57)
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As we will demonstrate in the next step, we want to construct an equi-
librium where asset prices and present-value prices converge to q∗ = βζ1−β =
0.792 and R∗ = βζ1−β(1−ζ) = 0.442. These are the no-trade prices when
individual one is the representative individual in the market.
At R∗, expressions (56),(57) take the following values respectively:
s2 = 0.442 =
βζ
1− β(1− ζ) = R
∗ = s1
s2 = 1.472× 10−4
It is evident from the two fix points above that the different selves of
individual two could coordinate to either situation. I define the fix point
where all the selves of individual two save relatively low compare to individ-
ual one as a Low Saving Trap. In particular, consider the following definition
Low Saving Trap. A Low Saving Trap is a situation where the saving rate
of individual two is initially lower than that of individual one and is also
strictly decreasing in the future until it converges to a finite point.
In the next steps we argue that the phenomenon of a Low Saving Trap
for individual two emerges as part of the equilibrium we construct.
Step 2: Characteristics of the equilibrium.
The usefulness of this step is to describe the characteristics of the equi-
librium we want to construct before we start with the construction.
The equilibrium sequence of asset prices and present-value prices should
have the following characteristics
1. Initially, q1 <
β
1−β = 0.792, R2 <
βζ
1−β(1−ζ) = 0.442
2. {qt}∞t=1, strictly increasing with a decreasing rate
3. {Rt+1}∞t=1, strictly increasing
4. qt → 0.792, Rt+1 → 0.442 as t→∞
5. Find {qt}∞t=1, {Rt+1}∞t=1 such that {s2t }∞t=1 is sufficiently close to s2 =
1.472× 10−4
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Since we want to construct an equilibrium where individual two vanishes
in the long-run, characteristics 1-4 simply describe some properties of the
equilibrium price sequence. It should converge to the no-trade prices as
if individual one was the representative individual in the market. On the
other hand, the last characteristic, number 5, is more elaborate and we will
comment on it in the next paragraph.
The most crucial step in the construction is to construct a sequence
of saving rates for individual two such that he falls in a Low Saving Trap
as defined before. In particular, the sequence of saving rates of individual
would have the following property:
s21 > s
2
2 > s
2
3 > · · · > s2t → s2∞ = 1.472× 10−4, as t→∞ (1.58)
Going back to the last characteristic enumerated before, number 5, the
equilibrium price sequence must make s21 sufficiently close to s
2∞ initially
and also must be consistent with property (58).
Step 3: An economy with two logarithms.
Consider an economy of two individuals with the following intertemporal
utilities25
U1t = log(ct) + ζ
∞∑
j=1
βj1 log(ct+j)
U2t = log(ct) + δ
∞∑
j=1
βj2 log(ct+j)
where β1 = 0.99 and ζ = 0.008. Thus, individual one has identical prefer-
ences as in the original economy. From (55) we get that s1 = 0.442. Let
us assume that β1 > β2 and ζ > δ. The saving rate of individual two is as
follows,
s2 =
β2δ
1− β2(1− δ) (1.59)
25The main set-up is similar to the that of the original economy.
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Suppose we choose values for (β2, δ)
26 such that s2 = 1.472 × 10−4. Thus,
s1 > s2, by construction. Consider the good’s market clearing every period
t,
y1t−1(1 + qt)(1− s1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c1t
+ (1− y1t−1)(1 + qt)(1− s2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c2t
= 1 (1.60)
and to get the consumption demands we have used (53). From (60), we
can solve explicitly for asset prices every period since the saving rates of
individuals are constant27,
qt =
s2 + y1t−1(s1 − s2)
(1− s2)− y1t−1(s1 − s2)
(1.61)
Since s1 > s2, individual two will continuously sell shares of the tree
and individual one will continuously buy shares of the tree. In other words,
y1t → 1 and y2t → 0 as t → ∞. For any profile of initial asset holdings,
0 < yi1 < 1, it is evident from (61) that
qt → s
1
1− s1 =
βζ
1− β = 0.792, as t→∞ (1.62)
The equilibrium asset price sequence, {qt}∞t=1, is strictly increasing and
converges as in (62). The next step is to argue that it increases with a
decreasing rate.
To show that {qt}∞t=1 increases with a decreasing rate at least after a
certain point in time, consider the following thought experiment: Suppose
individuals are endowed with equal asset holdings initially. Since s1 > s2,
individual two will continuously keep selling shares of the tree and individual
one will continuously keep buying them. The asset price initially is lower
than 0.792 but {qt}∞t=1 increases and converges as in (62). Since individual
two will keep selling shares of the tree, after a certain point in time his shares
will become sufficiently low and he will want to continue selling shares of the
tree with a decreasing rate. The reason for the latter effect has to do with
the fact that individual two will prefer to save even an infinitesimal amount
every period rather than zero. His marginal utility at zero is infinite. Since
26One combination is β2 = 0.024, δ = 0.006.
27From the assumption of log-utilities and the fact that individuals do not have other
endowments.
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individual two contemplates the previous scenario taking equilibrium prices
as given, equilibrium prices should reflect the fact that after a certain point
in time, individual two prefers to sell shares of the tree with a decreasing
rate. It is evident from (62), that if y1t−1 increases with a decreasing rate,
then {qt}∞t=1 increases with a decreasing rate.
According to the previous argument, there exists a period T ∗, such that
individual two starts with sufficiently low initial asset holdings, y2T ∗−1, and
from T ∗ onwards asset holdings of individual one and asset prices increase
with a decreasing rate. To sum up, consider the following properties of the
equilibrium asset price sequence
Properties of the equilibrium asset price sequence. Let us assume
that individual two starts with sufficiently low initial asset holdings, y20 > 0
but close to zero. He is initially extremely poor. This assumption guaran-
tees that {qt}∞t=1 increases with a decreasing rate and converges as in (62)
and moreover it guarantees that q1 is lower but sufficiently close to 0.792.
According to the previous assumption on initial asset holdings, all the dy-
namic changes in the economy for asset demands, consumption demands,
asset prices, are infinitesimally small.
Step 4: An explicit construction.
Let us go back to the original economy: u1(c) = log(c), u2(c) = 2
√
c
and β = 0.99, ζ = 0.008. The main argument is that we will use the
equilibrium price sequence from the previous economy, {qt}∞t=1, with the
properties discussed at the end of the previous step, in order to construct
explicitly an equilibrium for the original economy.
In order to construct an equilibrium for the original economy explicitly,
we will use the following three steps
• Saving rates of individual two as decreasing steps
• Euler Equations
• Market Clearing
Saving behavior of individual two.
One of the main difficulties in the construction of an equilibrium for the
original economy is the fact that the saving behavior of individual two is
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relatively complicated compared to the saving behavior of individual one.
For ease of exposition and since it is the main focus of this step, let us repeat
once more the best-response function of individual two
s2t =
R−1t+1
(
βζ(1−s2t+1)+βs2t+1
)2
1−s2t+1
1 +
R−1t+1
(
βζ(1−s2t+1)+βs2t+1
)2
1−s2t+1
(1.63)
The best-response of individual two depends on his future self best-
response and importantly on the present-value prices today. To analyze
individual’s two saving behavior we must figure out how his savings depend
on present-value prices. We will construct a sequence of saving rates for
individual two using the equilibrium asset price sequence computed in the
previous step.
Consider the asset price sequence computed in step 3, {qt}∞t=1. We said
in step 3 that if the initial asset holdings of individual two are sufficiently
low, then {qt}∞t=1 is strictly increasing with a decreasing rate and q1 is lower
but sufficiently close to q∗ = 0.792. This property turns out to be extremely
important as we will demonstrate right away.
Since saving rates depend on present-value prices, Rt+1, we need to spec-
ify a sequence of present-value prices which will help us construct a sequence
of saving rates. Present-value prices are defined as follows
Rt+1 =
qt
1 + qt+1
Consider the equilibrium price sequence from step 3. For this price se-
quence, the sequence of present-value prices, {Rt+1}∞t=1, is strictly increasing
with a decreasing rate and converges to R∗ = 0.442. Since {qt}∞t=1 is strictly
increasing with a decreasing rate, then we get the following implication
Rt+2 > Rt+1 ⇔ qt+1 − qt
qt︸ ︷︷ ︸ >
qt+2 − qt+1
qt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
qt+1
1 + qt+1
(1.64)
but from the properties of the equilibrium price sequence analyzed at the
end of step 3, (64) is satisfied. In particular, the terms in the underbrace
represent the growth rates of asset prices from (t, t + 1) and (t + 1, t + 2)
respectively. If {qt}∞t=1 increases with a decreasing rate then (64) is satisfied.
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Lastly, since q1 is lower but sufficiently close to q
∗ = 0.792, R2 is lower but
sufficiently close to R∗ = 0.442. Thus, all the increases in {Rt+1}∞t=1 are
infinitesimal.
The next step is to use the sequence of {Rt+1}∞t=1 in order to construct
a sequence of saving rates for individual two, {s2t }∞t=1. This is the crucial
part of the construction of the equilibrium. The next graph illustrates
the main mechanisms behind the construction of individual’s two saving
rates.
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The previous figure graphs the best-response function of individual two
for different values of Rt+1. The s
∗ in the figure is a fix point of (63) at
R∗ = 0.442, s∗ = 1.472 × 10−4. The best-response function of individual
two can be written as s2t = f(Rt+1, s
2
t+1). We showed that {Rt+1}∞t=1 is
strictly increasing, R2 is lower but sufficiently close to R
∗ and Rt+1 → R∗.
Fixing s2t , s
2
t+1, we plot the graph of f for different values of Rt+1 around
the fix point s∗. It is evident from (63) that if Rt+1 increases then the best-
response function should move downwards. It does so in a parallel fashion
as the figure illustrates because increases of Rt+1 do not change the slope
of the best-response function. Also, the graph of f in a neighborhood of s∗
looks like a straight line with a slope very close to zero. The reason is that in
a neighborhood of s∗, differences in saving behavior between different selves
are infinitesimal.
From the sequence of {Rt+1}∞t=1 that we constructed before, we can
construct a countable infinite number of graphs which decrease in a parallel
fashion and eventually cross the fix point s∗. Associate the first graph with
R2, the second with R3, the third with R4 and so forth until R∞ is the graph
that crosses s∗.
So far we have not said anything about the saving behavior of individual’s
two selves. Our goal is to construct a sequence of saving rates for individual
two with the following two properties: (i) s21 is higher but sufficiently close
to s∗, (ii) and
s21 > s
2
2 > s
2
3 > · · · > s2t → s2∞ = 1.472× 10−4, as t→∞
We will show that there exists a unique sequence {s2t }∞t=1, which satisfies
the previous two properties. The proof evolves along the following lines:
Let us start from a graph of (63) associated with RT , for T sufficiently high.
In other words, start from a period far away in the future. Pick a point
on this graph which is sufficiently close and above the 450 line. From this
point, project a horizontal line parallel to the x axis in order to hit the 450
line. The point where you hit the 450 line is below the graph RT because
the graph of the best-response function has a nonzero positive slope. From
this point, project a vertical line parallel to the y axis in order to hit the
graph RT−1 which is above the graph RT . Following the previous argument,
we construct a sequence of increasing steps, a sequence of increasing saving
rates, until we hit the initial graph R1. Importantly, we can repeat the
previous argument for any large T we want. Thus, we can start as close as
we want to s∗ and construct a sequence of increasing steps in order to go
back to the initial graph, R1.
The steps that we construct are infinitesimal steps because {Rt+1}∞t=1
changes infinitesimally. This important because if we start from a point
close to s∗ and we go up the steps, we hit the R1 graph at s21 which is
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higher but sufficiently close to s∗. The R1 graph intersects the 450 line at
a point which is higher but sufficiently close to s∗ by construction since R1
is sufficiently close to R∗. From the previous argument we know that we
will hit R1 at a point sufficiently close but above the 45
0 line. It follows
that s21 has to be higher but sufficiently close to s
∗. Lastly, given {Rt+1}∞t=1,
the sequence of increasing (decreasing) steps we construct is unique. The
reason is that if we start from a point in the distant future, there is only
one path of increasing steps to take us back to the beginning for the given
price sequence.
To sum up, we have shown that we can construct a countable number
of decreasing steps with the properties discussed before. This is important
because the saving behavior of all selves of individual two are similar to the
saving behavior of all selves of individual two in the economy considered in
step 3.
Euler Equations.
The idea of this step is to construct the Euler equations for each indi-
vidual. Let us start with individual one. His generalized Euler equation is
as follows
Rt+1(w
1
t −Rt+1w1t+1)−1 =
(
(1− s1t+1)w1t+1
)−1[
βζ(1− s1t+1) + βs1t+1
]
which can be simplified as follows
w1t+1 =
w1t
Rt+1
s1 or y1t = y
1
t−1
1 + qt
qt
s1 (1.65)
where expression (65) is undoubtedly simpler to use. Consider again the
asset price sequence computed in step 3, {qt}∞t=1. This price sequence was
computed under the assumption that individual two (individual one) starts
with sufficiently low (high) initial asset holdings. We assume that individ-
uals start with the same initial asst holdings as in the economy of step 3.
Construct his Euler equations recursively as follows,
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y11 = y
1
0
1 + q1
q1
s1
y12 = y
1
1
1 + q2
q2
s1
·
·
·
The Euler equations of individual one are identical with the Euler equations
of individual one in the economy of step 3. Let us do the same for individual
two. Consider the asset price sequence of step 3, {qt}∞t=1, the sequence of
saving rates constructed before, {s2t }∞t=1 and suppose also that individual
two starts with the same initial asset holdings as in the economy of step 3.
Construct his Euler equations recursively as follows:
y21 = y
2
0
1 + q1
q1
s21
y22 = y
2
1
1 + q2
q2
s22
·
·
·
It is not very difficult to see that the asset holdings of individual two will
tend to zero. The term 1+qtqt s
2
t is always less than one and tends to a positive
number as t→∞.
Market Clearing.
So far we have used the equilibrium asset price sequence from step 3
in order to construct a sequence of saving rates for individual two and the
Euler equations for both individuals in the original economy. The last step is
to argue that this equilibrium price sequence is indeed an equilibrium price
sequence for the original economy.
Consider the asset market clearing every period
y1t−1
1 + qt
qt
s1︸ ︷︷ ︸
y1t
+ y2t−1
1 + qt
qt
s2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
y2t
= 1 (1.66)
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Let us start from period one,
y10
1 + q1
q1
s1 + y20
1 + q1
q1
s21 = 1 (1.67)
When we constructed the sequence of saving rates for individual two, we
argued that s21 is higher but sufficiently close to s
∗. Thus, period one market
clearing for the original economy, expression (67), and period one market
clearing for the economy of step 3, are equivalent. Although for period one
we are done, it is not obvious how to guarantee market clearing in that set-
up for the following reason: We can not check market clearing every period
because the horizon is infinite and thus it is not obvious how to guarantee
that any potential mistakes in market clearing will not propagate over time.
Rewrite period one asset market clearing as follows:
y21 − (1− y11) = 0
and observe that the asset demands of individual one are identical with the
asset demands in the economy of step 3. Thus, from the market clearing
equations in step 3 we know that 1 − y11 = (y21)Log−Econ. We can rewrite
period one asset market clearing as the difference of the following objects,
(y21)
Orig−Econ − (y21)Log−Econ︸ ︷︷ ︸(= 0) (1.68)
by construction, the term in the underbrace is nonnegative. We have as-
sumed that individual two is extremely poor initially. This means that both
terms in the underbrace are sufficiently close to zero. Define the following
sufficiently small and fix number ,
 = (y21)
Orig−Econ (1.69)
Going back to period one market clearing as expressed in (68), we get the
following inequality
(y21)
Orig−Econ − (y21)Log−Econ <  (1.70)
The idea is to place a uniform bound on the asset market clearing. This is
the idea encapsulated by the inequality above for period one. The next step
is to consider asset market clearing for any period t. We can rewrite it as in
(68),
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(y2t )
Orig−Econ − (y2t )Log−Econ︸ ︷︷ ︸ (= 0)
By construction, the difference in the underbarce is nonnegative. Also, in-
dividual’s two asset holdings are strictly decreasing over time. Thus,
(y2t )
Orig−Econ − (y2t )Log−Econ < , ∀t
We have managed to place a uniform and sufficiently small bound on asset
market clearing. This guarantees that any mistakes will not exceed 28.
The previous argument showed that we can construct an equilibrium
where individual two vanishes in the long-run because his effective discount
factor every period is lower than the effective discount factor of individual
one. Thus, her saving rate is lower than the saving rate of individual one.
Lastly, we need to specify a transversality condition (TC). The model we
considered before is a deterministic version of the Lucas asset pricing model.
To derive the TC, we will solve recursively the generalized euler equation
for each individual. Before doing this, define the following term,
γit = 1− (1− ζ)(1− sit)
Solving recursively the generalized Euler equation for each individual we get
the following:
qtu
′
(ct) =βγtu
′
(ct+1) + β
2γtγt+1u
′
(ct+2) + ...︸ ︷︷ ︸+
lim
T→∞
βT
( T∏
t
γt
)
u
′
(cT )qT︸ ︷︷ ︸
and the last term in the underbrace is the transversality condition (TC).
Divide the previous expression by u
′
(ct) and the TC becomes
lim
T→∞
βT
( T∏
t
γt
)u′(cT )
u′(ct)
qT
28This idea is related to the -equilibrium concept discussed in Kubler and Schmedders
(2005)
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From the Euler equations of the two individuals, the term βT
(∏T
t γt
)
u
′
(cT )
u′ (ct)
is common and equal to the product of present-value prices up to period
T . Thus, to check if the (TC) is satisfied, it suffices to check it for one
individual. According to the previous construction, qt → 0.792, and the
consumption of individual one tended to one. Thus,
lim
T→∞
βT
( T∏
t
γt
)u′(cT )
u′(ct)
qT → 0
The previous equilibrium is not the only one. Suppose we fix asset
prices to q = 0.792 every period and suppose also that all the selves of
individual two play the following strategy: s2t = s
2
t+1 = s
2
t+2 = ·· = 0.442 =
s1. It is not very hard to show that this satisfies all the conditions for an
intrapersonal competitive equilibrium where each individual consumes the
following amount of the good every period
c1 = y10, c
2 = 1− y10
where y10, 1− y10 are the initial shares of the tree.
1.4.3 Naive Individuals
Naive individuals do not realize that their preference are going to change in
the future. They think that their preferences are described by those that
they perceive at the current period. We will stick to the equilibrium concept
described in Herings and Rohde (2008) for the naive case and sequential
complete markets. In particular, naive individuals set up their plan today
taking the sequence of future prices as given. The difference between naive
and sophisticated individuals is that the former wake up next period and
realize that their preferences have changed. Thus, they trade again in the
market facing a different set of prices than the ones forecasted yesterday.
Let us first examine the previous economy when individuals are naive
HD maximizers. Each naive individual solves the following problem every
planning period,
max
[
ui(ct) + ζβu
i(ct+1) + ζ
∞∑
j=2
βjui(ct+j)
]
, s.t
cit + qty
i
t = y
i
t−1(1 + qt)
1.4. Hyperbolic Discounting and Survival in the Market 71
The FOCs for each planning horizon and each individual are as follows
qtu
i
c(ct) = βζ(1 + qt+1)u
i
c(ct+1)
qt+1u
i
c(ct+1) = β(1 + qt+2)u
i
c(ct+2)
.
.
We can verify that ci = yi0, ∀t and at the start of each planning horizon for
each actual period t, the asset prices are as follows:
qt
1 + qt+1
= βζ,
qt+1
1 + qt+2
= β,
qt+2
1 + qt+3
= β, ....
which means that the actual price level every period is qt =
βζ
1−β , for every
planning horizon. The naive equilibrium and the second equilibrium for
the sophisticated we mentioned before give the same consumption for each
individual.
The way we solve for a naive competitive equilibrium is similar to the
way we solve for an Incorrect Forecast Myopic Equilibrium (IFME) analyzed
in the previous sections. It turns out that we can establish a clear connection
for economies populated by myopic individuals and economies populated by
naive HD maximizers. Consider the following type of preferences,
U it =
c1−a
i
t
1− ai + β
c1−a
i
t+1
1− ai + ζ
∞∑
j=2
βj
c1−a
i
t+j
1− ai
which have been discussed in the beginning of section 4.
Consider the dividend pattern of (26) discussed in the case of myopia.
Solve the above economy as if each individual is the representative in the
market. The way we do it is to collapse all the constraints into an intertem-
poral one and work again with the present value prices. From assumption
I we know that dividends are bounded and the dividend pattern repeats
every six periods. Solving for the representative individual case we get the
no-trade present value prices from the viewpoint of every actual period as
follows: Rit+1 = β(
dt
dt+1
)α
i
,Rit+j = ζβ
j( dtdt+j )
αi , j = 2, .., and the subscript i
in the present value prices refers to the individual we pick to solve for the
representative case. Following claim I, the equilibrium present value prices
in the economy with two individuals are going to be bounded between the
present value prices of the representative individual cases. Thus asset prices
in this economy have to be bounded.
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Following a similar argument as in the finite myopic horizon case, we
can compute the saving rate of individual i every actual period t as follows,
sit =
β
1
αiR
αi−1
αi
t + ζ
1
αi
∑∞
j=1 β
j+1
αi R
αi−1
αi
t+j
1 + β
1
αiR
αi−1
αi
t + ζ
1
αi
∑∞
j=1 β
j+1
αi R
αi−1
αi
t+j
(1.71)
Consider the following Proposition,
Proposition IX. Suppose individuals are enough patient, high β, and sup-
pose we inject enough fluctuations in the dividends of the asset. If ζ is
sufficiently close to zero and either one of the following cases apply,
• there exist a region of α′s such that α2 > α1, 1 ≤ α1 and α1 sufficiently
close to one.
• there exist a region of α′s such that 1 ≥ α1 > α2 > 0 and α1 sufficiently
close to one.
then individual two vanishes in the long-run.
Proof. For ζ sufficiently close to zero, the analysis follows from the discussion
in the case of myopia.
The previous result follows from the discussion for the myopic case. For
ζ close to zero, the previous results on the long-run survival of symmetric
myopic individuals apply also for naive HD maximizers. The same is true
for the case of asymmetric myopia. For sufficiently low values of ζ, more
present-biased individuals dominate over less present-biased ones.
§ 1.5 Concluding Remarks
In this work we argued that particular forms of dynamically-inconsistent
preferences can give rise to equilibrium dynamics that may help us explain
certain phenomena observed in financial markets. The main result discussed
extensively in the previous paragraphs concerns the long-run survival of
some individuals. The reason we are interested in the long-run non-survival
of some individuals is twofold. First, we get a clear characterization of
equilibrium asset prices. The second and more important reason involves the
behavior of asset trades. The benchmark case implies that trade in assets
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follow the pattern of dividends we specified. In other words, individuals
trade the same number of shares every time they enter in the same aggregate
state. The introduction of time-inconsistency modifies this result. There is
continuous trade in assets that does not vanish in the long-run and does
not necessarily depend on the aggregate state of the economy. The other
interesting point about time-inconsistent preferences involves the case of
myopia and the dynamics of equilibrium asset prices. We showed cases where
economies populated by myopic individuals are characterized by extreme
asset price fluctuations even though dividends of the assets are constant
over time.
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- Chapter 2 -
Unemployment Equilibria in a Monetary Economy
§ 2.1 Introduction
In this paper we characterize optimal monetary policy when two different
types of unemployment may prevail in the market, Keynesian Unemploy-
ment and Classical Unemployment. We want to analyze how optimal mone-
tary policy prescriptions depend on the type of unemployment that prevails
in the market. Unlike models of Blanchard and Gali (2008), Trigari (2005),
unemployment in that set-up is not a result of search and matching frictions.
Unemployment in equilibrium is possible because some prices are fixed and
different from the Walrasian ones which imply zero unemployment. Given
this way of introducing unemployment in the economy, we able to analyze
different unemployment regimes depending on the direction we fix some
prices with respect to their Walrasian counterparts. Given the possibility
of different unemployment regimes in the market, the characterization of
monetary policy across these different unemployment regimes is the main
question we want to address.
Following Malinvaud (1982), we define as Keynesian Unemployment the
situation where because of a low real wage individuals reduce their demands
of goods and as a consequence firms face a demand constraints when they
decide how much to produce. This spills over to the labor market where
firms decide to hire less because of the demand constraint they face in the
goods market. The other type which we will call Classical Unemployment is
a situation where firms hire less because the real wage is so high such that
their profitability reduces.
We employ a three period economy with operative cash-in-advance con-
straints. The last period is added for accounting purposes. The timing of
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transactions is similar to Lucas and Stokey (1987) and the monetary econ-
omy is based on Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2005). There are two types
of individuals, employed and unemployed and there is only one consump-
tion good each period. The timing of transactions is as follows: First the
asset market opens where individuals hold money balances, trade a riskless
bond and they are endowed with initial wealth-outside money. After asset
market closes, good’s market opens where individuals buy the good with
initial money balances brought from the asset market. They also supply
labor elastically at the prevailing wage rate. The timing of transactions is
similar in period two except that they do not receive outside money. Money
balances are injected into the economy through open market operations by
the monetary-authority. The monetary authority fixes also the policy pa-
rameters which are the nominal interest rates in period one and period two.
Lastly, the production side of the economy consist of two firms: a non-
investment and an investment firm. The former hires labor in period one
and produces total output of period one while the latter invest in period
one and hires labor in period two in order to produce the aggregate output
of period two. Both firms have to acquire money balances from the asset
market in order to finance inputs and issue profits.
Unemployment prevails only in period one because we assume that the
price of the good and that of labor are fixed exogenously. Prices are fully
flexible in period two and clear markets in the usual sense. The case where
prices of period one are allowed to adjust freely we will refer to as the
Walrasian case. Since prices are fixed and different from the Walrasian ones,
we have a notion of equilibrium involving quantities. This means that excess
capacities are possible in the market. Since excess capacities are possible,
a rationing scheme determines how these excess capacities are distributed
among the agents of the economy. The notion of equilibrium that we use in
period one is described by the following conditions
1. Voluntary exchange, no one is forced to trade more than he wishes
2. There can be no rationed sellers and rationed buyers in the same mar-
ket
3. Trade balances
Let us analyze first the Keynesian Unemployment regime. As mentioned
before, this regime is characterized by excess supply in the good’s market
and excess supply in the labor market because of a real wage in period
one that is lower from the Walrasian one. The excess supply in the good’s
market originates from the fact that non-investment firm faces a demand
constraint when it maximizes profits in period one. This spills over to the
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labor market where the non-investment firm hires less than the Walrasian
case of full employment. The rationing scheme takes a simple form in that
case. Individuals can be fully employed or unemployed and non-investment
firm faces a binding demand constraint when it maximizes profits. Invest-
ment firm is not constrained in any market. Given this set-up, the policy
question that is of interest to us can be summarized as follows: What is the
characterization of optimal monetary policy when the monetary-authority
can manipulate nominal interest rates in order to reduce unemployment in
the economy and make everybody at least not worse-off?
Nominal interest rates represent a cost to liquidity because individuals
have to borrow in order to acquire money balances in the asset market ev-
ery period. The reason for unemployment in equilibrium, in the Keynesian
regime, is a lower real wage than the Walrasian one which induces indi-
viduals to reduce the demand in the market. A policy designed to reduce
unemployment in that regime should be able to boost demand in period
one and as a consequence reduce unemployment. If the monetary-authority
sets nominal rates close to zero, then it can achieve the lowest possible un-
employment level given fixed prices of period one and make employed and
unemployed individuals better-off.
We mentioned before that the only cause of unemployment in equilib-
rium is that period one prices are fixed and different from the Walrasian
ones. There is a possibility that the behavior of monetary-authority can
be one of the main causes of excessive unemployment. Suppose period one
prices are very close to the Walrasian ones. The excess capacities in the
market should not very large. If the monetary-authority sets nominal rates
higher than a certain threshold, it can be calibrated to be around 1.5, then
for prices very close to the Walrasian ones the unemployment rate is suffi-
ciently high. If the nominal rate is below that threshold, then unemployment
is close to zero. High nominal rates in period one imply that the effective la-
bor supply of employed individuals is sufficiently higher than labor demand.
Labor market clearing requires high levels of unemployment.
Consider the other type of unemployment, Classical Unemployment. In
that regime firms are not constrained in any market. Only individuals are
constrained in period one. Unemployed individuals are excluded from the
labor market in period one as before. The main difference with the Keyne-
sian regime is the behavior of employed people. We assume that employed
individuals face a constraint in the good’s market in period one. They buy
less than they would have bought if the constraint was not binding. As a
consequence they consume more leisure in period one since more labor hours
would be devoted to less consumption today. Their consumption pattern is
shifted towards more consumption in period two. Unemployment is possi-
ble in equilibrium because the real wage of period one is higher than the
Walrasian one and the non-investment firm will hires less. To sum up, this
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regime is characterized by excess demand in the good’s market and excess
supply in the labor market of period one.
As before let us examine the behavior of equilibrium close to Walrasian
prices given that conditions for excess demand and excess supply are sat-
isfied. If the nominal interest rate of period one is higher than a certain
threshold, then for period one prices close to the Walrasian ones there can
be sufficiently high unemployment but also the unemployment rate can ex-
ceed one which makes the equilibrium not well-defined. This threshold can
be computed to be close to zero. The reason is as follows: Since employed
individuals face a constraint in the good’s market their labor supply in pe-
riod is reduced. Higher nominal rates in period one decrease consumption
and labor supply of period one even further. But initially employed indi-
viduals were implicitly constrained to supply less hours because they were
constrained in the good’s market. Higher period one nominal rates amplify
this effect. To exclude this anomaly and have a well-defined equilibrium the
monetary-authority should fix the nominal rate of period one close to zero.
We said before that employed individuals are forced to consume more
tomorrow because they face a binding constraint in the good’s market today.
An optimal policy should restore consumption smoothing for employed peo-
ple, reduce unemployment and make the remaining unemployed individuals
not worse-off. The optimal policy in that case is as follows: If the nominal
rate of period two is expected to be sufficiently high initially, then announc-
ing a reduction of the nominal rate tomorrow decreases unemployment and
make everybody better-off. Employed individuals expecting a high nominal
rate tomorrow are able to shift their consumption pattern towards more
consumption today because investment and consumption demand of unem-
ployed individuals in period one are low. An announcemnt of lower nominal
rates tomorrow will make them better-off because they would like to sacrifice
consumption and labor supply today in order to consume and supply more
hours in period two. Unemployment decreases because employed individuals
reduce their labor supply today since the labor demand does not depend on
the nominal rate of period two 1. Unemployed individuals become better-off
after an announcement of lower rates tomorrow because they increase con-
sumption today since they can borrow more given that the cost of liquidity
is reduced tomorrow and they can increase consumption and labor supply
tomorrow since the real wage of period two increases and the price of the
good falls. The monetary authority should target the inflation rate initially
by fixing high nominal rates in period two. If this is the case, then monetary
policy can improve upon the initial allocation.
To sum up, we have built a stylized monetary economy featuring two
1The total supply and labor demand of the non-investment firm depends only on period
one prices and the nominal rate of period one.
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different unemployment regimes. The policy conclusions are revised to a
large extend when we talk about different unemployment types. The very
nature of unemployment is of great interest when we design policies that
aim to reduce unemployment. Also, when the conditions in the market do
not justify high unemployment, prices close to the Walrasian ones, monetary
policy can be the cause of excessive unemployment.
In section 2 we analyze the benchmark economy. Section 3 is devoted
to the construction of unemployment regimes when the supply of labor is
inelastic. Section 4 deals with the issue of optimal monetary policy. Lastly,
section 5 deals with elastic labor supply.
§ 2.2 A monetary economy
2.2.1 The basic model
The basic ingredients of our simple monetary economy are listed below:
1. There are three periods: t = 1, 2, 3. The last period is added for an
accounting purpose. There are no stochastic shocks in the economy.
2. There is one consumption good each period, xt, and individuals are
endowed with time that they supply inelastically to firms for a wage
income in return- wtlt.
3. (pt, wt)
2
t=1 denotes the commodity and labor prices respectively.
4. There are two firms in the economy. One produces the entire output
of period one whereas the other invests in period one and produces
period’s two output with period one investment.
5. Money is the sole medium of exchange. It is valued through a cash-
in-advance constraint.
6. A monetary-fiscal authority supplies balances, charging or paying in-
terest on account balances.
7. Individuals are endowed with initial nominal wealth δ. It is a form of
outside money. This corresponds to the initial public liability.
2.2.2 Individuals
Assume there is a large number of identical individuals. The timing of
transactions is as follows:
1. The asset markets open first where individuals exchange bonds with
money balances and receive their initial wealth.
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2. After asset markets are closed, goods markets open where individuals
buy consumption goods and sell their endowment of time.
3. End of period money balances are carried to the next period.
4. At the beginning of the next period the timing of transactions is sim-
ilar.
5. Lastly, in period three individuals redeem their debt.
Individuals visit the asset market in order to exchange bonds and money
balances according to the constraint
m̂1 +
b1
1 + r1
= δ
where b1 denotes bond units that are exchanged with the monetary-fiscal
authority, m̂1 denotes initial money balances and δ is initial wealth.
Once the asset market is closed individuals visit the good’s market that
opens next. With the initial balances acquired before they buy the con-
sumption good according to the following constraint
p1x1 ≤ m̂1
and accumulate end-of-period money balances through receipts from sales
of labor time
m1 = m̂1 − p1x1 + w1l1
The constraints of period one reduce to
p1x1 +m1 +
b1
1 + r1
≤ δ + w1l1
m1 ≥ w1l1
With a similar argument, the budget constraints of period two are as follows
p2x2 +m2 +
b2
1 + r2
≤ m1 + b1 + w2l2
m2 ≥ w2l2
Lastly, at the beginning of period three individuals repay their debt to the
monetary-authority
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m2 + b2 ≥ 0
Given this debt constraint, the flow budget constraints reduce to the in-
tertemporal constraint
p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 +
r1
1 + r1
m1 +
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
m2 ≤
δ + w1l1 +
w2l2
1 + r1
The cash constraints can be written as
r1
1 + r1
m1 =
r1
1 + r1
w1l1
r2
1 + r2
m2 =
r2
1 + r2
w2l2
because if r1, r2 > 0 the cash constraint binds. If r1, r2 = 0 both side of the
equation are zero. Substituting these back to the intertemporal constraint,
we get
p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 ≤ δ + w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
= Π
The representative individual solves the following problem2
max
x1,x2
[
log x1 + β log x2
]
s.t p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 = Π
The respective demands are as follows
x1 =
1
p1(1 + β)
Π
x2 =
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π
2the intertemporal constraint is binding at the optimum. Also the previous transver-
sality condition is binding
m2 + b2 = 0
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2.2.3 Firms
There are two firms in the economy. There is a firm in period one that
produces the total output of that period and another firm that invest in
period one and produces output in period two3. The crucial point is that
firms also visit the asset market of the economy. They acquire funds for
buying inputs and financing profits.
2.2.3.1 Non-investment firm
The non-investment (NI) firm produces the aggregate output of period one
with the following simple technology
y1 =
√
l1
where l1 is the labor demand of period one.
The timing of transactions is similar to that of an individual. NI firm
visit the asset market to exchange bonds for money balances in the amount
needed to pay for inputs and issue profits
n̂NI1 +
1
1 + r1
bNI1 = 0
and then buys inputs and issues profits4
n̂NI1 = w1l1 + pi1
It then accumulates cash balances through receipts for sale of output
nNI1 = p1y1
and uses these terminal balances to repay its debt to the bank
nNI1 + b
NI
1 = 0
This defines the dividend policy as
pi1 =
p1y1
1 + r1
− w1l1
3the reason for this separation will become clear afterwards.
4 Write these constraints with equality to simplify the presentation.
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Finally, the NI firm’s problem becomes
max
l1
[ p1y1
1 + r1
− w1l1
]
s.t y1 =
√
l1
At the optimum we get
y1 =
p1
2(1 + r1)w1
l1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w21
pi1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w1
2.2.3.2 Investment firm
The investment (I) firm of our story buys part of the output in period one
and holds it as investment in order to augment the productivity of labor in
period two. Period’s two production function takes the following form
y2 = F (l2, I1) =
√
l2
√
I1
The timing of transactions is analogous to that of the individual. The
investment firm visits the asset market
n̂I1 +
bI1
1 + r1
= 0
The good’s market opens next. The investment firm buys investment op-
portunities, part of period’s one output, with the cash acquired in the asset
market
n̂I1 = p1I1
At the beginning of period two, the investment firm visits the asset market
once more
n̂I2 +
bI2
1 + r2
= bI1
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acquires cash balances, n̂I2, in exchange for bonds, b
I
2, and receives the pro-
ceeds of earlier transactions, bI1.
With the cash acquired in the asset market, the investment firm buys inputs
and issues profits
n̂I2 = w2l2 + pi2
It accumulates cash through the receipts for sale of output
nI2 = p2y2
and uses these cash balances to repay its debt
nI2 + b
I
2 = 0
This defines the dividend policy of the investment firm as follows
pi2 =
p2y2
1 + r2
− w2l2 − (1 + r1)p1I1
The profit maximization problem of the investment firm calls for maximizing
discounted profits
max
I1,l2
[ p2y2
(1 + r2)(1 + r1)
− w2l2
(1 + r1)
− p1I1
]
s.t y2 = F (l2, I1)
The first-order conditions with respect to I1, l2 are as follows
p2
p1
=
2(1 + r1)(1 + r2)√
l2
√
I1
w2
p2
=
1
2(1 + r2)
√
I1√
l2
At the optimum, profits are equal to zero.
2.2.4 The monetary-fiscal authority
The last agent in our economy is the monetary-fiscal authority (MFA). Its
main role is to determine the monetary policy rule, money supply or interest
rate rule, that will be followed and supply money balances into the economy
in exchange for bonds.
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The flow budget constraint of period one can be written as follows
M1 +
1
1 + r1
B1 + pi1 = δ
For period two, we get
M2 +
1
1 + r2
B2 + pi2 = M1 +B1
and at the beginning of period three
M2 +B2 = 0
Some notation:
M1 : stands for the total money balances the MFA supplies to individuals
and firms in period one
B1 : total bonds that are exchanged with individuals and firms for money
balances in period one
M2 : total money balances supplied to individuals and firms in period two
B2 : total bonds exchanged with individuals and firms for money balances
in period two
δ : initial public liability- initial wealth of individuals.
From the flow budget constraints we observe that profits appear in the
left hand side of these constraints. What we really mean is encapsulated in
the following assumption,
Assumption 2.2.4.1. Profits are taxed by the monetary-fiscal authority.
The previous assumption will be quite useful for the rest of the analysis.
The motivation for it is to be able to guarantee that a fully determinate
monetary equilibrium is well-defined whenever interest rates are zero and
also simplify the analysis when we talk about unemployment.
The next thing to specify is the policy rule that the MFA follows.
Monetary policy. The MFA fixes the nominal interest rates, r1, r2 ≥ 0
and accommodates the money demand in the market.
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2.2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods and labor markets require the following:
x1 + I1 = y1 =
√
l1 (2.1)
x2 = F (l2, I1) (2.2)
l1 = l1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w21
(2.3)
l2 = l2 (2.4)
the money market clears a fortiori, since the MFA accommodates the money
demand
m1 + n
NI
1 = M1
m2 + n
I
2 = M2
Bond market clearing is as follows
b1 + b
NI
1 + b
I
1 = B1
b2 + b
I
2 = B2
The last condition that we must take into account is the intertemporal con-
straint of MFA,
r1
1 + r1
M1 +
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
M2 + pi1 +
1
1 + r1
pi2 = δ (2.5)
since δ is treated as outside money, condition (5) provides an additional
restriction for the determination of equilibrium prices.
Conditions (1)-(4), the investing firm’s first-order conditions and con-
dition (5), give us sufficient equations to determine prices and investment
opportunities in equilibrium. Combine (1),(2) to get
p2
p1
= β(1 + r1)
√
l1 − I1
F (l2, I1)
(2.6)
Combining (6) together with the FOCs of the investing firm, we determine
investment opportunities in equilibrium as follows:
I1 =
β
√
l1
2(1 + r2) + β
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Condition (5) can be written as
r1
1 + r1
(w1l1
p1
+ y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(w2l2
p2
p2
p1
+
p2
p1
y2
)
+
pi1
p1
=
δ
p1
(2.7)
and since relative prices are determined in equilibrium we can compute the
equilibrium price level of period one-p1. After a bit of algebra we end up in
the following expression for the price level
p1 =
δ√
l1
[
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
]
The nominal wages are determined from (3) and the second FOC of the in-
vestment firm. Finally, p2 is determined from (6). We get a fully determinate
equilibrium.
2.2.5.1 A note on the (in)determinacy result
In the previous discussion δ is interpreted as outside money. This is the only
reason the equilibrium is determinate in that case. In order to understand
this point we turn first our attention to the money and bond market clearing
conditions and then to the case of distribution of nominal transfers every
period.
Under an interest rate peg, the MFA accommodates the money demand,
the money market clearing equations become identities. Bond market clear-
ing implies that the flow budget constraint of the MFA holds every period.
No restrictions are added to the equilibrium system. This argument does
not depend on the distribution of transfers every period.
Suppose that individuals receive nominal transfers every period, h1,h2,
instead of endowed with fixed initial wealth. The individual’s intertemporal
constraint is modified as follows:
p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 = h1 +
h2
1 + r1
+
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(2.8)
and the MFA’s intertemporal constraint is as follows
r1
1 + r1
M1 +
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
M2 + pi1 +
1
1 + r1
pi2 = H1 +
H2
1 + r1
(2.9)
with
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h1 = H1
h2 = H2
Since h1,h2 are considered as transfers, expression (9) becomes an iden-
tity. Nominal transfers accommodate any price change by adjusting accord-
ingly. Since (9) becomes an identity, we can no longer solve for period’s
one price level. The intertemporal constraint in (8) is homogenous of degree
zero following an identical change of all prices and transfers. The degree
of indeterminacy is one since there is no uncertainty5. The indeterminacy
is purely nominal under an interest rate peg and a policy of distribution of
nominal transfers every period. The introduction of outside money instead
of transfers makes equation (9) an additional equilibrium restriction. This
will become important in later analysis.
2.2.5.2 A note on individual’s bond holdings
Going back to the asset market budget constraints, it is evident that the
firms of our economy will sell bonds to the MFA in exchange for money
balances-bNI1 , b
I
1, b
I
2 < 0.
The case of individuals is quite different though. From the asset market
constraint of period one, the equilibrium bond holdings are computed as
follows:
b1 = (1 + r1)δ
[
1− 2(1 + r2)
(2(1 + r2) + β)
[
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
]]
which is positive unless nominal interest rates are close to/or zero. When
nominal interest rates are close to/or zero, the real value of the initial wealth
decreases whereas the good’s price of period one increases. Individuals sell
bonds to the MFA, b1 < 0, in order to obtain more money balances for
transactions purposes. The derivative of b1 with respect to nominal interest
rates is positive, verifying the previous argument.
2.2.6 Pareto Optimality
The equilibrium allocation of individuals is as follows
5Conditions (1),(2) are not independent equations for determining equilibrium prices.
We can only determine relative prices in equilibrium.
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x1 =
2(1 + r2)
2(1 + r2) + β
√
l1
x2 =
√
l2
√
β
√
l1
2(1 + r2) + β
The equilibrium allocation does not depend on r1. The reason is that output
in period one is fixed since labor is supplied inelastically. It depends on r2,
since individuals who are the net demanders of output in period two and
investment firm who is the net supplier would face different relative prices6.
Differentiating the utility of the individual with respect to r2, we get:
∂u
∂r2
= − βr2
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
< 0
so that reducing the nominal interest rate of period two would induce a
Pareto improvement upon the initial allocation. The initial equilibrium
allocation with positive interest rates is suboptimal.
§ 2.3 Unemployment equilibria
2.3.1 Introductory remarks
The monetary economy described above serves as a useful benchmark for
analyzing monetary policy in equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is
to study the role of monetary policy when different types of unemployment
prevail in the market. In order to do this we must modify the above story
considerably.
Suppose there are three periods again. Define the first period as the
immediate short-run and period two as the medium-run. Period three serves
only for accounting purposes. During period one quantities adjust faster
than prices. Prices are kept fixed in the short-run. During period two prices
adjust to their new equilibrium level. Since prices are fixed in the short-run
and we are dealing with quantity adjustments only, we must specify the
regime that prevails in the market. In this paper we deal with the following
two regimes:
• Keynesian Unemployment, excess supply of labor and goods.
• Classical Unemployment, excess demand of goods and excess supply
of labor.
6Compare the solution of p2/p1 from the investment firm’s FOC and expression (6).
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Its regime specifies a different way individuals and firms are rationed in
the market. We need to be more explicit about the way individuals and
firms are rationed.
Before going to comment on the way individuals and firms are rationed
in the market, we will assume that rationing schemes satisfy the following
two properties:
• Voluntary exchange, no one is forced to purchase more than he de-
mands or to sell more than he supplies.
• Market efficiency, this implies that one will not find rationed deman-
ders and rationed suppliers in the same market.
2.3.1.1 Individuals and Rationing Schemes
If excess supply prevails in the market for labor in period one, some individ-
uals supply their labor inelastically while some others are rationed from the
market. Rationed individuals become unemployed and do not earn labor
income. The fraction of the unemployed individuals is u and satisfies the
following restriction, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
The maximization problem of unemployed individuals is as follows:
max
x1,x2
(log x1 + β log x2)
s.t
p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 = δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
l1 = 0
The respective optimal demands are as follows:
x1 =
1
p1(1 + β)
Π˜ (2.10)
x2 =
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π˜ (2.11)
where
Π˜ = δ +
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
Unemployed individuals are effectively rationed in their supply of labor.
Removing the constraint in the labor market during period one will increase
their utility level.
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Rationing on the good’s market will be assumed to follow a very sim-
ple scheme: employed individuals will be equally rationed and unemployed
individuals will not be rationed on this market.
The maximization problem of employed individuals is as follows:
max
x1,x2
(log x1 + β log x2)
s.t
p1x1 +
1
1 + r1
p2x2 = δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
x1 = x1
The respective demands are:
x1 = x1 (2.12)
x2 =
(1 + r1)
p2
(
Π− p1x1
)
(2.13)
The employed individuals aggregate excess demand for period one consump-
tion is defined as follows:
D = (1− u)
[ Π
p1(1 + β)
− x1
]
(2.14)
If condition (14) is positive then employed individuals are forced to reduce
consumption today and increase consumption tomorrow. This consumption
profile contradicts their optimal plan when there is no rationing in the good’s
market. Employed individuals are effectively rationed in their demand for
period one consumption. Unemployed individuals are not rationed in the
good’s market. Their consumption plan is given from (10),(11).
Since voluntary exchange is assumed, a comparison between employed’s
and unemployed’s utility levels becomes very important. In the Keynesian
equilibrium the answer is immediate. Employed’s utility is higher than the
unemployed’s one. In the Classical unemployment case is not immediate.It
will become clear why it is so when we lay down the equilibrium conditions
and talk about the characterization of equilibrium.
2.3.1.2 Firms and Rationing Schemes
Since we are considering two different market regimes, Keynesian or Classi-
cal, firms will be rationed only if excess supply prevails in the good’s market.
To be more precise, only the non-investing firm will be rationed in the good’s
market.
96 Chapter 2. Unemployment Equilibria in a Monetary Economy
The NI firm’s profit maximization is modified as follows:
max
[ p1y1
1 + r1
− w1l1
]
s.t
y1 ≤
√
l1
y1 ≤ y1
where y1 is the sales constraint coming from the good’s market. In the case
of binding constraints, maximum profits are as follows:
pi1 =
p1y1
1 + r1
− w1y21
In the Classical unemployment regime non-investing firm supplies output
and hires labor according to the Walrasian plan specified before and repeated
here:
y1 =
p1
2(1 + r1)w1
l1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w21
pi1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w1
2.3.2 Keynesian Unemployment
Equilibrium conditions in goods and labor markets respectively are as fol-
lows:
(1− u) 1
p1(1 + β)
Π + u
1
p1(1 + β)
Π˜ + I1 = y1 (2.15)
(1− u)β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π + u
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π˜ = F (l2, I1) (2.16)
(1− u)l1 = f−1(y1) = y21 (2.17)
l2 = l2 (2.18)
where y1, the demand-determined output, is allocated between the new level
of investment demand, I1, and consumption of employed and unemployed
individuals. Besides rationed in the labor market during period one, in-
dividuals are identical in all other respects. Taking this into account, the
interpretation of (16),(17),(18) is immediate.
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The money market clears a fortiori since the MFA accommodates the
money demand:
mT1 + n
NI
1 = M1 (2.19)
mT2 + n
I
2 = M2 (2.20)
where mT1 , m
T
2 are the total,(T), money demands of individuals. They are
equal to:
mT1 = (1− u)w1l1
= w1y
2
1 (2.21)
mT2 = (1− u)w2l2 + uw2l2 = w2l2 (2.22)
where (21) follows from the fact that unemployed individuals do not receive
labor income in period one.
The bond market clearing is as follows:
(1− u)bE1 + ubUN1 + bNI1 + bI1 = B1 (2.23)
(1− u)bE2 + ubUN2 + bI2 = B2 (2.24)
Also the following conditions are true:
bUN1 > b
E
1 (2.25)
bUN2 = b
E
2 = b2 (2.26)
Condition (25) follows from the asset market’s budget constraints in period
one and the fact that employed’s consumption is greater than unemployed’s
one. Condition (26) follows from the individuals transversality condition and
the fact that end-of-period money balances of period two are equal across
individuals.
Lastly, the MFA’s intertemporal constraint is as follows:
r1
1 + r1
M1 +
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
M2 + pi1 +
1
1 + r1
pi2 = δ (2.27)
We rewrite it as follows:
r1
1 + r1
(w1
p1
y21 + y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(w2l2
p2
p2
p1
+
p2
p1
y2
)
+
pi1
p1
=
δ
p1
(2.28)
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Following the same argument with the flexible price economy, the new level
of investment demand is equal to:
I1 =
β
2(1 + r2) + β
y1
Substituting for relative prices and investment demand, (28) becomes:
− w1y
2
1
1 + r1
+Ap1y1 − δ = 0 (2.29)
where
A = 1 +
βr2(3 + 2r2)
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
Solving (29) with respect to y1 we get:
y1 =
Ap1(1 + r1)±
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
2w1
(2.30)
Expression (30) is very important for the rest of the analysis in the
Keynesian unemployment regime. It is here that the assumption of taxation
of profits by the MFA will prove to be useful. Its usefulness lies in the
simplicity of expression (30). The importance of this simplicity is twofold.
First, it will be easy to prove that the bigger root is not accepted as a
solution when we specify the condition required for the characterization of
the Keynesian Unemployment equilibrium. Second, the comparative statics
of the smaller root with respect to r1, r2 give us unambiguous results that
will prove useful. Differentiating the smaller root of (30) with respect to r1,
r2 we get:
∂y1
∂r1
=
Ap1
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)−A2p21(1 + r1) + 2w1δ
2w1
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
(2.31)
∂y1
∂r2
=
∂A
∂r2
p1(1 + r1)
2w1
[
1− Ap1(1 + r1)√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(<0)
]
(2.32)
The numerator of (31) is always negative7:
7in order to prove this, use the following property: If α, b ≥ 0 and α2 < b2, then α < b.
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Ap1
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1) < A2p21(1 + r1)− 2w1δ
so that the derivative in (31) is always negative.
The derivative in (32) is always negative as well because the term in brackets
is negative and the following is true:
∂A
∂r2
=
β
(
2r22(1 + β) + 3(2 + β) + 4r2(2 + β)
)
(1 + r2)2(2 + 2r2 + β)2
> 0
The main message stemming from the signs of (31),(32) is that reductions
of the nominal interest rates will boost aggregate demand in period one and
as a consequence will increase demand-determined output.
2.3.2.1 Characterization of Keynesian Unemployment
Before looking at the welfare implications of an interest rate policy, we must
examine the fix price domain that characterizes the Keynesian Unemploy-
ment regime. The separation between non-investment and investment firms
proves to be quite useful.
In order for the above equilibrium to represent excess supply in the
markets during period one, the following two conditions must apply:
p1
2(1 + r1)w1
> y1 (2.33)√
l1 > y1 (2.34)
where (33) expresses the fact that there is excess supply in the good’s market
in period one and (34) that there is less than full employment. The usefulness
of having two firms in the economy is that conditions (33),(34) are easy to
manipulate and characterize the domain of Keynesian Unemployment.
Consider first the bigger root of (30). It will not satisfy the condition
(33) even if the term in the square root is positive:
p1
1 + r1
> Ap1(1 + r1) +
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
Applying this property we get the following:
A2p21
[
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
]
< A4p41(1 + r1)
2 + 4w21δ
2 − 4A2p21(1 + r1)w1δ
which reduces to
4w21δ
2 > 0
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which can not be true. The only possible candidate for a solution is the
smaller root of (30). The fix price domain characterizing the Keynesian
Unemployment regime should satisfy the following two inequalities:
p1
1 + r1
> Ap1(1 + r1)−
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)√
l1 >
Ap1(1 + r1)−
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
2w1
which is a system of two inequalities in p1, w1. Manipulating the previous
inequalities we get8:
p21 >
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.35)
p1 >
w1l1 + δ(1 + r1)
A(1 + r1)
√
l1
(2.36)
These curves intersect at two points: the Walrasian equilibrium (p∗1, w∗1) and
at (p¯1, w¯1) which satisfies:
p¯1 > p
∗
1, w¯1 > w
∗
1
so that the slope of (36) close to the Walrasian equilibrium is higher than
(35).
2.3.2.2 An intermediate case
Suppose we fix only the period one nominal wage rate. All other prices are
allowed to adjust to clear markets. Only the labor market in period one
does not clear in the usual sense.
Consider the FOC of the non-investment firm:
p1 = 2(1 + r1)w1y1 (2.37)
Combining (28),(37) we compute the equilibrium value of period one output
as follows9:
y1 =
√√√√ δ
w1
1
2(1 + r1)
(
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
)
8If condition (35) holds true, then the discriminant of (30) is always positive.
9Decreasing r1 or r2 will increase period one output and decrease the unemployment
level in that case as well.
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There is unemployment in period one for values of w1 that satisfy the fol-
lowing condition:
y1 <
√
l1
or
w1 > w
∗
1
where w∗1 is the nominal wage schedule in the Walrasian equilibrium.
The equilibrium value of period one price level is given by the following
relation:
p21 =
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
which is identical to (35).
2.3.3 Classical Unemployment
Consider the other type of unemployment where only individuals are ra-
tioned in the good’s and labor markets during period one. The respective
equilibrium conditions are written as follows:
(1− u)x1 + u 1
p1(1 + β)
Π˜ + I1 =
p1
2(1 + r1)w1
(2.38)
(1− u)(1 + r1)
p2
(
Π− p1x1
)
+ u
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π˜ = F (l2, I˜1) (2.39)
(1− u)l1 = p
2
1
4(1 + r1)2w21
= ld1 (2.40)
l2 = l
d
2 (2.41)
The money market clears a fortiori since the MFA accommodates the
money demand:
mT1 + n
NI
1 = M1 (2.42)
mT2 + n
I
2 = M2 (2.43)
where mT1 , m
T
2 are equal to:
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mT1 = (1− u)w1l1
= w1l
d
1 =
p21
4(1 + r1)2w1
(2.44)
mT2 = (1− u)w2l2 + uw2l2 = w2l2 (2.45)
The bond market clearing is analogous to the Keynesian case. It will not be
repeated again.
The MFA’s constraint is written as follows:
r1
1 + r1
(w1
p1
ld1 + y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(w2l2
p2
p2
p1
+
p2
p1
y2
)
+
pi1
p1
=
δ
p1
(2.46)
Combing the investment’s firm first order conditions and (46), we com-
pute the new level of investment demand
I1 =
(1 + r2)
r2(3 + 2r2)
[
δ
p1
− p1
4w1
4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1
(1 + r1)3
]
(2.47)
and p2, w2 are computed from the investment’s firm first order conditions
and u, x1 from (40),(38) respectively.
Employed individuals violate their optimal plan and consume more in
period two since they are rationed in the good’s market during period one.
Removing the constraint from the good’s market will allow them to smooth
consumption across periods and achieve a higher level of utility. The crucial
point is to show that employed individuals achieve a higher level of utility
than the unemployed achieve. Since exchange is voluntary, we need to guar-
antee that employed individuals participate in the exchange, namely that
they supply labor in period one.
If the aggregate excess demand, condition (14), is positive then em-
ployed’s period two consumption demand is always higher than the unem-
ployed’s one,
(1 + r1)
p2
(
Π− p1x1
)
>
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + β)
Π˜
which reduces to
Π
p1(1 + β)
+
β
p1(1 + β)
w1l1
1 + r1
> x1
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For period one consumption demand we need to show that the following
inequality is true10,
x1 ≥ 1
p1(1 + β)
Π˜
which is true for parameter values that satisfy the following condition:
p21 ≥
4δ(1 + r1)
3[2(1 + r2)
2 + β(1 + r2)]w1
2r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + r1)2(1 + β) + (4r1 + 2r21 + 1)(1 + (1 + r2)(1 + β))
(2.48)
For simplicity, let us denote with Λ(w1, r1, r2, .) the right hand side of (48).
Participation constraint. If the aggregate excess demand is positive,(14),
and condition (48) is satisfied, then employed individuals achieve a higher
level of utility than the unemployed ones.
2.3.3.1 Characterization of Classical unemployment
Since only employed individuals are rationed in the good’s market in period
one, the employed’s aggregate excess demand should be positive
D = (1− u)
[
Π
p1(1 + β)
− x1
]
> 0
Similarly, since a fraction u of individuals are rationed in the labor market,
positive unemployment means that the following must be true
u = 1− p
2
1
4(1 + r1)2w21
1
l1
> 0
The fix price domain characterizing Classical unemployment regime should
satisfy the following inequalities:
p21 <
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.49)
p21 < 4(1 + r1)
2w21l1 (2.50)
10A comparison of utility levels between employed and unemployed would have been
sufficient for the participation constraint argument.
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where (49) implies excess demand in the good’s market and (50) unemploy-
ment in the labor market.
Comparing the conditions that characterize the two unemployment regimes,
we see that condition (49) is identical to (35)- only that the inequality is
reversed. Substitute for zero aggregate excess demand, D = 0, into the
equilibrium conditions of the Classical unemployment regime. They become
identical with the equilibrium conditions in the Keynesian unemployment
regime. Thus there is one common curve that separates the two regimes.
In order to complete the characterization argument we must ensure that
the participation constraint restriction, (48), does not contradict conditions
(49),(50).
Classical unemployment with full participation requires the following
conditions:
Λ(w1, r1, r2, .) ≤ p21 <
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.51)
and also condition (50) must hold.
The interval in (51) is well defined since
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
> Λ(w1, r1, r2, .)⇒ 1 > 0
2.3.3.2 A note on the characterization of Classical unemployment
From (47) we see that equilibrium investment demand becomes infinite at
r2 = 0. The reason is the following: If we fix r2 = 0 initially, then from
(46) we can no longer solve for the investment demand simply because the
middle term in that equilibrium condition vanishes.
We can solve this problem by postulating that the investment firm’s
technology displays decreasing returns to scale. Thus, profits are positive in
equilibrium. If investment firm’s profits appear in (46), then the previous
argument when r2 = 0 does not apply. Working in a classical unemployment
regime we will assume that initially r2 is strictly positive.
2.3.3.3 Over-investment
The new level of investment demand, I1, is given in (47). In this section we
will lay down conditions such that there is over-investment compared to the
Walrasian equilibrium.
Consider the following inequality
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I1 >
β
√
l1
2(1 + r2) + β
It is always true if and only if
p1 < Ω(w1, r1, r2, .) (2.52)
where
Ω(w1, r1, r2, .) =
√(
βw1
2(1+r2)+β
√
l1
)2
+ (1+r2)
2
r22(3+2r2)
2
(4r1+2r21+1)
(1+r1)3
δw1 − βw12(1+r2)+β
√
l1
(1+r2)
r2(3+2r2)
(4r1+2r21+1)
2(1+r1)3
The graphs of (49),(52), intersect at the Walrasian equilibrium, (p∗1, w∗1),
and at zero. For points close11 to the Walrasian equilibrium condition (52)
is implied from (49).
§ 2.4 Welfare
In the first part of the paper we showed that if the price level is free to
adjust to clear markets, the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto optimal.
This inefficiency is implied by the cash-in-advance technology that we have
assumed. In the second part we extended this framework to incorporate two
different types of unemployment into the analysis.
The question we want to answer in this part and in this paper is the
following: What are the welfare implications of a nominal interest rate per-
turbation given the unemployment regime that prevails in the market?
2.4.1 Keynesian Unemployment
From (31),(32) we determine the sign of investment’s demand comparative
statics with respect to r1, r2,
∂I1
∂r1
=
β
2(1 + r2) + β
∂y1
∂r1
< 0
∂I1
∂r2
=
β
2(1 + r2) + β
∂y1
∂r2
− 2β
(2(1 + r2) + β)2
y1 < 0
11At w1 < w
∗
1 the slope of (52) is higher than that of (49). For all (p1, w1), (52) is
implied by (49),(50). At w1 > w
∗
1 the slope of (52) decreases and becomes lower than the
slope of (49). This happens at w1 = w
∗
1 + ,  > 0. At w1 > w1, the parameter region
consistent with Classical unemployment splits in two regions. One that (52) is implied
from (49) and another one that (52) is not implied from (49). The former region is much
bigger that the latter.
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where y1 is determined in (30).
Consider the inflation rate which is computed from the investment firm’s
first order conditions,
p2
p1
=
2(1 + r1)(1 + r2)√
l2
√
I1
The derivative of the inflation rate with respect to r1 is as follows
∂(p2/p1)
∂r1
=
√
I1√
l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
[
2
1 + r1
+
∂y1
∂r1
1
y1
]
(2.53)
and the sign of it depends on the term in the underbrace.
The term in brackets is positive if the following condition apply
−∂y1
∂r1
1
y1
<
2
1 + r1
⇒ p21 >
25w1δ
6A2(1 + r1)
(2.54)
The second inequality in (54) is implied by (35). Reductions of period one
nominal rate, reduce the inflation rate.
The derivative of the inflation rate with respect to r2 is as follows
∂(p2/p1)
∂r2
=
√
I1√
l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
[
2
1 + r2
+
∂I1
∂r2
1
I1
]
(2.55)
The term in brackets is positive if
−∂I1
∂r2
1
I1
<
2
1 + r2
⇒ p21 >
(
2(1+r2)+2β
2(1+r2)2+β(1+r2)
)2
4w1δ(1 + r1)
(1 + r1)2
(
A2
(
2(1+r2)+2β
2(1+r2)2+β(1+r2)
)2 − (∂A/∂r2)2)
(2.56)
and the denominator is always positive.
The second inequality in (56) is always implied by (35) for r2 > 0.81 even if
r1 is close to zero
12.
We analyze the comparative statics of the inflation rate with respect to
perturbations in r1, r2 because it is going to be useful to analyze welfare
implications in the next section.
12If r2 ≤ 0.81 then (35) implies (56) for all r1 > Φ(r2 ≤ 0.81), where
Φ(r2) =
1
2− β + 4r2(1 + β) + 2r22(1 + β)
[
− 2 + β − 4r2(1 + β)− 2r22(1 + β)+
√
2
√
(1 + r2) (2 + β − β2 + 2r23(1 + β) + 2r22 (3 + 4β + β2) + r2 (6 + 7β + 4β2))
]
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2.4.1.1 Unemployed individuals
The equilibrium allocation of unemployed individuals is as follows:
x1 =
1
1 + β
(
δ
p1
+
I1
1 + r2
)
x2 =
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
(
δ
√
l2
2p1
√
I1
+
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + r2)
)
where
I1 =
β
2(1 + r2) + β
y1
y1 =
p1(1 + r1)A−
√
A2p21(1 + r1)
2 − 4w1δ(1 + r1)
2w1
A = 1 +
βr2(3 + 2r2)
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
Perturbing r1 we compute the effect on the unemployed’s equilibrium allo-
cation as follows:
∂x1
∂r1
=
1
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
∂I1
∂r1
< 0 (2.57)
∂x2
∂r1
=
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
√
l2
4
√
I1
[
1
1 + r2
− δ
p1I1
]
∂I1
∂r1
(2.58)
The sign of (58) depends on the term in brackets. It is positive if
1
1 + r2
− δ
p1I1
> 0⇒ y1 >
p1(1 + r1)
w1
(
A− β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
)
(2.59)
where we have used (29) to derive the second inequality above. From the
existence argument we know that condition (33) has to hold. Comparing
At r1 ≥ Φ(r2), (35) is greater or equal to (56). Condition r1 > Φ(r2 ≤ 0.81) is not very
restrictive. If r2 = 0, the maximum value of Φ is Φ(r2 = 0, β = 1) = 1. Otherwise, Φ is a
small number.
If r2 > 0.81 then (56) is implied from (35) for any non-negative value of r1 because
Φ(r2 > 0.81) < 0.
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(33),(59) we end up in a contradiction13. The derivative in (58) is always
positive.
The effect on unemployed’s utility is computed as follows:
∂u
∂r1
=
∂I1
∂r1
[
I1
1 + r2
− β
2 + β
δ
p1
]
2(2 + β)(1 + r2)p1I1
δ(1 + r2) + p1I1
The term in brackets is positive if
I1
1 + r2
− β
2 + β
δ
p1
> 0⇒ y1 >
p1(1 + r1)
w1
[
A− 2 + β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
]
(2.60)
where we have used (29) again to derive the second inequality in (60). Com-
paring again (33),(60) we end up in the following condition for a Pareto
improvement,
Condition I.
In order for a reduction in the nominal interest rate of period one to make
unemployed individuals better off, the nominal rate of period two should be
close to/or zero initially such that (60) is satisfied14.
If r2 = 0, then (60) is trivially satisfied. Since r2 must be very close to zero,
we can also work with the following stricter form of the above condition
13From (33),(59) the following must be true
p1(1 + r1)
w1
(
A− β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
)
< y1 <
p1
2w1(1 + r1)
which cannot hold because
p1(1 + r1)
w1
(
A− β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
)
>
p1
2w1(1 + r1)
for all parameter values.
14From (33),(60) the following must be true
p1(1 + r1)
w1
(
A− 2 + β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
)
< y1 <
p1
2w1(1 + r1)
which is a well-defined interval if
p1
2w1(1 + r1)
>
p1(1 + r1)
w1
(
A− 2 + β
2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2)
)
This inequality holds if r2 is a very small number or r2 = 0 for any r1.
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Condition I (Strict Form).
In order for a reduction in the nominal interest rate of period one to make
unemployed individuals better off, the nominal rate of period two should be
equal to zero initially.
Considering perturbations of r2, the effect on unemployed’s equilibrium
allocation is as follows:
∂x1
∂r2
=
1
1 + β
(
− I1
(1 + r2)2
+
1
1 + r2
∂I1
∂r2
)
< 0 (2.61)
∂x2
∂r2
=
−β
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + β)(1 + r2)3
− βδ
√
l2
4p1
√
I1(1 + β)(1 + r2)
(
2
1 + r2
+
1
I1
∂I1
∂r2
)
+
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
( √
l2
4(1 + r2)
√
I1
∂I1
∂r2
−
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + r2)2
)
(2.62)
Condition II.
If condition (56) is satisfied then the derivative in (62) is always negative.
As a consequence, reductions of r2 make unemployed individuals better off.
Condition II is unnecessary. If we consider perturbations of r2 on unem-
ployed’s utility we can verify that reductions of r2 always increase utility
15.
Thus, we are led to the following condition,
Condition II. (revisited)
Decreases of r2 always make unemployed individuals better off.
2.4.1.2 Employed individuals
The equilibrium allocation of employed individuals is as follows:
x1 =
1
1 + β
[
δ
p1
+
w1l1
p1(1 + r1)
+
I1
1 + r2
]
x2 =
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
[
δ
√
l2
2p1
√
I1
+
w1l1
p1
√
l2
2(1 + r1)
√
I1
+
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + r2)
]
Perturbing r1 we compute the effect on the unemployed’s equilibrium
allocation as follows:
15We can show this by doing some numerical calibrations involving the parameters of
the model.
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∂x1
∂r1
=
1
(1 + β)
[
− w1l1
p1(1 + r1)2
+
1
1 + r2
∂I1
∂r1
]
< 0
∂x2
∂r1
=
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
[
− δ
√
l2
4p1I1
√
I1
∂I1
∂r1
+
√
l2
4(1 + r2)
√
I1
∂I1
∂r1
−
w1l1
√
l2
4p1(1 + r1)I1
√
I1
∂I1
∂r1
− w1l1
√
l2
2p1(1 + r1)2
√
I1
]
The effect on employed’s utility is computed as follows:
∂u
∂r1
=
1
Π
[
− βw1l1
2p1(1 + r1)
(
2(1 + β)
β(1 + r1)
+
1
y1
∂y1
∂r1
)
+
∂I1
∂r1
(
2 + β
2(1 + r2)
− βδ
2p1I1
)]
(2.63)
We do not have to make further restrictions. The first term in parenthesis
is implied by (53),(54), because
2(1 + β)
β(1 + r1)
>
2
1 + r1
The second term in parenthesis is implied by condition I. Thus, decreases of
r1 make employed individuals better off according to the previous conditions.
Lastly, consider perturbations of r2. The effect on the equilibrium allo-
cation is as follows:
∂x1
∂r2
=
1
1 + β
[
1
1 + r2
∂I1
∂r2
− I1
(1 + r2)2
]
< 0 (2.64)
∂x2
∂r2
= − β
√
l2
4(1 + β)(1 + r2)p1
√
I1
[
2
1 + r2
+
1
I1
∂I1
∂r2
][
δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
]
−
β
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + β)(1 + r2)3
− β
√
l2
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
√
I1
[
I1
2(1 + r2)2
− ∂I1/∂r2
4(1 + r2)
]
(2.65)
Again the same argument applies as in the case of unemployed individuals.
Reductions of r2 always make employed individuals better-off.
2.4.1.3 Keynesian Unemployment and the Friedman Rule
The main message from the previous discussion is that optimal monetary
policy is characterized by zero interest rates. In a Keynesian Unemployment
2.4. Welfare 111
Equilibrium output is demand determined in period one. Nominal rates
represent a cost to liquidity under the previous cash-in-advance set-up. Zero
nominal rates imply costless borrowing in the asset markets which boost the
aggregate demand in period one.
For condition I we do not require r1 to be positive initially. We required
only r2 to be zero initially. This means that we could have fixed r1 =
r2 = 0 and argue that the monetary-authority should not deviate from this
rule. For condition II, the revisited version, we do not require nominal rates
to be positive initially. We could have fixed them at zero and consider
the derivatives with respect to r2. From footnote 12 we showed that for
low initial values of r1, r2, the good’s price of period two reduces when r2
is reduced. This is sufficient to make employed and unemployed better-
off according to condition II, not the revisited one. Since we can show
numerically that this sufficient condition is redundant, it is not surprising
that we can fix nominal rates at zero and conclude that it is not optimal to
increase r2.
In order to understand the argument behind condition I, it is useful to
take a look at the asset market constraints of unemployed individuals16.
Following a decrease of r1, demand-determined output is increased in pe-
riod one. Unemployed individuals increase their holdings of initial money
balances in their portfolio in order to increase consumption and reduce their
holdings of bonds. Since their bond holdings, savings, in period one de-
crease, they will enter with less resources in the asset market in period two.
Thus, setting initially r2 = 0, makes it costless to borrow money balances in
the asset markets of period two, given that they transfer less resources from
period one.
When we consider perturbations only of r2 we can show numerically for
employed and unemployed that r2 should be zero at the optimum. The
reason is that r2 is a cost on liquidity and reductions of it boost aggregate
demand when unemployment is of a Keynesian nature. Condition II is
redundant. We can verify numerically that the revised form of condition II
is true for unemployed and employed individuals. Thus, condition II is a
corollary of the strict form of condition I.
2.4.2 Classical unemployment
The comparative statics of investment demand with respect to r1, r2 are as
follows:
16The argument for employed individuals is analogous.
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∂I1
∂r1
=
p1
4w1
1 + r2
r2(3 + 2r2)
2(r1 + 2.22)(r1 − 0.22)
(1 + r1)4
∂I1
∂r2
= −
[
δ
p1
− p1
4w1
(4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1)
(1 + r1)3
]
(3 + 4r2 + 2r
2
2)
r22(3 + 2r2)
2
< 0
and for initial values of r1 above 0.22
17, the investment demand is increasing
in r1.
The derivative of the inflation rate with respect to r1 is as follows:
∂(p2/p1)
∂r1
=
√
I1√
l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
[
2
1 + r1
+
∂I1
∂r1
1
I1
]
always positive for r1 > 0.22.
The derivative of the inflation rate with respect to r2 is as follows:
∂(p2/p1)
∂r2
=
√
I1√
l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
[
2
1 + r2
+
∂I1
∂r2
1
I1
]
and for r2 ≷ 0.82 the derivative above is either positive or negative.
2.4.2.1 Unemployed individuals
The equilibrium allocation of unemployed individuals is as follows
x1 =
1
1 + β
(
δ
p1
+
I1
1 + r2
)
x2 =
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
(
δ
√
l2
2p1
√
I1
+
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + r2)
)
where
I1 =
(1 + r2)
r2(3 + 2r2)
[
δ
p1
− p1
4w1
4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1
(1 + r1)3
]
The derivative of the equilibrium allocation with respect to r1 is as follows:
17This threshold value will play a role when we discuss the elastic labor supply case.
For the rest of the analysis in this section I will assume that initially r1 > 0.22 whenever
we consider perturbations with respect to r1.
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∂x1
∂r1
=
1
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
∂I1
∂r1
(2.66)
∂x2
∂r1
=
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
√
l2
4
√
I1
[
1
1 + r2
− δ
p1I1
]
∂I1
∂r1
(2.67)
The effect on unemployed’s utility is:
∂u
∂r1
=
∂I1
∂r1
[
I1
1 + r2
− β
2 + β
δ
p1
]
2(2 + β)(1 + r2)p1I1
δ(1 + r2) + p1I1
(2.68)
The term in parentheses determines the sign of (68). A sufficient condition
for this term to be negative and for the unemployed to become better off is:
βr2(3 + 2r2) ≥ 2 + β (2.69)
A necessary and sufficient condition for the term in parentheses to be neg-
ative and for the unemployed to become better off is:
p21 +
w1δ
4r1+2r21+1
4(1+r1)3
[
βr2(3 + 2r2)− (2 + β)
2 + β
]
> 0 (2.70)
which is automatically satisfied whenever (69) is true. Condition (70) should
apply whenever (69) is not true. Without loss of generality, consider the
following sufficient condition
Condition III.
If the nominal interest rate of period two is expected to be sufficiently high
initially, condition (69), then reducing the nominal rate of period one will
make unemployed individuals better off.
The derivative of the equilibrium allocation with respect to r2 is as fol-
lows:
∂x1
∂r2
=
1
1 + β
(
− I1
(1 + r2)2
+
1
1 + r2
∂I1
∂r2
)
< 0
∂x2
∂r2
=
−β
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + β)(1 + r2)3
− βδ
√
l2
4p1
√
I1(1 + β)(1 + r2)
(
2
1 + r2
+
1
I1
∂I1
∂r2
)
+
β
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
( √
l2
4(1 + r2)
√
I1
∂I1
∂r2
−
√
l2
√
I1
2(1 + r2)2
)
The following sufficient condition guarantees that unemployed individuals
become better off after a decrease of r2,
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Condition IV.
If the nominal interest rate of period two is expected to be sufficiently high
initially, r2 > 0.82, then a reduction of it will make unemployed individuals
better off.
2.4.2.2 Employed individuals
In order to determine the effect of an interest rate perturbation on the
employed’s equilibrium allocation, we need to determine the sign of the
following derivatives: ∂x1/∂r1, ∂x1/∂r2.
Considering perturbations of r1, the following is true:
∂x1
∂r1
< 0⇔ p21 <
√
B2 + 4∆Γ−B
2Γ
(2.71)
where
B = 1 +
[
1
1 + β
+ 1 + r2
]
3 + 4r1 + 2r
2
1
2(1 + r1)2r2(3 + 2r2)
Γ =
(r1 + 2.22)(r1 − 0.22)
4w21l1(1 + β)(1 + r1)
4r2(3 + 2r2)
∆ =
4(1 + r1)(1 + r2)w1δ
r2(3 + 2r2)
+
4(1 + r1)w1δ
1 + β
[
1 +
1
r2(3 + 2r2)
]
Condition (71) looks complicated but we can show that it is implied from
(49).
The effect on employed’s utility is as follows:
∂u
∂r1
=
−β
(Π− p1x1)
1
2I1
∂I1
∂r1
[
Π− p1x1
]
+
∂x1
∂r1
p1(1 + β)
(Π− p1x1)x1
[ Π
p1(1 + β)
− x1
]
+
β
(Π− p1x1)
1
4w1(1 + r1)4
[
2r21 + 4r1 − 1
r2(3 + 2r2)
p21 − 4w21(1 + r1)2l1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(?)
]
(2.72)
The sign of the above expression is negative if the term in the underbrace is
negative. The term in the underbrace is negative when we consider condition
(50) from the characterization argument if the following is true:
2r21 + 4r1 − 1
r2(3 + 2r2)
≤ 1
and it is satisfied whenever r2 is sufficiently higher than r1. This lead us to
the following condition
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Condition V.
If monetary policy is sufficiently tighter in period two than period one ini-
tially, r2 > r1, then reducing the nominal interest rate today will make
employed individuals better off.
The effect on employed’s equilibrium allocation from a perturbation of
r2 is as follows:
∂x1
∂r2
> 0 (2.73)
∂x2
∂r2
=
−
√
l2
2p1(1 + r2)
√
I˜1
(
1
2I1
∂I1
∂r2
+
1
1 + r2
)(
Π− p1x1
)
−
√
l2
2p1(1 + r2)
√
I1
(
− p1∂I1/∂r2
1 + r2
+
p1I1
(1 + r2)2
+ p1
∂x1
∂r2
)
(2.74)
where the sign of (73) follows from the good’s market clearing of period one
and the sign of (74) is always negative whenever r2 > 0.82.
The effect on the employed’s utility is
∂u
∂r2
=
1
x1
∂x1
∂r2
− β
Π− p1x1
[(
1
2I1
∂I1
∂r2
+
1
1 + r2
)(
Π− p1x1
)
+(
− p1∂I1/∂r2
1 + r2
+
p1I1
(1 + r2)2
+ p1
∂x1
∂r2
)]
(2.75)
Since the above expression is rather complicated, we can determine the
sign of it using an informal argument. Suppose we focus attention to fix
price combinations close to the Walrasian equilibrium but strictly inside the
region of Classical unemployment implied by (49),(50). This means that the
constraint in the good’s market in period one is not severe. If the interest
rate in period two is expected to fall, then individuals will save more in
the asset market in period one and increase their indebtedness in the asset
market tomorrow. Since the constraint in period one is not severe, the
increase in consumption tomorrow outweighs the decrease in consumption
today so that total utility is increased.
Condition VI.
If the nominal interest rate of period two is expected to be sufficiently high
initially, r2 > 0.82, and we restrict attention to period one price-wage config-
urations close to the Walrasian ones which satisfy (49),(50), then a reduction
of r2 will make the employed individuals better off.
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2.4.2.3 The formal argument behind Condition VI
A formal argument requires to manipulate expression (75). Reducing the
nominal rate of period two will make employed individuals better off if the
following expression is positive:
Ψ(p1, w1, ·) = −∂I1
∂r2
(p1, w1, ·) p1
(1 + r2)[Π(p1, w1, ·)− p1x1(p1, w1, ·)]
[
β−
(1 + β)(1 + r2) + u(p1, w1, ·)
(1− u(p1, w1, ·))2x1(p1, w1, ·)D(p1, w1, ·)
]
+
p1I1(p1, w1, ·)
(1 + r2)2[Π(p1, w1, ·)− p1x1(p1, w1, ·)]
[
β−
u(p1, w1, ·)
(1− u(p1, w1, ·))2x1(p1, w1, ·)D(p1, w1, ·)
]
+
β
2
[
2
1 + r2
− 3 + 4r2 + 2r
2
2
r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + r2)
]
(2.76)
Proving that Ψ(p1, w1, ·) > 0 is really involved. Instead, I will characterize
the sign of Ψ(p1, w1, ·) at price-wage configurations close to the Walrasian
one18. Suppose the price-wage configuration of period one is given by the
following relations,
pn1 = p
∗
1 − n1 , 0 < 1 < 1
wn1 = w
∗
1 + 
n
2 , 0 < 2 < 1, n = 1, 2, 3, ...
and
lim
n→∞ p
n
1 = p
∗
1, limn→∞w
n
1 = w
∗
1
It is not difficult to find sufficiently small values of 1, 2 such that con-
ditions (49),(50) from the characterization argument are satisfied and as
n → ∞, the price-wage configuration tend to the Walrasian one but from
points strictly inside the region characterizing Classical Unemployment. Us-
ing the above sequences we can show that if prices are close to the Walrasian
ones but strictly inside the region of Classical Unemployment, then the sign
of Ψ(p1, w1, ·) is positive. In order to do that, we need to show that the
following limit is strictly positive,
18 Satisfying always (49),(50)
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lim
n→∞Ψ(p
n
1 , w
n
1 , ·)
This can be easily proved since we can determine the following limits
lim
n→∞u(p
n
1 , w
n
1 , ·) = 0
lim
n→∞D(p
n
1 , w
n
1 , ·) = 0
lim
n→∞
(
− ∂I1
∂r2
(pn1 , w
n
1 , ·)
)
= positive constant
lim
n→∞x1(p
n
1 , w
n
1 , ·) =
Π(p∗1, w∗1, ·)
p∗1(1 + β)
Given the above limit values and r2 > 0.82, limn→∞Ψ(pn1 , wn1 , ·), is always
positive.
2.4.2.4 Classical Unemployment and Optimal Monetary Policy
Let us start with the unemployed individuals. The effects of perturbations of
r1 is different than the Keynesian case. Reducing r1 will reduce consumption
demand of unemployed in period one because the real wage of period two falls
and as a consequence the intertemporal income of unemployed individuals
is reduced. Unemployed individuals are better-off because the good’s price
level in period two falls after a reduction of r1 and this outweigh the fall
of the real wage in period after a reduction of r1. This happens because
r2 is sufficiently high initially. Consider perturbations of r2. A sufficient
condition for reductions of r2 to make unemployed individuals better-off is
the good’s price level to fall in period two. This requires r2 > 0.82 initially.
Consider the employed individuals. Reductions of r1 increase employed’s
constrained demand in period one because investment demand and con-
sumption demand of unemployed falls. The good’s price in period two falls.
Employed’s net discounted income, Π− p1x1, falls as well after a reduction
of r1. Condition V guarantees that the latter effect does not dominate the
former effects on employed’s utility. Consider perturbations of r2. Reduc-
ing r2 is welfare improving for employed individuals if r2 is sufficiently high
initially. The intuition is that since employed individuals are constrained in
the good’s market in period one, they are forced to consume more in period
two. If r2 is sufficiently high initially, then the constraint of employed in the
good’s market is not so severe because unemployed individuals demand in
period one and equilibrium investment are sufficiently low. Reducing r2 in
that case will make employed individuals reduce consumption in period one
and increase consumption in period two.
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§ 2.5 Elastic labor supply
2.5.1 Flexible prices
Let us start again with the case of flexible prices.
The problem of each individual is modified as follows:
max
x1,x2,l1,l2
[
log(x1) + log(l1 − l1) + β log(x2) + β log(l2 − l2)
]
s.t
p1x1 +
p2x2
1 + r1
= δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
The respective demands and supplies are as follows:
x1 =
1
2p1(1 + β)
Π
x2 =
β(1 + r1)
2p2(1 + β)
Π
l1 = l1 − 1 + r1
2w1(1 + β)
Π
l2 = l2 − β(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
2w2(1 + β)
Π
where
Π = δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
The equilibrium for this case is as follows,
x1 + I1 = y1 =
p1
2w1(1 + r1)
(2.77)
x2 = F (l2, I1) (2.78)
l1 =
p21
4w21(1 + r1)
2
= ld1 (2.79)
l2 = l
d
2 (2.80)
r1
1 + r1
(
w1l
d
1 + p1y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(
w2l
d
2 + p2y2
)
+ pi1+
1
1 + r1
pi2 = δ (2.81)
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and the first-order-conditions from the investing firm’s problem are as fol-
lows:
w2
p2
=
1
1 + r2
√
I1
2
√
ld2
(2.82)
p2
p1
= 2(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
√
I1√
ld2
(2.83)
Combining (77),(78) we get:
p2
p1
= β(1 + r1)
y1 − I1
F (l2, I1)
(2.84)
and from (83),(84) we compute I1 as follows:
I1 =
β
2(1 + r2) + β
y1 (2.85)
Combining (81),(82),(83),(85) we end up in the following relation:
p21
w1
A = δ (2.86)
where
A =
4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1
4(1 + r1)3
+
βr2(3 + 2r2)
2(1 + r1)(1 + r2)[2(1 + r2) + β]
Substituting (86) into (79) we compute the equilibrium value of w1 as follows:
w∗1l1
1 + β
2 + β
=
1 + r1
2(1 + β)
[
δ + δ
β
2 + β
+
β(1 + β)δ
A(2 + β)(1 + r1)(1 + r2)[2(1 + r2) + β]
]
+
δ
4A(1 + r1)2
(2.87)
a rather complicated solution.
The equilibrium value of period one labor supply is as follows
l1 =
δ
4A(1 + r1)2w∗1
and of period two labor supply,
l2 =
l2
3 + 4r2 + 2r22
which is independent of r1.
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2.5.2 Keynesian Unemployment
The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
(1− u) Π
2p1(1 + β)
+ u
Π˜
2p1(1 + β)
+ I1 = y1 (2.88)
(1− u)β(1 + r1)Π
2p2(1 + β)
+ u
β(1 + r1)Π˜
2p2(1 + β)
= F (l2, I1) (2.89)
(1− u)l1 = f−1(y1) = y21 (2.90)
(1− u)l2 + ul˜2 = ld2 (2.91)
r1
1 + r1
(
w1y
2
1 + p1y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(w2l
d
2 + p2y2)+
pi1 +
1
1 + r1
pi2 = δ (2.92)
where
Π˜ = δ +
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
l˜2 = l2 − β(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
2w2(1 + β)
Π˜
Combining (88),(89) we get:
p2
p1
= β(1 + r1)
y1 − I1
F (l2, I1)
and
I1 =
β
2(1 + r2) + β
y1
From (92) we get:
y1 =
p1(1 + r1)∆±
√
(1 + r1)2∆2p21 − 4w1δ0(1 + r1)
2w1
where19
19only the smaller root is accepted as a solution as it is shown in the characterization
argument below.
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∆ = 1 +
βr2(3 + 2r2)
(1 + r2)(2(1 + r2) + β)
From the investment firm’s first order conditions we get that:
w2l
d
2
1 + r1
= p1I1 (2.93)
and from (91),(93) we get:
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
=
2(1 + β)
2 + β
p1I1
1 + r2
+
β
2 + β
δ + (1− u) β
2 + β
w1l1
1 + r1
(2.94)
Labor market clearing of period one, (92), can be written as follows:
u2D + u(E − 2D)− (E −B −D) = 0
where
E =
w1l1
1 + r1
− 1
2(1 + β)
[
δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
2(1 + β)
2 + β
p1I1
1 + r2
+
β
2 + β
δ
]
B =
w1y
2
1
1 + r1
D =
β
2(2 + β)(1 + β)
w1l1
1 + r1
Solving for the unemployment rate we get:
u =
−(E − 2D)±√(E − 2D)2 + 4D(E −B −D)
2D
(2.95)
From (95) there is the possibility of two solutions. The characterization
argument is more challenging in that case since we need to look for conditions
that allows us to work with only one of them.
2.5.2.1 Characterization of Keynesian Unemployment
The solutions for the demand-determined output and the unemployment
rate are as follows,
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y1 =
p1(1 + r1)∆±
√
(1 + r1)2∆2p21 − 4w1δ0(1 + r1)
2w1
u =
−(E − 2D)±√(E − 2D)2 + 4D(E −B −D)
2D
For the demand-determined output solution the argument in the inelastic
labor case applies. We accept only the smaller root. For the unemployment
solution we need to do more work.
If E −B −D > 0, then
u =
−(E − 2D) +√(E − 2D)2 + 4D(E −B −D)
2D
(2.96)
is accepted as a solution.
Condition E −B −D > 0, can be equivalently written as follows:
lW1 − y21 > 0 (2.97)
where lW1 is the Walrasian labor supply plan. At the Walrasian price-wage
combination, condition (97) becomes zero. Manipulating (97) we end up in
the following inequality,
p1Θ
√
(1 + r1)2∆2p21 − 4w1δ(1 + r1) >p21(1 + r1)∆Θ−(
w21l1
1 + r1
1 + β
2 + β
+
w1δ(1 + β)
2 + β
)
where the right hand side is positive for a sufficiently large neighborhood of
points close to the Walrasian prices. Thus, the above expression becomes
p21 >
(
w21l1
1+r1
1+β
2+β +
w1δ(1+β)
2+β
)2
2(1 + r1)∆Θ
(
w21l1
1+r1
1+β
2+β +
w1δ(1+β)
2+β
)
− 4w1δ(1 + r1)Θ2
(2.98)
where
Θ =
β
2(2 + β)(2(1 + r2)2 + β(1 + r2))
+
∆
2
∆ = 1 +
βr2(3 + 2r2)
(1 + r2)(2(1 + r2) + β)
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Expression (98) has an asymptote at
wˆ1 =
(1 + r1)(2 + β)δ
∆(1 + β)l1
[
2Θ− (1 + β)∆
2 + β
]
and also w∗1 > wˆ1 for all parameter values.
The next step is to verify that if the price-wage combination of period
one is equal to the Walrasian one, then the unemployment rate tends is zero.
We said before that if the price-wage combination of period one is equal to
the walrasian one, then
E −B −D = 0 (2.99)
Since we are working with the bigger root from the solution above, if prices
equal the Walrasian ones and condition (99) applies, a necessary condition
for the unemployment rate to be zero is
E − 2D > 0⇔ lW1 >
βl1
2(2 + β)(1 + β)
(2.100)
which means that the Walrasian labor supply plan has to be bounded below.
Combining (97),(100), we see that (100) is implied by (97) if the following
is true,
y21 >
βl1
2(2 + β)(1 + β)
(2.101)
Condition (101) reduces to the following requirement
√
(1 + r1)2∆2p21 − 4w1δ(1 + r1) < p1(1 + r1)∆− 2w1
√
βl1
2(2 + β)(1 + β)
and the right hand side is strictly positive close to the Walrasian prices. It
can be simplified as follows,
p1 <
βw1l1
2(1+β)(2+β) + δ(1 + r1)
(1 + r1)∆
√
βl1
2(1+β)(2+β)
(2.102)
To sum up, conditions for a well-defined20 Keynesian unemployment
equilibrium when we accept the big root from (95) are as follows
20well-defined in the sense that whenever prices tend to the Walrasian ones, the unem-
ployment rate tends to zero.
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p21 >
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.103)
p1 <
βw1l1
2(1+β)(2+β) + δ(1 + r1)
(1 + r1)∆
√
βl1
2(1+β)(2+β)
(2.104)
p21 >
(
w21l1
1+r1
1+β
2+β +
w1δ(1+β)
2+β
)2
2(1 + r1)∆Θ
(
w21l1
1+r1
1+β
2+β +
w1δ(1+β)
2+β
)
− 4w1δ(1 + r1)Θ2
(2.105)
Condition (103) implies that there is excess supply in the good’s market
in period one. Conditions (104),(105) imply that the unemployment rate
is positive and is close to zero in a neighborhood close to the Walrasian
equilibrium prices.
In order to complete the argument we must guarantee that the above
inequalities, (103)-(105), do not lead to a contradiction. We must prove that
the graph of (104) is above the graph of (103) and as a consequence above
the graph of (105). The graphs of (103),(104) cross at
w¯1 =
(X2 − 2AΓ)±X√X2 − 4AΓ
2A2
where
X =
√√√√ 2(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
A =
βl1
2(1+β)(2+β)
(1 + r1)∆
√
βl1
2(1+β)(2+β)
Γ =
δ(1 + r1)
(1 + r1)∆
√
βl1
2(1+β)(2+β)
where we will not pay attention to the bigger root because it refers to points
very far from the Walrasian equilibrium price-wage configuration. If w¯1 >
w∗1, then the graph of (104) is above the graph of (103). We need to show
that w¯1 > w
∗
1. For this we need to place the following restriction on the
policy parameters,
r1 < Φ(r2, β, δ, l1) (2.106)
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where Φ(·) is a rather complicated expression. If we calibrate21 the param-
eters of the model, we end up in the following restriction
r1 < 1.5 (2.107)
Discussion of condition (107) will be given in the following section.
If E − B − D < 0, E − 2D < 0, then we could accept both solutions.
Since this multiplicity of equilibria is not very helpful in doing comparative
statics, we will not pursue it further.
2.5.2.2 Monetary policy as the main cause of excessive unem-
ployment: Keynesian Unemployment regime
The solution that we decided to accept and work is the following:
u =
−(E − 2D) +√(E − 2D)2 + 4D(E −B −D)
2D
This solution has an interesting feature. According to the previous discus-
sion, two different situations can arise in a neighborhood of the walrasian
equilibrium,
Low Unemployment E − 2D > 0
High Unemployment E − 2D < 0
The Keynesian equilibrium is well-defined in a neighborhood of the Wal-
rasian equilibrium when E − 2D > 0, such that the unemployment rate is
close to zero whenever prices tend to the Walrasian ones.
There is also a possibility that the unemployment rate is sufficiently
high whenever prices of period one are very close, but not equal, to the
Walrasian ones. This is interesting because the principal reason for any kind
of excess capacities in equilibrium is that prices of period one are different
from the Walrasian ones. Thus, when the fundamentals in the market,
period one prices, do not justify high rates of unemployment, the actions of
the monetary-authority can create excessive unemployment.
Condition (107) is a sufficient condition to rule out abnormally high
levels of unemployment for price-wage configurations close to the Walrasian
21Consider the following values for the structural parameters of the economy,
β 0.9
l2 1
l1 1
δ 0.5
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equilibrium one. It simply states that if monetary policy in period one is not
sufficiently tight, then Keynesian equilibrium is well-defined for price-wage
configurations close to the Walrasian equilibrium one.
The interesting point is that if condition (107) does not apply and mon-
etary policy is sufficiently tight in period one, then high levels of unemploy-
ment are possible close for price-wage configurations close to the Walrasian
equilibrium one. Effective labor market clearing in period one can be written
as follows,
(1− u)
(
lW1 + u
βl1
2(2 + β)(1 + β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective labor supply
)
= y21 (2.108)
If condition (109) is not satisfied then we can not guarantee that E−2D > 0.
In that case the following situation may arise,
βl1
2(2 + β)(1 + β)
> lW1 > y
2
1 (2.109)
From (108),(109) we see that the effective labor supply is sufficiently higher
than labor demand when monetary policy is very tight in period one. The
only way for labor market to clear is the unemployment rate to be also
sufficiently high.
To sum up, monetary policy can be the main cause of excessive unem-
ployment in the economy if condition (107) is violated. This is interesting
because it happens in a neighborhood of period one prices close to the Wal-
rasian equilibrium ones. This means that although the fundamentals in the
economy do not justify high rates of unemployment, the unemployment level
can be sufficiently high.
The following numerical examples illustrate the previous argument,
•
r1 = 1, r2 = 1
p∗1 = 1.02842, w
∗
1 = 0.705545
(p1, w1) Condition (102) Condition (103) Unempl. rate
(1.0286, 0.7055) + + 0.000522861
(1.03, 0.7053) + + 0.0064
(1.05, 0.697) + + 0.011
(1.04, 0.705) + + 0.05
(1.07, 0.693) + + 0.07
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•
r1 = 1.8, r2 = 1
p∗1 = 1.33109, w
∗
1 = 0.882998
(p1, w1) Condition (102) Condition (103) Unempl. rate
(1.34, 0.8815) negative negative 0.1334
(1.35, 0.88) negative negative 0.16
(1.38, 0.875) negative negative 0.2
(1.334, 0.8826) negative negative 0.125
We can observe by comparing the two cases that for points close to (p∗1, w∗1),
the unemployment level in the second case is not close to zero whereas in the
first it is. The second case violates condition (109) since monetary policy is
sufficiently tight in period one.
2.5.3 Classical Unemployment
Consider the other type of unemployment which would appear if firms were
not rationed but individuals were rationed in both markets. The set up is
similar to the one before.
The problem of employed22 individuals is as follows:
max
x1,x2,l1,l2
[
log(x1) + log(l1 − l1) + β log(x2) + β log(l2 − l2)
]
s.t
p1x1 +
p2x2
1 + r1
= δ +
w1l1
1 + r1
+
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
x1 = x¯1
The respective demands and supplies are as follows:
x2 =
β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + 2β)
[
Π− p1x¯1
]
l1 = l1 − 1 + r1
w1(1 + 2β)
[
Π− p1x¯1
]
l2 = l2 − β(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
w2(1 + 2β)
[
Π− p1x¯1
]
22The problem of unemployed individuals is similar to the Keynesian case.
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2.5.3.1 Equilibrium
(1− u)x¯1 + u 1
2p1(1 + β)
Π˜ + I1 =
p1
2(1 + r1)w1
(2.110)
(1− u) β(1 + r1)
p2(1 + 2β)
[
Π− p1x¯1
]
+ u
β(1 + r1)
2p2(1 + β)
Π˜ = F (ld2, I1) (2.111)
(1− u)
[
l1 − 1 + r1
w1(1 + 2β)
[
Π− p1x¯1
]]
=
p21
4(1 + r1)2w21
= ld1 (2.112)
(1− u)l2 + ul˜2 = ld2 (2.113)
r1
1 + r1
(
w1l
d
1 + p1y1
)
+
r2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(
w2l
d
2 + p2y2
)
+
pi1 +
1
1 + r1
pi2 = δ (2.114)
where
Π˜ = δ +
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
l˜2 = l2 − β(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
2w2(1 + β)
Π˜
The investment firm’s first order conditions are:
w2
p2
=
1
1 + r2
1
2
√
ld2
√
I1 (2.115)
p2
p1
=
2(1 + r1)(1 + r2)√
ld2
√
I1 (2.116)
From (114),(115),(116) we get:
I1 =
1 + r2
r2(3 + 2r2)
( δ
p1
− p1
4w1
4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1
(1 + r1)3
)
(2.117)
Combining (110),(113),(115),(116),(117) we get the following expression:
w2l2
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
=
1 + 2β
(1 + β)
p1I1
1 + r2
+
β
1 + β
p1I1 − β
1 + β
p21
2(1 + r1)w1
+
β
1 + β
δ +
β(1− u)
1 + β
w1l1
1 + r1
(2.118)
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Labor market clearing in period one, expression (112), can be written as
follows:
Zu− V u2 +B = 0 (2.119)
where
B =
w1l1
1 + r1
β
1 + β
− δ
1 + β
− p1I1 2 + r2
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
+
p21
2(1 + r1)(1 + β)w1
− p
2
1
4(1 + r1)3w1
V =
β
2(1 + β)2
w1l1
1 + r1
Z =δ
1 + 2β
2(1 + β)2
− w1l1
1 + r1
β(1 + 2β)
2(1 + β)2
+ p1I1
1 + 2β + β(1 + r2)
2(1 + β)2(1 + r2)
−
βp21
4(1 + r1)(1 + β)2w1
Solving (119) we get:
u =
−Z ±√Z2 + 4V B
−2V (2.120)
As in the case of Keynesian equilibrium, we get two solutions for the
unemployment rate. The next section is devoted to the analysis of (120)
and the characterization of the classical equilibrium.
2.5.3.2 Characterization of Classical Equilibrium
If B > 0, then only the following solution is accepted:
u =
Z +
√
Z2 + 4V B
2V
In order for B to be greater than zero, the following must be true:
[
(2 + r2)(4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1)
4r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)(1 + r1)3
+
1
2(1 + r1)(1 + β)
− 1
4(1 + r1)3
]
p21 >
w1δ
[
1
1 + β
+
2 + r2
r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)
]
− β
1 + β
w21l1
1 + r1
(2.121)
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For points close to the Walrasian equilibrium, the RHS of (121) must be
positive. This requires the following restriction:
w1 < δ
[
1
1 + β
+
2 + r2
r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)
]
(1 + r1)(1 + β)
βl1
= wˆ1
and also wˆ1 > w
∗
1.
The unemployment rate is zero if the price-wage combination equals the
Walrasian one if and only if
√
Z2 + 4V B = −Z
which requires that Z < 0. This is true if and only if
[
(1 + 2β + β(1 + r2))(4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1)
8r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)2(1 + r1)3
+
β
4(1 + r1)(1 + β)2
]
p21 >
w1δ
[
1 + 2β
2(1 + β)2
+
1 + 2β + β(1 + r2)
2r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)2
]
− w
2
1l1
1 + r1
β(1 + 2β)
2(1 + β)2
(2.122)
The RHS is positive if and only if
w1 < δ
[
1 + 2β
2(1 + β)2
+
1 + 2β + β(1 + r2)
2r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)2
]
2(1 + r1)(1 + β)
2
β(1 + 2β)l1
= w¯1
also w¯1 > w
∗
1 and wˆ1 > w¯1.
Only employed individuals are constrained in the good’s market. The
respective excess demand is as follows
D = (1− u)
[ Π
2p1(1 + β)
− x¯1
]
= (1− u)D′
and is positive for
p21 <
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.123)
Condition (123) is identical with the Keynesian case. If we substitute D = 0
to the equilibrium conditions they become identical with that of the Key-
nesian unemployment regime.
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The equilibrium must be well-defined close to the Walrasian price-wage
combination. The graph of (122) must be below the graph of (121). Other-
wise, Z > 0 and the unemployment rate is not zero whenever prices equal
the Walrasian ones. The graphs of (122),(123) cross at
w˜1 =
[
(1 + r1)(1 + r2)
(
2 + 3β + 6β2 + 8r1(1 + r2)
(
1 + 2β + 2β2
)
+
4r21(1 + v)
(
1 + 2β + 2β2
)
+ r2
(
2 + 4β + 8β2
))
δ
]/[
l1β(1 + 2β)(2 + β+
r22(2 + 4β) + r2(4 + 7β) + 4r1
(
2 + β + 4r2(1 + β) + 2r
2
2(1 + β)
)
+
2r21
(
2 + β + 4r2(1 + β) + 2r
2
2(1 + β)
)) ]
For w∗1 > w˜1, consider the following restriction on policy parameters23,
r1 < 0.22 (2.124)
If condition (124) applies, then the graph of (122) is below the graph of
(121). The reason is simple: the graphs of (121),(123) cross at the walrasian
prices, (p∗1, w∗1). From condition (124), w∗1 > w˜1 which implies that the graph
of (122) is below the graph of (121) and the equilibrium is well-defined close
to the walrasian equilibrium.
The last thing to prove is that the unemployment level is less than one-
u < 1. This is true if and only if
p21 <
w1δ
(
1
1+β − 1+2β2(1+β)2 + 2+r2r2(3+2r2)(1+β) −
1+2β+β(1+r2)
r2(3+2r2)2(1+β)2
)
(2+r2)(4r1+2r21+1)
4r2(3+2r2)(1+β)(1+r1)3
+ 12(1+r1)(1+β) − 14(1+r1)3 −
(1+2β+β(1+r2))(4r1+2r21+1)
8r2(3+2r2)(1+β)2(1+r1)3
− β
4(1+r1)(1+β)2
The above inequality is implied by (126).
To sum up, the followings conditions are required in order to have a well-
defined classical equilibrium in a neighborhood of the walrasian equilibrium,
23Again we set the fundamentals of the economy to the following values,
β 0.9
l2 1
l1 1
δ 0.5
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p21 <
2w1(1 + r1)δ
4r1+2r21+1
2(1+r1)2
+ βr2(3+2r2)(1+r2)(2(1+r2)+β)
(2.125)
[
(2 + r2)(4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1)
4r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)(1 + r1)3
+
1
2(1 + r1)(1 + β)
− 1
4(1 + r1)3
]
p21 >
w1δ
[
1
1 + β
+
2 + r2
r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)
]
− β
1 + β
w21l1
1 + r1
(2.126)[
(1 + 2β + β(1 + r2))(4r1 + 2r
2
1 + 1)
8r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)2(1 + r1)3
+
β
4(1 + r1)(1 + β)2
]
p21 >
w1δ
[
1 + 2β
2(1 + β)2
+
1 + 2β + β(1 + r2)
2r2(3 + 2r2)(1 + β)2
]
− w
2
1l1
1 + r1
β(1 + 2β)
2(1 + β)2
(2.127)
Condition (125) implies excess demand in the good’s market in period one.
Conditions (126),(127) simply state that there is positive unemployment and
the unemployment rate is close to zero in a neighborhood of the walrasian
equilibrium.
2.5.3.3 Monetary policy as the main cause of excessive unem-
ployment: Classical Unemployment regime
In order for the equilibrium to be well-defined we need to place some restric-
tions on the policy parameters as in the case of keynesian equilibrium. The
difference with the keynesian case is that condition (124) requires monetary
policy in period one to be very loose. The nominal rate of period one must
be close to zero.
The reason that monetary policy in period one has to be very loose in
order for the equilibrium to be well-defined is closely connected with the
construction of the classical unemployment regime. Since consumption of
employed individuals is constrained in the good’s market in period one,
employed individuals will reduce their labor supply in period one compared
to the walrasian case,
lW1 > l
Cl
1 (2.128)
and (128) is true if and only if Π2p1(1+β) − x¯1 > 0, which is true by the
definition of classical equilibrium. Employed individuals will decide to sup-
ply less labor in period one since extra income from supplying more labor
can be spent in less units of the consumption good in period one. If the
nominal rate of period one is sufficiently high, the constraints in the good’s
market of period one is tighter so that employed individuals reduce labor
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supply even further. The equilibrium is not well-defined close to walrasian
prices because the unemployment rate can exceed one and labor supply goes
negative. Condition (124) rules out this possibility.
§ 2.6 Welfare
2.6.1 Keynesian Unemployment
Before analyzing the effects of monetary policy on individual’s welfare, it
is very interesting to consider first the effect of monetary policy on the
unemployment rate.
2.6.1.1 Effects of interest rate perturbations on unemployment
Consider the effect of perturbations of r2 on unemployment given any initial
value of r1:
du
dr2
=
1
2D
√
E2 − 4BD
[
dE
dr2
(
E −
√
E2 − 4BD − 4DdB
dr2
)]
> 0
where
dE
dr2
> 0,
dB
dr2
< 0
The answer that we get is unambiguous. Announcing a reduction of the
nominal rate tomorrow, will reduce the unemployment rate today.
The comparative statics with r1 do not give us an unambiguous answer
as before. Decompose the effective labor supply of employed individuals in
to two parts,
l1 = l
W
1 + u
βl1
2(1 + β)(2 + β)
where the effective labor supply of employed individuals is the sum of two
terms: the walrasian labor supply plan and a second term which indicates
that the effective labor supply plan is higher than the walrasian one since a
measure of individuals is rationed in the labor market.
The derivative of unemployment with respect to r1 is as follows:
∂u
∂r1
=
−2y1 ∂y1∂r1 + (1− u)
∂lW1
∂r1
lW1 + u
βl1
(1+β)(2+β) − βl12(1+β)(2+β)
(2.129)
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where
∂lW1
∂r1
=
−1
2w1(1 + β)
[
2(1 + β)δ
2 + β
+
2(1 + β)
2 + β
p1(1 + r1)I1
1 + r2
[
1
1 + r1
+
1
I1
∂I1
∂r1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(>0)
]]
< 0
∂y1
∂r1
< 0
The sign of (129) depends solely on the sign of the term in the numerator.
We will fix interest rate close to zero initially and according to the argument
given in the previous section, the denominator is always positive,
lW1 >
βl1
2(1 + β)(2 + β)
2.6.1.2 Numerical analysis of (129)
In the analysis that follows we will fix the nominal rates at {r1 = 0, r2 = 0.3}
initially, and examine whether it is optimal for the monetary-authority to
deviate from that rule. At these initial values, the Walrasian prices are as
follows
p∗1 = 1.10465, w
∗
1 = 0.870804
Consider the following numerical results,
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(p1, w1) du/dr1
(1.07, 0.62− 0.79) +
(1.07, 0.47− 0.61) -
(1.09, 0.63− 0.83) +
(1.09, 0.46− 0.62) -
(1.1, 0.64− 0.84) +
(1.1, 0.46− 0.63) -
(1.05, 0.61− 0.73) +
(1.05, 0.49− 0.6) -
(p1, w1) du/dr1
(1.2, 0.7− 1) +
(1.2, 0.41− 0.69) -
(1.15, 0.67− 0.92) +
(1.15, 0.43− 0.66) -
(.) .
(.) .
(.) .
(.) .
We can observe from the above tables that when the real wage initially
is sufficiently low and monetary policy is loose initially, then increasing the
nominal rate of period one reduces the unemployment level in the economy.
Going back to (129), in order for the unemployment rate to reduce when
the nominal rate of period one increases, the numerator of (129) must be
negative,
−2y1
∂y1
∂r1
< (1− u)
∣∣∣∂lW1
∂r1
∣∣∣ (2.130)
which means that the differential change of labor demand after a perturba-
tion of r1 should be less than the differential change of the walrasian labor
supply plan in the percentage of employed individuals. Employed individu-
als have less incentive to supply labor when the real wage is relatively low.
If on top of that the monetary authority increases the nominal rate in period
one, they would want to substitute labor with leisure even more. This is
depicted in condition (130).
The main message from the previous argument is relatively simple. When
nominal rates are initially close to zero and the real wage of period one is
sufficiently low, then increasing the nominal rate of period one will decrease
the unemployment rate. This happens because the increase of r1 will de-
crease effective labor supply more than it decreases labor demand such that
unemployment has to fall in order for employment to increase and clear the
labor market.
2.6.1.3 Individual welfare
Consider a differential change of unemployed’s and employed’s indirect util-
ity from simultaneous perturbations of r1, r2:
dUUN =
∂UUN
∂r1
dr1 +
∂UUN
∂r2
dr2
dUE =
∂UE
∂r1
dr1 +
∂UE
∂r2
dr2
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Let us continue with our numerical exercises. Consider the following cases
starting with the utility of employed individuals,
(p1, w1) dr1, dr2
(1.07, 0.62− 0.79) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.07, 0.47− 0.61) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.09, 0.63− 0.83) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.09, 0.46− 0.62) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.1, 0.64− 0.84) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.1, 0.46− 0.63) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.05, 0.61− 0.73) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.05, 0.49− 0.6) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(p1, w1) dr1, dr2
(1.2, 0.7− 1) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.2, 0.41− 0.69) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.15, 0.67− 0.92) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.15, 0.43− 0.66) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.12, 0.8− 0.89) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.13, 0.83− 0.9) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.11, 0.79− 0.87) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
For unemployed individuals consider the following comparative statics,
(p1, w1) dr1, dr2
(1.07, 0.72− 0.79) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.07, 0.47− 0.71) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(1.09, 0.75− 0.83) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.09, 0.46− 0.74) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(1.1, 0.77− 0.84) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.1, 0.46− 0.76) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(1.05, 0.68− 0.73) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.05, 0.49− 0.67) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(p1, w1) dr1, dr2
(1.2, 0.95− 1) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.2, 0.41− 0.95) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(1.15, 0.86− 0.92) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.15, 0.43− 0.85) dr1 > 0, dr2 < 0
(1.12, 0.8− 0.89) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.13, 0.83− 0.9) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
(1.11, 0.79− 0.87) dr1 = 0, dr2 < 0
Given the above comparative statics, consider the following monetary
policy rule
Monetary policy rule. If we restrict attention to period one price-wage
configurations in a neighborhood of the Walrasian equilibrium one, (p∗1, w∗1),
but strictly inside the region characterizing Keynesian Unemployment, then
the optimal monetary policy is to set nominal rates at values close to zero.
Restricting attention to points in a neighborhood of the Walrasian equi-
librium give us a more clear answer about optimal policy. Optimal monetary
policy in that case calls for a Freidman rule argument. Nominal rates must
be set optimally close to zero. Since the nature of unemployment in that
case is a lack of demand in period one, low nominal rates will boost aggre-
gate demand and reduce unemployment. Employed individuals will benefit
from low nominal rates since the cost of consumption is low. They will bor-
row more money balances in the asset markets and will supply more labor.
Unemployed individuals benefit from low nominal rates also since the cost
of consumption is low and the excess supply constraints are not severe in
period one. The previous comparative statics do not give us a clear answer
for the welfare effects of unemployed individuals and that is why we restrict
attention to points close to the Walrasian equilibrium.
2.6. Welfare 137
2.6.2 Classical Unemployment
We said before that in order to have a well-defined classical equilibrium
close to the Walrasian one, the nominal rate of period one must be close
to zero. In the comparative statics that follow we will fix r1 = 0.1 and do
comparative statics only with r2.
Let us start with the effects of perturbations of r2 on the unemployment
rate,
∂u
∂r2
(2V − Z) = ∂B
∂r2
+ u
∂Z
∂r2
where
∂B
∂r2
= −
[
p1
2 + r2
(1 + β)(1 + r2)
∂I1
∂r2
− p1I1
(1 + β)(1 + r2)2
]
> 0
∂Z
∂r2
= p1
1 + 2β + β(1 + r2)
2(1 + β)2(1 + r2)
∂I1
∂r2
− p1I1 1 + 2β
2(1 + β)2(1 + r2)2
< 0
and
∂B
∂r2
>
∣∣∣ ∂Z
∂r2
∣∣∣
so that
∂u
∂r2
> 0
2.6.2.1 Individual welfare
Consider the following numerical comparative statics for both individuals,
•
r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.6
p∗1 = 0.911327, w
∗
1 = 0.704059
(p1, w1) ∂u
UN/∂r2 ∂u
EM/∂r2
(0.9, 0.75− 0.78) < 0 +
(0.89, 0.78− 0.8) < 0 +
(0.91, 0.72− 0.74) < 0 +
(0.88, 0.81− 0.83) < 0 +
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•
r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.8
p∗1 = 0.860467, w
∗
1 = 0.670177
(p1, w1) ∂u
UN/∂r2 ∂u
EM/∂r2
(0.84, 0.715− 0.78) < 0 +
(0.8, 0.78− 0.82) < 0 +
(0.83, 0.735− 0.75) < 0 +
(0.82, 0.75− 0.78) < 0 +
•
r1 = 0.1, r2 = 1
p∗1 = 0.824585, w
∗
1 = 0.646537
(p1, w1) ∂u
UN/∂r2 ∂u
EM/∂r2
(0.81, 0.67− 0.69) < 0 < 0
(0.8, 0.69− 0.695) < 0 +
(0.78, 0.71− 0.74) < 0 +
(0.79, 0.7− 0.73) < 0 +
•
r1 = 0.1, r2 = 1.5
p∗1 = 0.768828, w
∗
1 = 0.610403
(p1, w1) ∂u
UN/∂r2 ∂u
EM/∂r2
(0.75, 0.63− 0.66) < 0 < 0
(0.74, 0.64− 0.67) < 0 < 0
(0.73, 0.65− 0.68) < 0 < 0
(0.72, 0.66− 0.68) < 0 < 0
The above tables suggest that if the nominal rate of period two is suffi-
ciently high initially, then announcing a reduction of it will make everybody
better-off. Thus, we led to the following policy rule
Monetary policy rule. Restrict attention to period one price-wage con-
figurations in a neighborhood of the Walrasian equilibrium one, (p∗1, w∗1),
but strictly inside the region characterizing Classical Unemployment. If the
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nominal rate of period two, r2, is sufficiently high initially, then the opti-
mal policy of the monetary authority is to announce a reduction of r2 in
period one. This policy reduces the unemployment level in the economy and
makes the remaining unemployed and the rest of the employed individuals
better-off.
Optimal monetary policy takes a completely different form in that case
since the nature of unemployment is different form the keynesian equilib-
rium. Let us focus our attention to the actions of employed individuals since
the results in that case are driven mostly from their behavior.
Since employed individuals are constrained in the good’s market in pe-
riod one they are forced to save more today and consume more tomorrow.
As a consequence they will reduce their supply of labor in period one as
was discussed before. We also discussed the reasons why the nominal rate
of period one should be close to zero. Suppose the nominal rate of period
two is expected to be initially sufficiently high. In other words, monetary
policy tomorrow is expected to be sufficiently tight. If employed individuals
expect tight monetary policy tomorrow, their constraint in the good’s mar-
ket in period one is relaxed because unemployed individuals consume less
and there is less investment. Thus, if r2 is sufficiently high initially, then
there is a redistribution of consumption from period two to period one for
employed individuals.
If the initial situation is as before, then announcing a reduction of r2
will be make everybody better-off in the economy. Unemployed individu-
als benefit from the low cost of borrowing tomorrow, borrow more money
balances today, consume more and transfer more debt, or less savings, in
period two. Since the cost of borrowing tomorrow has been reduced, they
are able to borrow more money balances in period and increase their supply
of labor. Employed individuals also benefit from the lower cost of borrow-
ing tomorrow. Their constraint in the market today becomes tighter so that
they can consume less today and supply less labor. This is optimal since
initially r2 was sufficiently high and they were able to transfer enough units
of consumption from period two. They borrow more money balances in the
asset market tomorrow and supply more labor.
§ 2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we tried to show that given the unemployment regime that
prevails in the market, monetary policy can make individuals better off
by using the nominal rate as its policy instrument. The interesting point
is that interest rate policy implies different policy restrictions when the
unemployment regime in the market is different. Monetary policy has to
take into account the type of unemployment that prevails in the market.
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Extensions to the above framework include the case of elastic labor and
economies with uncertainty and an incomplete asset market. With an in-
complete asset market, the effect of an interest rate policy on unemployment
might be different across states of nature. Improving interventions will be
very interesting to characterize.
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- Chapter 3 -
Entrepreneurial risk and Optimal Monetary Policy
§ 3.1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to characterize opti-
mal monetary policy in the face of entrepreneurial risk and
credit frictions in the asset markets. We want to argue that
optimal monetary policy is characterized by strictly posi-
tive interest rates and optimal monetary policy depends on
the magnitude of entrepreneurial risk in the economy.
The issue of entrepreneurial risk has been analyzed by
Angeletos (2007). He introduced firm-specific risk in a neo-
classical growth model where each household owns a con-
stant returns to scale technology. He showed that the equi-
librium is characterized by lower interest rates and under-
accumulation of capital when the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is higher than the fraction of private equity to
total wealth. Panousi (2010) built on Angeletos (2007) and
showed that capital taxation may stimulate capital accu-
mulation. Gottardi et al. (2012), analyzed a two period
general equilibrium model with entrepreneurial and labor
risk. They dealt with the issue of optimal tax rates on cap-
ital and labor. Akyol (2004) characterized optimal mone-
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tary policy in an economy faced with uninsured endowment
risk. He argued that the optimal monetary policy is to have
an inflation tax of 10 percent although the welfare gains are
small compared to the Friedman rule. Money in that frame-
work serves as an additional asset and it is valued through
a timing friction in the bond market. Also capital accumu-
lation is absent. As we will show the effects of idiosyncratic
risk on individual’s return of capital can have interesting
implication for the conduct of optimal monetary policy.
Firstly, we analyze extensively a two-period economy
where all entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical. Our construc-
tion has similarities with Gottardi et al. (2012). We will
analyze various cases starting from a simple entrepreneurial
economy in the first section and moving to economies with
elastic labor and an aggregate firm producing the total out-
put in the economy. The main message is that optimal
monetary policy requires positive interest rates. This im-
plies positive seignorage profits for the monetary-authority
which in turn is one of the main insurance instruments the
monetary-authority has at its disposal. A non-contingent
distribution of seignorage across states can be beneficial in
an environment of idiosyncratic contingencies and credit
frictions.
An alternative policy of the monetary-authority is to fol-
low money supply rules. We consider a simple entrepreneurial
economy, and instead of interest rates we analyze money-
supply rules. Compute the optimal interest rate under an
interest rate rule policy, i∗. Then compute the optimal
money supply growth that is implied from this interest rate
rule, m∗. We will construct the economy with money sup-
ply rules in such a way such that if the monetary-authority
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fixes the growth rate at m∗, then at least one equilibrium
will gives us i∗. We say at least because with money supply
rules there may be more than one equilibria at m∗. Inter-
estingly enough, the economy with insurable risk, complete
markets, will give us a unique equilibrium in the case of
money supply rules under the specific construction we em-
ploy. The main message from this part is that moving from
interest rate to money supply rules may have important
consequences for optimal policy. In particular, at m∗, com-
puted in the case of interest rate rules, moving to money
supply rules we may get another equilibrium which is far
from being optimal.
Lastly, we extend the two-period economy to three peri-
ods. Given that we employ the same monetary structure,
we will be able to get closed form solutions in the three pe-
riod economy under log-utilities. It is interesting to do this
because optimal policy in that case means setting the inter-
est rates of different periods at different values. In partic-
ular, we will argue that the monetary-authority should set
higher interest rates in the long-run than in the medium-
run. The long-run in that case is the third period. In
that period there are entrepreneurs which have received a
bad shock twice in a row. The latter require insurance in
the form of seignorage distribution. The only way for the
monetary-authority to provide insurance to these group is
to set the nominal rate at that period at sufficiently high
values. This implies that rich entrepreneurs are taxed by in-
creasing the inflation rate from period two to period three.
In order for the monetary-authority not to impose a big
tax on the rich entrepreneurs, which will be suboptimal, it
should set nominal rates at period two at lower values and
make the opportunity cost of holding money balances lower
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than that of period three.
In section 2 we analyze a two-period economy with en-
trepreneurial risk and interest rate rules. We are going to
modify the set-up in various ways and characterize optimal
monetary policy. In section 3 we deal with money-supply
rules. Lastly, in section 4 we extend the two-period set-up
in three periods. We analyze the optimal response of the
monetary-authority across periods.
§ 3.2 The basic environment
There are three periods: t = 1, 2, 3. A stochastic shock,
s ∈ S = {H,L}, realizes at the beginning of period two.
The high realization of the uncertainty, (H), occurs with
probability µ. The last period is added only for accounting
purposes.
3.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The economy is populated by a continuum of entrepreneurs
of size one. Each of them is endowed with a constant-
returns to scale technology which transforms capital held
as investment in period one to consumption units in pe-
riod two. The stochastic shock is purely idiosyncratic and
affects the productivity of entrepreneur’s technology,
y2,s = γsk
Entrepreneurs are identical from an ex-ante perspective,
but differ in the realization of the idiosyncratic shock in
period two. A fraction µ of them will be more productive
(H) and a fraction 1−µ will be less productive (L). With-
out loss of generality, assume γH > γL > 0. Assume also
that there is no aggregate risk: µγH + (1− µ)γL = 1.
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Preferences are represented by the following CRRA spec-
ification
U =
x1−α1
1− α + µ
x1−α2,H
1− α + (1− µ)
x1−α2,L
1− α, α > 0
Concerning the timing of transactions we assume that
at each date-event the asset market opens before the goods
market. As a consequence, cash obtained from sales of
output or endowments have to be carried over next period.
Entrepreneurs enter in the asset market in period one to
trade cash, a riskless bond and receive transfers from the
monetary authority,
mˆ1 +
b1
1 + i1
≤ h1 (3.1)
When the asset market closes, the goods market open. En-
trepreneurs buy consumption and invest in physical capital
with the initial money balances acquired in the asset mar-
ket,
p1x1 + p1k ≤ mˆ1 (3.2)
They are also endowed with one unit of the good in period
one and receive money balances from selling their endow-
ment in the market. The end-of-period money balances
that transfer next period are as follows
m1 = mˆ1 − (p1x1 + p1k) + p1 (3.3)
Manipulating (2),(3) we end up in an equivalent form of
the cash-in-advance constraint
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m1 ≥ p1 (3.4)
Substituting (3) into (1) yields the flow budget constraint
of period one
p1x1 + p1k +m1 +
b1
1 + i1
≤ h1 + p1
The idiosyncratic shock realizes in the beginning of pe-
riod two, after capital is installed but before entrepreneurs
enter in the asset market. High productive entrepreneurs
enter the asset market,
mˆ2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1
In the good’s market in period two they buy consumption
according to the following cash constraint
p2x2,H ≤ mˆ2,H
and receive end-of-period cash balances by selling the pro-
ceeds of their production
m2,H = mˆ2,H − p2x2,H + p2y2,H
According to the previous argument the cash constraint can
be written as follows:
m2,H ≥ p2y2,H
and the flow constraint is as follows
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p2x2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
+m2,H ≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + p2y2,H
In the beginning of period three, high productive entrepreneurs
redeem their debt
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
For the low productive entrepreneurs the timing is similar
and will not be repeated.
A representative entrepreneur solves the following ex-
ante problem
max
[ x1−α1
1− α + µ
x1−α2,H
1− α + (1− µ)
x1−α2,L
1− α
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1
m1 ≥ p1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + p2y2,H
m2,H ≥ p2y2,H
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + p2y2,L
m2,L ≥ p2y2,L
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
Assume that the cash constraints bind and we know that
at the optimum allocation all the rest of the constraints
should bind as well. The unconstrained problem of the
entrepreneur can be written as follows:
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max
k,b1
[
(h1 − p1k − b11+i1 )1−α
1− α
1
p1−α1
+
µ
p1−α2
(h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2y2,H
1+i2
)1−α
1− α +
(1− µ)
p1−α2
(h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2y2,L
1+i2
)1−α
1− α
]
The first order conditions with respect to bond and capital
holdings respectively, are as follows
(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µ(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2kγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
(1− µ)(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2kγL
1 + i2
)−α
(3.5)(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µγH
1 + i2
(p2
p1
)α(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2kγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
(1− µ)γL
1 + i2
(p2
p1
)α(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2kγL
1 + i2
)−α
(3.6)
3.2.2 Monetary-Fiscal Authority
The flow constraints of the monetary-fiscal authority (MFA)
are as follows:
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M1 +
1
1 + i1
B1 = H1
M2 +
1
1 + i2
B2 = H2 +M1 +B1
M2 +B2 = 0
where M1,M2 are money supplies, B1, B2 are bonds traded
by the monetary authority and H1, H2 are transfers to indi-
viduals. Consider the intertemporal constraint of the MFA,
i1
1 + i1
M1 +
i2
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)
M2 = H1 +H2
1
1 + i1
the following rule for the distribution of seignorage simpli-
fies our analysis considerably,
Distribution of Seignorage. The MFA distributes seignor-
age according to the following rule,
H1 =
i1
1 + i1
M1, H2 =
i2
1 + i2
M2
Lastly, the MFA fixes monetary policy,
Interest rate rules. The monetary authority specifies an
implicit rule for nominal interest rates setting them at non-
negative values: i1 ≥ 0, i2 ≥ 0, accommodating the money
demand in the market.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions of the previous economy are as
follows:
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x1 + k = 1
µx2,H + (1− µ)x2,L = y2
m1 = M1, µm2,H + (1− µ)m2,L = M2
b1 = B1, µb2,H + (1− µ)b2,L = B2
h1 = H1 =
i1
1 + i1
M1, h2 = H2 =
i2
1 + i2
M2
and y2 = µy2,H + (1− µ)y2,L.
Combine conditions (5),(6) and the following version of
equilibrium conditions
b1 = −p1, h1 = i1
1 + i1
p1, h2 =
i2
1 + i2
p2k
to get
p2
p1
= (1 + i1)(1 + i2)
µ(γL + i2)
α + (1− µ)(γH + i2)α
µγH(γL + i2)α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i2)α
(3.7)( k
1− k
)α
=
µγH(γL + i2)
α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i2)α
(γL + i2)α(γH + i2)α
( 1
1 + i2
)1−α
(3.8)
3.2.4 Nominal effects of i1 , Market Incompleteness and Cash-
in-Advance Frictions
It is evident from equilibrium relation (8), that the real
allocation will not depend on i1, only on i2. The nominal
rate of period one has only nominal effects according to (7).
The only reason that the nominal rate in period one has no
real effects is because the supply of output in period one is
fixed. Suppose on the contrary that the supply of period
one was endogenous. Individuals must sacrifice some of
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their leisure time in order to produce output in period one.
If nominal rates are sufficiently high in period one, individ-
uals will substitute away consumption and capital holdings
since the effective cost of buying them is high. They will
reduce the supply of output by holding less end-of-period
money balances since the opportunity cost of holding them
is also high and consume more leisure time. This argument
collapses when output is supplied inelastically.
Since i1 does not affect the real allocation, we can rein-
terpret the monetary policy rule by saying that the mone-
tary authority commits to a uniform rule:
i1 = i2 = i
or simply fix i1 = 0. Doing either of the two gives the same
answer.
Let us go back to the ex-ante problem of the representa-
tive entrepreneur. It can be written in the following form,
max
[ x1−α1
1− α + µ
x1−α2,H
1− α + (1− µ)
x1−α2,L
1− α
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
= h1
p2x2,H = h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2k
1 + i2
γH
p2x2,L = h2 + b1 + p1 +
p2k
1 + i2
γL
It is useful to rewrite the problem in that form in order
to understand what is the main friction that drives the
result in this paper. Markets are not incomplete in the
usual sense, less assets more states and the return matrix
not full rank. The friction that drives the results is that
entrepreneurs in period one can buy the output of period
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one through credit. Observe that in the budget constraints
of period two we have an extra term, p1. This is the value of
period one output. Entrepreneurs supply inelastically one
unit of time and produce the total output of period one.
They receive the wage from supplying labor inelastically as
end-of-period money balances, m1 = p1 · 1. But end-of-
period money balances can not be reinvested in the asset
market because asset markets are closed when the good’s
market opens. Entrepreneurs have to carry end-of-period
money balances in the next period. They consume period
one output only through credit.
In equilibrium, the ex-ante indirect utility of the repre-
sentative entrepreneur can be written
V = log(1− k∗) + µ log
(
i2
1 + i2
k∗ +
k∗
1 + i2
γH
)
+
(1− µ) log
(
i2
1 + i2
k∗ +
k∗
1 + i2
γL
)
and ∗ denotes equilibrium objects. Writing the indirect
utility in the above form we have used the previous version
of equilibrium conditions. Taking a closer look at the indi-
rect utility, it is as if in the economy there was only one
asset in period one, capital.
3.2.5 Equilibrium (continued)
Since we have considered the class of CRRA preferences, let
us first examine the case of log-utilities which corresponds
to the case of α = 1.
Equilibrium inflation is as follows:
p2
p1
=
(1 + i)2(i+ µγL + (1− µ)γH)
i+ γHγL
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which can be written in an equivalent form
p2
p1
= (1 + i)2
[
1 +
σ2γ
i+ γHγL
]
where σ2γ represents the volatility of entrepreneurial risk
and the second term in brackets is the risk premium on
private equity. The role of the risk premium is to provide
sufficient incentives to the entrepreneurs to invest in the
risky project in period one.
Equilibrium capital holdings are as follows
k =
i+ γHγL
(1 + i)2 + (2 + i)γHγL + iσ2γ − 1
Entrepreneurs will under-invest compared to the bench-
mark case1 unless the nominal rate goes to zero:
1
2 + i
− i+ γHγL
(1 + i)2 + (2 + i)γHγL + iσ2γ − 1
≥ 0⇒ iσ2γ ≥ 0
The first part represents capital holdings in the benchmark
case.
3.2.6 Optimal monetary policy
The optimal monetary policy is summarized in the next
proposition,
Proposition 1. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate at strictly positive values in
order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider the derivative of the entrepreneur’s ex-ante
indirect utility with respect to the nominal rate
1The volatility of entrepreneurial risk is zero.
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dU
di
∣∣∣
i=i¯
=
(1− 2k∗)
k∗(1− k∗)
dk
di
∣∣∣
i=i¯
+
µγL + (1− µ)γH − γHγL
(¯i+ γH)(¯i+ γL)
(3.9)
where we evaluate (9) at i = i¯ > 0. We can not evaluate it
at zero because the equilibrium is not defined for negative
nominal rates. In the case of negative nominal rates, pure
arbitrage profits are possible by selling short the riskless
bond and holding money. Also,
k∗ =
i¯+ γHγL
(1 + i¯)2 + (2 + i¯)γHγL + i¯σ2γ − 1
(3.10)
dk
di
= − i¯
2 + γHγL(2¯i+ γH + γL − 1)
(¯i2 + 2γHγL + i¯+ i¯(γH + γL))2
< 0 (3.11)
Consider the following limits of the right hand side of
(9),
lim
i¯→0
(k∗) = 0.5
lim
i¯→0
(dk
di
)
= −γH + γL − 1
4γHγL
lim
i¯→0
(1− 2k∗) = 0
lim
i¯→0
µγL + (1− µ)γH − γHγL
(¯i+ γH)(¯i+ γL)
=
µγL + (1− µ)γH − γHγL
γHγL
> 0
The above limits show that as i¯ → 0, the right hand side
of (9) converges to a positive finite value. It is not optimal
to set nominal rates to zero.
Consider the other extreme, i¯ → ∞. We want to prove
that as i¯ increases, the right hand side of (9) becomes neg-
ative so that it is not optimal to set nominal rates at high
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values. There is a unique intermediate value which makes
the right hand side of (9) zero. This is the optimal interest
rate. Uniqueness of the optimal interest rate follows from
the strict concavity of the utility function.
Consider the limit of the second term in the right hand
side of (9),
lim
i¯→∞
µγL + (1− µ)γH − γHγL
(¯i+ γH)(¯i+ γL)
= 0
Consider the limit of the first term in the right hand side of
(9) as i→∞. Figure 1 shows that this limit goes to zero,
lim
i¯→∞
(1− 2k∗)dkdi
k∗(1− k∗) = 0
Consider also the following limits,
lim
i¯→∞
k∗ = 0
lim
i¯→∞
dk
di
= 0
and the reason that the above limits go to zero as i¯ → ∞
is that the denominator increases faster than the numer-
ator as can be seen from (10),(11). The first term of the
right hand side of (9) goes to zero as i¯ → ∞ because the
numerator decreases faster than the denominator.
Lastly, we have to show that the second term in the
right hand side of (9) converges faster to zero than the first
term so that as the nominal rate increases, the right hand
side of (9) becomes negative. The following graphs depict
the value of each term in the RHS of (9) as the nominal
rate becomes very large for some values of the idiosyncratic
shock
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Figure 3.1: First term of the RHS of (9)
Figure 3.2: Second term of the RHS of (9)
As we can observe from the above graphs, the second term
in the RHS of (9) converges faster to zero than the first
term.
Optimal monetary policy balances the trade-off between
consumption today and tomorrow because of the credit fric-
tions in the asset markets. If the nominal rate is below
the optimal one, entrepreneurs under-consume today, high
productive entrepreneurs over-consume tomorrow and less
productive ones consume less. If the nominal rate is above
the optimal one the argument is analogous.
Consider also the following proposition
Proposition 2. Given σ2γ > 0, money growth under en-
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trepreneurial risk is higher compared to the benchmark case.
Proof. Money growth when the volatility of idiosyncratic
risk is positive is as follows:
M2
M1
=
(i+ γHγL)(1 + i)
2
[
1 +
σ2γ
i+γHγL
]
(1 + i)2 + (2 + i)γHγL + iσ2γ − 1
(3.12)
whereas when the volatility of risk is zero, money growth
is as follows:
M2
M1
=
(1 + i)2
2 + i
(3.13)
As long as σ2γ > 0, expression (12) is always greater than
(13).
3.2.7 The case of α 6= 1
Fix α 6= 1.
Equilibrium inflation is as follows:
p2
p1
= (1 + i)2
µ(γL + i)
α + (1− µ)(γH + i)α
µγH(γL + i)α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i)α
From expression (8) we get equilibrium capital holdings
k = (
1
1+i
) 1−α
α
(
µγH(γL + i)
α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i)α
) 1
α
(γH + i)(γL + i) +
(
1
1+i
) 1−α
α
(
µγH(γL + i)α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i)α
) 1
α
160 Chapter 3. Entrepreneurial risk and Optimal Monetary Policy
3.2.8 Optimal monetary policy
Consider the following proposition,
Proposition 3. Fix α 6= 1. Given σ2γ > 0 and suppose also
that the degree of heterogeneity is sufficiently high, optimal
monetary policy should set the nominal rate at strictly pos-
itive values in order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. The argument is similar to the one given in the pre-
vious proposition.
Consider the derivative of ex-ante indirect utility with
respect to the nominal rate evaluated at i = i¯ > 0,
dU
di
=
dk
di
[
µ(γL + i¯)
α + (1− µ)(γH + i¯)α
]¯
i[
(γL + i¯)(γH + i¯)+
(1 + i¯)
α−1
α (µγH(γL + i¯)
α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i¯)α)
]α/
(γL + i¯)
α(γH + i¯)
α(1 + i¯)α−1
[
µγH(γL + i¯)
α+
(1− µ)γL(γH + i¯)α
]
+
(1 + i¯)α
kα−1
[(1− µ)(1− γL)(¯i+ γH)α − µ(γH − 1)(¯i+ γL)α]
(γL + i¯)α(γH + i¯)α
(3.14)
where dk/di < 0 and
k = (
1
1+i¯
) 1−α
α
(
µγH(γL + i¯)
α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i¯)α
) 1
α
(γH + i¯)(γL + i¯) +
(
1
1+i¯
) 1−α
α
(
µγH(γL + i¯)α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i¯)α
) 1
α
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As i¯ → 0 the first term in the derivative becomes zero
and the second term is positive given the assumption of
sufficiently high heterogeneity. Thus, the derivative in (14)
is positive.
The assumption about sufficiently high heterogeneity guar-
antees that the second term of (14) is positive as i¯→ 0,
(
γH
γL
)α
>
µ(γH − 1)
(1− µ)(1− γL)
3.2.9 Elastic labor in period one
Let us now relax the assumption about inelastic supply in
period one.
Suppose entrepreneurs have access to a short-run tech-
nology in period one that transforms labor into consump-
tion units. They are also endowed with one unit of leisure
time.
The ex-ante problem of a representative entrepreneur is
as follows:
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max
[ x1−α1
1− α +
(1− y1)1−α
1− α + µ
x1−α2,H
1− α + (1− µ)
x1−α2,L
1− α
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1y1
m1 ≥ p1y1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + p2y2,H
m2,H ≥ p2y2,H
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + p2y2,L
m2,L ≥ p2y2,L
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
The unconstrained problem can be written as follows:
max
k,b1,y1
[
(h1 − p1k − b11+i1 )1−α
1− α
1
p1−α1
+
(1− y1)1−α
1− α +
µ
p1−α2
(h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2y2,H
1+i2
)1−α
1− α +
(1− µ)
p1−α2
(h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2y2,L
1+i2
)1−α
1− α
]
The FOCs with respect to b1, k, y1 respectively are as fol-
lows:
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(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µ(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
(1− µ)(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγL
1 + i2
)−α
(3.15)(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µγH
1 + i2
(p2
p1
)α(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
(1− µ)γL
1 + i2
(p2
p1
)α(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγL
1 + i2
)−α
(3.16)
(1− y1)−α = µ
(p2/p1)p
−α
2
(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
1− µ
(p2/p1)p
−α
2
(
h2 + b1 + p1y1 +
p2kγL
1 + i2
)−α
(3.17)
From the equilibrium conditions we get the following:
b1 = −p1y1, h1 = i1
1 + i1
p1y1, h2 =
i2
1 + i2
p2k
Combining the equilibrium and the previous FOC condi-
tions we get
k =
A
1
α
1 + (1 + i1)
1
α + A
1
α
y1 =
1 + (1 + i1)
1
α
A
1
α
1+(1+i1)
1
α+A
1
α
1 + (1 + i1)
1
α
where
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A =
µγH(γL + i2)
α + (1− µ)γL(γH + i2)α
(γH + i2)α(γL + i2)α
(1 + i2)
α−1
3.2.10 Optimal monetary policy
Consider the following proposition
Proposition 4. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate from period one to period two
at zero, i1 = 0, and the nominal rate from period two to
period three at strictly positive values, i2 > 0, in order to
maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Let us examine the case of log-utilities which is eas-
ier to analyze.
Consider the total differential change of the entrepreneur’s
ex-ante indirect utility from simultaneous perturbations on
i1, i2:
dU =
∂U
∂i1
di1 +
∂U
∂i2
di2
where the partial derivatives with respect to i1, i2 are as
follows:
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∂U
∂i1
=
1
y1 − k
(
∂y1
∂i1
− ∂k
∂i1
)
− 1
1− y1
∂y1
∂i1
+
µ(1 + i¯2)
k(γH + i¯2)
∂k
∂i1
+
(1− µ)(1 + i¯2)
k(γL + i¯2)
∂k
∂i1
(3.18)
∂U
∂i2
=
1
y1 − k
(
∂y1
∂i2
− ∂k
∂i2
)
− 1
1− y1
∂y1
∂i2
+
µ(1 + i¯2)
k(γH + i¯2)
[
∂k
∂i2
( i¯2
1 + i¯2
+
γH
1 + i¯2
)
+
k
( 1
(1 + i¯2)2
− γH
(1 + i¯2)2
)]
+
(1− µ)(1 + i¯2)
k(γL + i¯2)
[
∂k
∂i2
( i¯2
1 + i¯2
+
γL
1 + i¯2
)
+
k
( 1
(1 + i¯2)2
− γL
(1 + i¯2)2
)]
(3.19)
and also
∂y1
∂i1
=
(k + (1 + i¯1)
∂k
∂i1
)(2 + i¯1)− (1 + i¯1)k
(2 + i¯1)2
∂k
∂i1
= − A
(2 + i¯1 + A)2
∂y1
∂i2
=
∂k
∂i2
1 + i¯1
2 + i¯1
,
∂k
∂i2
=
∂A
∂i2
2 + i¯1
(2 + i¯1 + A)2
∂A
∂i2
=
γHγL − i¯22 − γHγL(γH + γL) + 2¯i2γHγL
(γHγL + i¯2(γH + γL) + i¯22)
2
where all the derivatives are evaluated at i¯1 > 0, i¯2 > 0 and
k, y1 are fixed at their equilibrium values.
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Let us repeat the previous experiment once more. Sup-
pose that i¯1 → 0, i¯2 → 0. The partial derivatives of U are
as follows:
∂U
∂i1
= −0.25− µγL + (1− µ)γH
3γHγL
∂U
∂i2
=
σ2γ
γHγL
Going back to the total differential change of ex-ante utility,
the optimal monetary policy is characterized as follows:
di1 = 0, di2 > 0
We proved that as nominal rates tend to zero, it is opti-
mal to fix i1 close to zero and i2 at strictly positive values.
To finish the proof we must show that if we increase i2
above its optimal point, aggregate welfare decreases. Since
it optimal to keep i1 very close to zero, fix i¯1 close to zero
and let i¯2 → ∞. The limit values of the RHS terms of
(18),(19) respectively, are as follows:
lim
i¯2→∞
(RHS(18)) = −0.5, lim
i¯2→∞
(RHS(19)) = 0
but limi¯2→∞(RHS(19)) tends to zero from negative values
as the graph below shows.
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Figure 3.3: RHS of (19)
There is a unique optimal value of i¯2 such that further
increases above it decrease aggregate welfare.
3.2.11 A modified set-up
The monetary economy is similar with the previous case.
The only difference is that in period two there is an aggre-
gate firm that hires capital and labor in order to produce
aggregate output in period two. It solves the following
problem
max
K,L
[
F (K,L)− wL− qK
]
where F (K,L) = KθL1−θ, 0 < θ < 1.
The FOC with respect to K,L are
q
p2
= θ
(
L
K
)1−θ
, (1− θ)
(
K
L
)θ
=
w
p2
A representative entrepreneur solves the following ex-
ante problem
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max
[ x1−α1
1− α + µ
x1−α2,H
1− α + (1− µ)
x1−α2,L
1− α
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1
m1 ≥ p1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + w + qkγH
m2,H ≥ w + qkγH
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + w + qkγL
m2,L ≥ w + qkγL
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
The FOC of the unconstrained maximization with respect
to b1, k are
(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µ(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
w
1 + i2
+
qkγH
1 + i2
)−α
+
(1− µ)(1 + i1)
(p2/p1)1−α
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
w
1 + i2
+
qkγL
1 + i2
)−α
(
h1 − p1k − b1
1 + i1
)−α
=
µγH
1 + i2
q
p2
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
w
1 + i2
+
qkγH
1 + i2
)−α(p2
p1
)α
+
(1− µ)γL
1 + i2
q
p2
(
h2 + b1 + p1 +
w
1 + i2
+
qkγL
1 + i2
)−α(p2
p1
)α
The equilibrium conditions can written as follows:
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b1 = −p1, h2 = i2
1 + i2
p2K
θ, h1 =
i1
1 + i1
p1
To facilitate computations, consider the simple case of α =
1, θ = 0.5.
The equilibrium capital holdings are as follows:
K =
1 + 2i2 + γHγL
2 + 2(3i2 + 2i22) + 2γHγL + (1 + 2i2)(γH + γL)
The no-arbitrage condition between capital and bonds
is as follows:
q
(1 + i1)p1
= (1 + i2)
[
1 +
σ2γ
1 + 2i2 + γHγL
]
The above relation is the net return of the entrepreneur for
investing in the risky project since (1+ i1)p1 is the effective
price of capital in period one and q/(1+i2) the return in pe-
riod two. The second term in brackets is the risk premium
that the market provides in order for the entrepreneur to
hold capital in period one.
The introduction of labor income in period two, in each
personal state, induces entrepreneurs to hold less capital in
period one compared to the complete market solution. The
effective wealth of entrepreneurs tomorrow increases with
the introduction of labor income. Thus, the precautionary
motive effect of holding more capital is dominated by the
fact that risk averse entrepreneurs would hold less capital
since they benefit from the market premium in terms of
net return and in the bad state they get labor income with
certainty.
It is interesting to characterize optimal monetary policy
in this case. The following proposition argues that even if
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we the entrepreneur receives a certain amount of labor in-
come in each state tomorrow and although he under-invest
in period one, the monetary authority should set positive
nominal rates in order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proposition 5. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate at strictly positive values, i2 >
0, in order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. The idea of the proof follows from the previous sec-
tions. Consider the derivative of indirect utility with re-
spect to i2 evaluated at i¯2 > 0:
dU
di2
=
dK
di2
(1− 3K)
2K(1−K)+
1
1 + i¯2
[ µ(1− γH)
2¯i2 + 1 + γH
+
(1− µ)(1− γL)
2¯i2 + 1 + γL
]
(3.20)
where
K =
1 + 2¯i2 + γHγL
2 + 2(3¯i2 + 2¯i22) + 2γHγL + (1 + 2¯i2)(γH + γL)
dK
di2
=
1
(2 + 2(3¯i2 + 2¯i22) + 2γHγL + (1 + 2¯i2)(γH + γL))
2[
4 + 12¯i2 + 8¯i
2
2+
4γHγL + 2(γH + γL) + 4¯i2(γH + γL)−
(1 + 2¯i2 + γHγL)(6 + 8¯i2 + 2(γH + γL))
]
Suppose that i¯2 → 0, then from (20) we get:
dU
di2
=
σ2γ
2 + 2γHγL + σ2γ
[
1− 1 + γHγL(2 + γHγL + σ
2
γ)
(3 + 3γHγL + σ2γ)(1 + γHγL)
]
(3.21)
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3.2.11.1 A more general set-up
The purpose of this section is to show that the previous
argument does not depend on the specific utility functions
that we chose to work with. Consider the following two
assumptions:
Assumption 3.2.11.1. The flow utility function, u : R++ →
R, is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. The following condition hold as well:
lim
x→0
ux(·) =∞
Assumption 3.2.11.2. The production function, F : R2+ →
R+, is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, ho-
mogeneous of degree one and strictly quasi-concave. It sat-
isfies also the following:
F (0, l) = 0, FK(K, l) > 0, Fl(K, l) > 0, all K, l > 0
lim
K→0
FK(K, 1) =∞, lim
K→∞
FK(K, 1) = 0
The ex-ante problem of the entrepreneur can be written
as follows:
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max
[
u(x1) + µu(x2,H) + (1− µ)u(x2,L)
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1
m1 ≥ p1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + w + qkγH
m2,H ≥ w + qkγH
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + w + qkγL
m2,L ≥ w + qkγL
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
The FOC with respect to consumption demands, bond hold-
ings and capital respectively are as follows:
ux(x1) = λ1p1, µux(x2,H) = λHp2, (1− µ)ux(x2,L) = λLp2
(3.22)
λ1
1 + i1
= λH + λL (3.23)
λ1p1 =
q
1 + i2
(γHλH + γLλL) (3.24)
Combining (22),(23),(24), we get the following two condi-
tions:
ux(x1) =
1 + i1
p2/p1
[
µux(x2,H) + (1− µ)ux(x2,L)
]
(3.25)
ux(x1) =
q
(1 + i2)p2
[
µγHux(x2,H) + (1− µ)γLux(x2,L)
]
(3.26)
3.2. The basic environment 173
Condition (25) is a familiar condition which states that the
marginal rate of substitution should equal the real interest
rate at the optimum. Condition (26) should hold at the
optimum in order for entrepreneurs to invest in the risky
project in period one.
From (25),(26) the RHSs should be equal
1 + i1
p2/p1
[
µux(x2,H) + (1− µ)ux(x2,L)
]
=
q
(1 + i2)p2
[
µγHux(x2,H) + (1− µ)γLux(x2,L)
]
(3.27)
but given the normalization we have imposed, µγH + (1−
µ)γL = 1, we can show that the following is true
µux(x2,H)+(1− µ)ux(x2,L) >
µγHux(x2,H) + (1− µ)γLux(x2,L)⇔
(ux(x2,L)− ux(x2,H))(1− µ)(1− γL) > 0 or
(ux(x2,L)− ux(x2,H))µ(γH − 1) > 0 (3.28)
Given (28), the following should hold in order for (27) to
be true
1 + i1
p2/p1
<
q
(1 + i2)p2
(3.29)
Which implies
q/(1 + i2)
(1 + i1)p1
> 1 (3.30)
Condition (30) requires that the net return from investing
in the risky project in period one to be greater than the
total productivity of aggregate investment which is equal
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to one by our normalization. The term q1+i2 is the market
return in period two from selling capital to the aggregate
firm whereas (1 + i1)p1 is the effective price for investing in
the risky project in period one. Condition (30) expresses
the fact that in order for entrepreneurs to invest in a risky
project in period one, the market must provide sufficient
incentives to do so. It must provide entrepreneurs with a
risk premium for investing in the risky project in period
one,
q/(1 + i2)
(1 + i1)p1
= 1 + risk premium
Consider the derivative of indirect utility with respect
to i2
dU
di2
=
− ux(1−K)dK
di2
+ µux(x
∗
2,H)
dx2,H
di2
+ (1− µ)ux(x∗2,L)
dx2,L
di2
(3.31)
where x∗2,H , x
∗
2,L are equilibrium consumption demands.
Before writing down the derivatives of x∗2,H , x
∗
2,L with re-
spect to i2, we know that since F is homogeneous of degree
one, the following are true:
KFK + lFl = F, KFKK + lFlK = 0
The derivatives of x∗2,H , x
∗
2,L with respect to i2 are as follows:
dx2,s
di2
= KFK
1− γs
(1 + i2)2
−KFKK dK
di2
1− γs
1 + i2
+
dK
di2
FK
1 + i2
(i2 + γs)
s ∈ S = {H,L}
(3.32)
3.2. The basic environment 175
Substitute (26),(33) in (32) we get the following expression
dU
di2
=
dK
di2
[ i¯2
1 + i¯2
FK
(
µux(x2,H) + (1− µ)ux(x2,L)
)
−
µ
KFKK
1 + i¯2
(
ux(x2,L)− ux(x2,H)
)
(γH − 1)
]
+
µ
KFK
(1 + i¯2)2
(
ux(x2,L)− ux(x2,H)
)
(γH − 1) (3.33)
As i¯2 → 0, (33) simplifies to
dU
di2
= µK
(
ux(x2,L)− ux(x2,H)
)
(γH − 1)
[
FK − FKK dK
di2
]
(3.34)
It is always suboptimal to set the nominal rate to zero if the
term in brackets is positive. To understand this intuitively,
consider the following production function
F (K,L) = KθL1−θ, 0 < θ < 1
The term in brackets is positive if and only if
dK
di2
/
K <
1
1− θ (3.35)
which means that the rate of change of capital holdings
after a perturbation of i2 should be less than a number
which is greater than one, 11−θ > 1.
To sum up, a sufficient condition for nominal rates to be
strictly positive is the following,
FK > FKK
dK
di2
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3.2.12 Elastic labor in period two
Suppose we incorporate labor-leisure decisions in period
two. Entrepreneurs choose their supply of labor after they
have learned the realization of their productivity shock.
The ex-ante problem is as follows:
max
[
log(x1) + µ log(x2,H) + (1− µ) log(x2,L)+
µ log(1− lH) + (1− µ) log(1− lL)
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1
m1 ≥ p1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + wlH + qkγH
m2,H ≥ wlH + qkγH
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + wlL + qkγL
m2,L ≥ wlL + qkγL
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
The optimal labor supplies, lH , lL, are as follows
lH = 0.5− 1 + i2
2w
[
h2 + b1 + p1 +
qk
1 + i2
γH
]
lL = 0.5− 1 + i2
2w
[
h2 + b1 + p1 +
qk
1 + i2
γL
]
Equilibrium labor demand and capital holdings are as fol-
lows:
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L =
1
3 + 2i2
K =
6 + 8i2 + 2γHγL
15 + 32i2 + 16i22 + (3 + 4i2)(γH + γL) + 3γHγL
The no-arbitrage between capital and bonds are as follows
q
(1 + i1)p1
= (1 + i2)
[
1 +
σ2γ
3 + 4i2 + γHγL
]
Lastly, the equilibrium labor supplies are as follows:
lH = 0.5− 2i2 + γH
2(3 + 2i2)
, lL = 0.5− 2i2 + γL
2(3 + 2i2)
Before going to optimal policy, there is a subtlety that
we need to discuss. Consider the labor supply of the high
productive entrepreneurs. If the realization of the high pro-
ductivity shock is large, then high productive entrepreneurs
will have less incentives to supply labor and not to con-
sume more leisure. Labor supply becomes negative if the
high shock is very large so that we have to exclude this
possibility,
lH ≥ 0⇒ γH ≤ 3 (3.36)
Given condition (22), the derivative of lH , lL with respect
to i2 is:
dls
di2
= − 3− γs
(3 + 2i2)2
≤ 0, s ∈ S = {H,L} (3.37)
Reductions of the nominal rate induce entrepreneurs to sup-
ply more labor since the real wage in period two increases.
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From (37) we see that after a reduction of i2, low type
entrepreneurs have a higher inclination to increase labor
supply than than high types. High type entrepreneurs pre-
fer to supply less labor and consume more leisure since they
receive a high productivity shock whereas low types do the
complete opposite.
According to the previous arguments, the role of the
monetary-authority in an environment of incomplete insur-
ance possibilities is to provide insurance by setting positive
nominal rates. We saw before that the introduction of fixed
labor income across states does not modify the objective of
the monetary authority. The following proposition argues
that the policy conclusions are not revised when we intro-
duce labor-leisure decisions in period two.
Proposition 6. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate at positive values, i2 > 0, in
order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider the derivative of indirect utility with re-
spect to i2 evaluated at i¯2 > 0 initially and as before con-
sider the case when i¯2 → 0:
dU
di2
=
dK
di2
1− 3K
2K(1−K) −
12 + 4γHγL
3[12 + 4γHγL + 3σ2γ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption part
+
12 + 4γHγL + 6σ
2
γ
3[12 + 4γHγL + 3σ2γ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
leisure part
(3.38)
where
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dK
di2
=
1
(15 + 32¯i2 + 16¯i22 + (3 + 4¯i2)(γH + γL) + 3γHγL)
2[
8(15 + 32¯i2 + 16¯i
2
2+
(3 + 4¯i2)(γH + γL) + 3γHγL)−
(6 + 8¯i2 + 2γHγL)(32 + 32¯i2 + 4(γH + γL))
]
and as i¯2 → 0
dK
di2
= − 1
(15 + 4(γH + γL) + 3γHγL)2[
72 + 40γHγL + 8γHγL(1 + γHγL + σ
2
γ)
]
Expression (38) becomes
dU
di2
=
−σ2γ
[
72 + 40γHγL + 8γHγL(1 + γHγL + σ
2
γ)
]
(12 + 4γHγL)(12 + 4γHγL + 3σ2γ)(6 + 2γHγL + σ
2
γ)
+
2σ2γ
12 + 4γHγL + 3σ2γ
(3.39)
The RHS of (39) is always positive. Setting the nominal
rate to zero is always suboptimal.
The previous proposition stated that even with labor-
leisure decisions, the monetary authority should engage
in active policies by setting positive rates. Even though
the qualitative conclusions do not change with respect to
the previous models we discussed, the mechanism behind
proposition 6 is different from the previous propositions.
In the previous models we analyzed the objective of the
monetary authority as an insurance institution. The role
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of the monetary-authority was to balance the trade-off be-
tween consumption in period one and consumption in pe-
riod two across states. Even in the case of under-investment
in period one, reducing i2 to zero was not optimal. The rea-
son was that even though entrepreneurs over-consumed in
period one, low values of i2 implied very low consumption
in the bad state which was ex-ante suboptimal.
When labor-leisure decisions are present the above story
is modified. Consider the derivative of ex-ante utility with
respect to i2, expression (38). The first term in the under-
brace represents the differential change of utility from con-
sumption today and tomorrow across states. The second
term in the underbrace is the differential change of utility
from leisure. If there is under-investment compared to the
first-best in period one then the first term in the underbrace
is always negative. The second term is always positive.
Suppose i2 > 0 initially. Reductions of i2 increase con-
sumption in the good state but more importantly increase
consumption in the bad state as well. The main reason as
to why consumption in the bad state increases when i2 falls
is because low type entrepreneurs supply more labor since
the real wage increases. Even though seignorage transfers
fall, the increase in labor and capital income outweighs the
decrease of seignorage transfers. Elastic labor is a form of
insurance for entrepreneurs. This is to be contrasted with
the previous models. The first term in (38) is always neg-
ative since after a decrease of i2 the increase in consump-
tion across states dominates the decrease in consumption
in period one. This is because entrepreneurs over-consume
initially. But even though entrepreneurs are willing to de-
crease consumption today and increase consumption across
states after a decrease of i2, they get disutility from sup-
plying more labor. The reduction in leisure dominates the
3.2. The basic environment 181
effect on consumption demands in utility terms.
Consider the following remark
Remark 1. The introduction of labor-leisure decisions
in period two combined with an under-investment ef-
fect in period one minimizes the intertemporal trade-off of
consumption. After a reduction of i2, entrepreneurs will
optimally want to reduce consumption in period one, they
over-consume initially, and will always increase consump-
tion even in the bad state since they can increase the sup-
ply of labor. State-contingent labor supply acts as a form
of costly insurance. Costly, in terms of the disutility it
generates.
Given the previous discussion, we want to prove that the
monetary-authority has less incentives to engage in active
policies if there are labor-leisure decisions and an under-
investment effect in period one. To this end, consider the
following utility specification
U = log(x1) + µ log(x2,H) + (1− µ) log(x2,L)+
θµ log(1− lH) + θ(1− µ) log(1− lL) (3.40)
where for the moment assume only that θ > 0. By active
policies, I simply mean that the monetary-authority should
set nominal rates at positive values in order to maximize
ex-ante welfare. The incentive of the monetary-authority
to engage in active policies is measured by the derivative
of ex-ante indirect utility with respect to i2,
dU
di2
. If dUdi2 = 0,
then there is no incentive to engage in active policies.
Solving the ex-ante problem of the entrepreneur using
(40) we compute the new equilibrium. The no-arbitrage
between capital and bonds is as follows:
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q
(1 + i1)p1
= (1 + i2)
[
1 +
σ2γ
1 + 2i2 + γHγL + 2θ(1 + i2)
]
and equilibrium capital and labor demand are as follows:
L =
1
1 + 2θ(1 + i2)
K = (1 + θ)(1 + 2i2(1 + θ) + γHγL + 2θ)
/
[
2θ2
(
3 + 5i2 + 2i
2
2
)
+
θ
(
7 + 16i2 + 8i
2
2 + 2(1 + i2)(γH + γL) + γHγL
)
+
2 + 6i2 + 4i
2
2 + 2γHγL+
(γH + γL)(1 + 2i2)
]
Equilibrium labor supplies are
ls =
1
1 + θ
− θ(2i2 + γs)
(1 + θ)(1 + 2θ(1 + i2))
, s ∈ S = {H,L}
and equilibrium labor supply in the high state is nonnega-
tive if and only if
γH ≤ 1 + 2θ
θ
(3.41)
The next proposition argues that if entrepreneurs care
little about leisure, inelastic labor supply, the incentives of
the monetary-authority to pursue active policies are higher
than when entrepreneurs attach a relatively high weight
to leisure compared to consumption. The reason is the
argument given in the previous paragraphs.
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Proposition 7. Given that entrepreneurs under-investment
in period one, the incentive of the monetary-authority to
engage in active policies is a decreasing function of θ.
Proof. Consider the derivative of ex-ante indirect utility
with respect to i2, evaluated at i¯2 > 0. Consider the same
derivative as i¯2 → 0,
dU
di2
=
[
(1 + 2θ + γH)(1 + 2θ + γL)(1 + 2θ + γHγL)
(2 + 6θ2 + γH + γL + 2γHγL + θ(7 + 2γL + γH(2 + γL)))
]−1
[
(1 + 2θ)(−1 + γH)(−1 + γL)
(
1 + 6θ3 + γ2HγL+
γHγL(1 + γL) + θ
2(−7 + 5γHγL)+
θ(−3 + γ2HγL + γH(−3 + γL)γL)
)]
+
2θ(−1 + θ(−2 + γL))(−1 + µ)
(1 + 2θ)(1 + 2θ + γL)
− 2θ(−1 + θ(−2 + γH))µ
(1 + 2θ)(1 + 2θ + γH)
+
(2θ2(1 + 2θ)0.5 + (1 + 2θ)1.5(−1 + γL) + θ(1 + 2θ)0.5(1 + γL))(−1 + µ)
(1 + 2θ)1.5((1 + 2θ) + γL)
+
(−2θ2 + θ(−1− γH) + (1 + 2θ)(1− γH))µ
(1 + 2θ)((1 + 2θ) + γH)
= Φ(γH , γL, θ, µ)
(3.42)
where Φ(.) represents the incentive of the monetary-authority
to increase i2 whenever it is initially close to zero. We must
show that Φ(.) is a decreasing function of θ. Since Φ(.) is a
complicated algebraic expression, we must resort to numer-
ical calibrations to demonstrate our result. Before doing so,
it useful to examine a simple case to see why proposition 7
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holds true. Consider the derivative dΦdθ evaluated at θ = 1.
To simplify algebra consider also the maximum degree of
heterogeneity in period two, γL = 0, γH =
1
µ . Then the
derivative dΦdθ is as follows:
dΦ
dθ
=
−0.111111− 3.22222µ− 22.2222µ2 − 30.7778µ3 + 56.3333µ4
(1 + 8µ+ 15µ2)2
< 0
which is always negative. The incentive of the monetary-
authority to engage in active policies increases when θ de-
creases below one. The problem with the previous argu-
ment is that it is a special case.
Since Φ(.) is a complicated expression, consider the fol-
lowing graphs:
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Figure 3.4: Φ(θ), µ = 0.6
Figure 3.5: Φ(θ), µ = 0.5
Figure 3.6: Φ(θ), µ = 0.4
The above graphs show that when θ tends to zero, the
incentive to engage in active policies increases. On the
other hand, when θ is increases, optimal policy is close to
the Friedman rule argument.
The next corollary is a direct implication of proposition
7,
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Corollary 1. Given that entrepreneurs under-investment
in period one, if labor-leisure decisions are equally or more
important than consumption decisions, then optimal mone-
tary policy is very close to the Friedman rule argument. If
labor-leisure decisions are less important, labor is supplied
inelastically, then optimal monetary policy should deviate
from the Friedman rule argument.
A useful digression is to consider the case of idiosyncratic
shocks on labor productivity.
3.2.12.1 Elastic labor supply: idiosyncratic shocks on labor pro-
ductivity
The ex-ante problem of individuals is as follows
max
[
log(x1) + µ log(x2,H) + (1− µ) log(x2,L)+
µ log(1− lH) + (1− µ) log(1− lL)
]
, s.t
p1x1 + p1k +
b1
1 + i1
+m1 ≤ h1 + p1
m1 ≥ p1
p2x2,H +m2,H +
b2,H
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + wlHeH + qk
m2,H ≥ wlHeH + qk
m2,H + b2,H ≥ 0
p2x2,L +m2,L +
b2,L
1 + i2
≤ h2 + b1 +m1 + wlLeL + qk
m2,L ≥ wlLeL + qk
m2,L + b2,L ≥ 0
The equilibrium conditions in this case are as follows:
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x1 + k = 1
µx2,H + (1− µ)x2,L = F (K,L)
µeH lH + (1− µ)eLlL = L
k = K
h1 =
i1
1 + i1
M1, h2 =
i2
1 + i2
M2
M1 = m1, M2 = µm2,H + (1− µ)m2,L
B1 = b1, B2 = µb2,H + (1− µ)b2,L
Equilibrium capital, bond holdings and labor demand are
K =
[
0.5 + i2 +
µeL + (1− µ)eH
2
(3 + 2i2)
]/
[
0.75 + 2i2 + i
2
2+
(eH + eL)(3 + 2i2)(1 + 2i2)
4
+
µeL + (1− µ)eH
2
(3 + 2i) +
eHeL
4
(3 + 2i2)
2
]
b1 = −p1, L = 1
3 + 2i2
Equilibrium labor supplies are
lH = 0.5− 1 + 2i2
2eH(3 + 2i2)
(3.43)
lL = 0.5− 1 + 2i2
2eL(3 + 2i2)
(3.44)
Given our previous discussion on elastic labor, we need to
guarantee that labor supplies are nonnegative. Labor sup-
ply for high types poses no problem. The supply of labor
for low types is nonnegative if and only if
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eL ≥ 1 + 2i2
3 + 2i2
(3.45)
If the monetary-authority sets high nominal rates tomor-
row, given that (45) is always satisfied, it will induce low
type entrepreneurs to take more leisure and supply less la-
bor. The main difference with the previous case of en-
trepreneurial risk is that high nominal values of i2 can in-
duce low types to supply zero labor.
Consider the following proposition
Proposition 8. Given σ2γ > 0 and condition (45), opti-
mal monetary policy should set the nominal rate at positive
values, i2 > 0, in order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider the derivative of indirect utility with re-
spect to i2 evaluated at i¯2 > 0 initially and as before con-
sider the case when i¯2 → 0:
dU
di2
=
dK
di2
1− 3K
2K(1−K) −
4 + 12eHeL − 6σ2γ
3[4 + 12eHeL + 3σ2γ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption part
+
4 + 12eHeL + 12σ
2
γ
3[4 + 12eHeL + 3σ2γ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
leisure part
(3.46)
where as i¯2 → 0
dK
di2
=
− 8 + 60σ
2
γ + 72e
2
He
2
L + 36(σ
2
γ)
2 + 108eHeLσ
2
γ + 48eHeL
[6 + 18eHeL + 9σ2γ]
2
K =
2 + 6eHeL + 6σ
2
γ
18eHeL + 9σ2γ + 6
>
1
3
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The derivative in (47) can be written as follows:
dU
di2
=
(8 + 60σ2γ + 72e
2
He
2
L + 36(σ
2
γ)
2 + 108eHeLσ
2
γ + 48eHeL)9σ
2
γ
(4 + 12eHeL + 12σ2γ)(12eHeL + 3σ
2
γ + 4)(6 + 18eHeL + 9σ
2
γ)
+
18σ2γ
3(12eHeL + 3σ2γ + 4)
(3.47)
Consider the following proposition for the case of inelas-
tic labor supply and shocks to the productivity of labor,
Proposition 9. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate at positive values, i2 > 0, in
order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider the derivative of indirect utility with re-
spect to i2 evaluated at i¯2 > 0 initially and as before con-
sider the case when i¯2 → 0:
dU
di2
=
2σ2γ
(
σ2γ + (1 + eHeL + σ
2
γ)
2
)
(3 + 3eHeL + 2σ2γ)(1 + eHeL + σ
2
γ)(2 + 2eHeL + σ
2
γ)
+
σ2γ
2 + 2eHeL + σ2γ
3.2.13 Volatility of risk and incentives to engage in active
policies
The previous analysis focused on the fact that in the pres-
ence of incomplete insurance possibilities, the monetary-
authority should set positive nominal rates in order to achieve
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the second-best allocation. In this section we want to see
in what way the incentives to engage in active policies are
affected by the volatility of risk.
Consider the following experiment . Fix the probability
distribution of shocks and consider the normalization we
have imposed in the beginning, µγH + (1 − µ)γL = 1. We
want to show that the incentives to engage in active policies
increase when heterogeneity in period two increases, γH−γL
increases, so that σ2γ increases. In other words, we want to
show that the monetary-authority has a higher incentive to
intervene actively in the market when the volatility of risk
is high.
Proposition 10. The incentives of the monetary-authority
to engage in active policies is an increasing function of het-
erogeneity in period two and as a consequence increasing in
risk volatility.
Proof. The incentives of the monetary-authority to engage
in active policies is measured by the derivative of ex-ante
utility with respect to i2,
dU
di2
|i2=i¯2 where i¯2 > 0 initially.
Suppose as before that we take the limit from above of dUdi2 ,
i¯2 → 0.
Consider the model of section 2.6. Expression (9) is
dU
di2
=
σ2γ
γHγL
and the right hand side increases when heterogeneity in pe-
riod two increases because σ2γ increases and γHγL reduces.
The incentives of the monetary-authority to engage in ac-
tive policies increase with the degree of heterogeneity.
Consider the model of section 2.11 with inelastic labor
supply. Expression (21) is as follows
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dU
di2
=
σ2γ
2 + 2γHγL + σ2γ
[
1− 1 + γHγL(2 + γHγL + σ
2
γ)
(3 + 3γHγL + σ2γ)(1 + γHγL)
]
= Υ
It is difficult in the above expression to see what happens
when heterogeneity increases because both γH , γL change
and as a consequence σ2γ changes. Instead, suppose that we
set γH =
1−(1−µ)γL
µ keeping µ fixed and take the derivative
of Υ with respect to γL. We get
dΥ
dγL
= −((−1 + γL)(5γ9L(−1 + µ)5(−1 + 2µ)+
γ8L(−1 + µ)4(−23 + 31µ+ 14µ2)+
γ7L(−1 + µ)3(−39 + 33µ+ 11µ2 + 30µ3)+
γ6L(−1 + µ)2(−25 + 12µ+ 2µ2 − 35µ3 + 70µ4)+
µ(−1− 4µ− 6µ2 − 2µ3 + 7µ4 + 6µ5)+
γLµ(1− 12µ− 48µ2 − 14µ3 + 47µ4 + 26µ5)+
γ2L(1− 2µ− 9µ2 − 25µ3 − 92µ4 + 41µ5 + 86µ6)+
γ5L(−5 + 14µ− 40µ2 + 70µ3 + 71µ4 − 238µ5 + 128µ6)+
γ3L(−7 + 10µ+ 59µ2 − 33µ3 − 136µ4 − 35µ5 + 142µ6)+
γ4L(15− 22µ− 4µ2 + 132µ3 − 121µ4 − 160µ5 + 160µ6)))/
((1 + γL)
2(1 + γL(−1 + µ) + µ)2
(γL + γ
2
L(−1 + µ) + µ)2(1 + γL+
2γ2L(−1 + µ) + 2µ+ 2γLµ)2)
The above derivative is a complicated expression. If we
evaluate it numerically by fixing any probability distri-
bution, µ ∈ (0, 1), and choose to set initially any value
γL ∈ [0, 1) then the above derivative is always negative.
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§ 3.3 Money supply rules
Consider the other class of monetary policy rules: money
supply policies. More specifically,
Money supply rules. The monetary-authority fix the money
supplies, M¯1, M¯2 > 0, and let the nominal rates, i1, i2, de-
termine in equilibrium.
In order to talk about money supply policies we need
some qualification to the previous argument. In the fol-
lowing section we will analyze money supply policies in the
simple framework of the entrepreneurial economy of section
2.1.
3.3.1 Multiple equilibria, money supply rules and optimal
monetary policy
Consider the set-up of section 2.1. Combine the equilibrium
conditions of section 2.3 together with the money market
clearing, we get the following 4 equations,
p2
p1
=
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)
i2 + γHγL
[
i2 + γHγL + σ
2
γ
]
(3.48)
k =
i2 + γHγL
(1 + i2)2 + (2 + i2)γHγL + i2σ2γ − 1
(3.49)
p1 = m1 = M¯1 (3.50)
µγHp2k + (1− µ)γLp2k = m2 = M¯2 (3.51)
where we have used the previous rule for the distribution
of seignorage,
H1 =
i1
1 + i1
M¯1, H2 =
i2
1 + i2
M¯2
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Equations (48)-(51) are 4 four independent equations in
5 unknowns. There is one degree of real indeterminacy
left. Unless we eliminate the indeterminacy we can not
proceed further and claim something more. We need one
more equation to the above system.
To solve this problem assume that entrepreneurs are en-
dowed with outside money only in period one. The period
one budget constraint of entrepreneurs in the asset market
is as follows
mˆ1 +
b1
1 + i1
= δ
where δ represents units of outside money.
The intertemporal constraint of the monetary-authority
is as follows
i1
1 + i1
M¯1 +
i2
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)
M¯2 = δ +
h2
1 + i1
where δ is an initially public liability for the monetary-
authority and h2 are transfers to entrepreneurs in period
two across states. The monetary-authority finances the
initial public liability and transfers in period two through
seignorage profits from printing money balances. From the
previous rule for the distribution of seignorage we get,
i1
1 + i1
M¯1 = δ (3.52)
i2
1 + i2
M¯2 = H2 (3.53)
essentially we have picked a particular value for period one
transfers. This way provide us with the additional equation
we need in order to eliminate the real indeterminacy. From
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(52) we can solve for i1 and eliminate the degree of real
indeterminacy,
i1 =
δ
M¯1 − δ (3.54)
where M¯1 − δ > 0 for i1 ≥ 0. Observe that we can choose
the parameters in (54) to fix any nonnegative value for i1.
Since the policy variable for the monetary-authority would
be the growth rate of money supply between period one and
period two, we can choose any positive values for M¯1, δ such
as to make i1 very close to zero. Choosing (δ, M¯1), such that
i1 is very close to zero in equilibrium, we can safely ignore
it from (48). Alternatively, we can assume that individuals
do not receive transfers or outside money in period one
and they receive transfers only in period two. Using the
previous rule for the distribution of seignorage, i1 should
be zero in equilibrium.
Given the previous argument, combining (48)-(51) we
end up in the following relation:
(1 + i2)(i2 + γHγL + σ
2
γ)
(1 + i2)2 + γHγL(2 + i2) + i2σ2γ − 1
=
M¯2
M¯1
Define m = M¯2/M¯1 − 1, as the growth rate of the money
supply. The above relation can written in the following
quadratic form:
i22m+ i2(1 + 2m+ γHγLm+ σ
2
γm) + γHγL(1 + 2m)− σ2γ = 0
(3.55)
Define
B = 1 + 2m+ γHγLm+ σ
2
γm, Γ = γHγL(1 + 2m)− σ2γ
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Expression (56) gives the following two solutions:
i2 =
−B +√B2 − 4Γm
2m
(3.56)
i2 =
−B −√B2 − 4Γm
2m
(3.57)
Given the possibility of two solutions, we need to know
which solution to accept and under what conditions. Let
us start with the signs of B,Γ. B R 0 if and only if
M¯2
M¯1
R
1 + γHγL + σ
2
γ
2 + γHγL + σ2γ
(3.58)
Γ R 0 if and only if
M¯2
M¯1
R
σ2γ + γHγL
2γHγL
(3.59)
Suppose that m > 0. Then,
• If B > 0,Γ > 0 then we reject both solutions.
• If B > 0,Γ < 0 then we accept (56) provided the
discriminant is positive.
Suppose that m < 0. Then,
• If B > 0,Γ > 0 then accept (57).
• If B < 0,Γ > 0 then accept (57) again.
• If B < 0,Γ < 0 then reject both.
• If B > 0,Γ < 0 then accept both provided the dis-
criminant is positive.
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The reason we choose to fix parameters such as to make
i1 very close to zero is to be able to compare optimal mon-
etary policy in the case of interest rate rules with optimal
policies in the case of money supply rules. We know that
i1 does not affect the real allocation in the case of interest
rate rules but affects the real allocation in the case of money
supply rules. This introduces an asymmetry between the
two cases. In the case of interest rate rules we can simply
fix i1 to zero since it does not affect the real allocation. In
the case of money supply rules we can choose parameters
together with the assumption on the distribution of seignor-
age such as to make the equilibrium i1 very close to zero.
Why we do this will be clarified in the next paragraph.
Start with the case of interest rate rules as before. From
the previous analysis we know that given the volatility of
risk, it is optimal for the monetary-authority to set i∗2 > 0,
and maximize aggregate welfare. Take i∗2 and compute the
optimal rate of money growth in that case, m∗. The data we
have from interest rate rules are (i∗2,m
∗). Consider money
supply rules. We would like to argue the following: If the
monetary-authority fixes the growth rate of money supply
at m∗, then the equilibrium interest rate would equal i∗2 and
as a consequence we would maximize aggregate welfare in
that case as well.
We can not establish a one-to-one mapping from optimal
interest rate policies to optimal money supply policies. If
i∗2 maximizes ex-ante welfare under an interest rate rule
then m∗ is the optimal rate of money growth. Under a
money supply rule, m∗ is the optimal policy only if the
equilibrium is unique. If the equilibrium is not unique, then
under m∗ we get one solution which will be i∗2 but we get a
second one, i2 6= i∗2. It is interesting to know when optimal
monetary policy implies a unique equilibrium because in
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the case of uniqueness, optimal interest rate policies and
optimal money supply policies provide the same answer.
Consider the following numerical example which illus-
trates the fact that we accept two solutions,
Numerical example. Suppose γs = 0.5 and from the pre-
vious normalization, γH + γL = 2.
Consider the following table,
(γH , γL) i
∗
2 m
∗ î2
(1.55, 0.45) 0.3486 -0.3 0.098
(1.6, 0.4) 0.4 -0.2576 0.482319
(1.65, 0.35) 0.4412 -0.2230 1.04262
(1.7, 0.3) 0.4843 -0.1863 1.88442
(1.75, 0.25) 0.54 -0.1489 3.1747
(1.8, 0.2) 0.6077 -0.1125 5.27969
(1.85, 0.15) 0.6756 -0.076 9.5
(1.9, 0.1) 0.762 -0.0437 19.1
The first column represents the realizations of productiv-
ity shocks. The second column is the optimal interest rate
policy that results in a second-best allocation when the
monetary-authority follows an interest rate policy. The
third column is the optimal growth rate of the money sup-
ply that results from the optimal policy i∗2.
Let us conduct the following experiment that was men-
tioned before: Suppose the monetary-authority follows money
supply rules. If it fixes the growth rate at m∗, then two
equilibria are possible. One equilibrium which corresponds
to the second-best policy computed in the case of interest
rate policies, i∗2, and another equilibrium, î2. The latter
equilibrium implies an allocation that can potentially be
very far from the second-best one as we can observe from
the table above.
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Consider the benchmark case, σ2γ = 0. The solutions of
i2 are as follows:
i2 =
−(1 + 3m) +√(1 + 3m)2 − 4m(1 + 2m)
2m
i2 =
−(1 + 3m)−√(1 + 3m)2 − 4m(1 + 2m)
2m
and only the second solution is accepted.
3.3.2 Model of section 2.11
Consider the model of section 2.11 with inelastic labor sup-
ply. The argument is similar to the previous one. We get
the following two solutions
i2 =
−B +√B2 − 16mΓ
8m
(3.60)
i2 =
−B −√B2 − 16mΓ
8m
(3.61)
where
B = 2 +m(8 + 2γHγL + 2σ
2
γ)
Γ = 1 + γHγL − σ2γ +m(3 + 3γHγL + σ2γ)
B R 0 iff
M¯2
M¯1
R
3 + γHγL + σ
2
γ
4 + γHγL + σ2γ
and Γ R 0 iff
M¯2
M¯1
R
2 + 2γHγL + 2σ
2
γ
3 + 3γHγL + σ2γ
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§ 3.4 Finite horizon
Suppose we start again from the set-up of section 2.1 and
consider the case of three periods. Idiosyncratic shocks are
assumed to be i.i.d. In the following paragraphs we will
use a dynamic programming argument in finite horizon to
solve for the optimal plan of entrepreneurs.
Let us start from the last period and move backwards.
In period three, the objective is to maximize
V3,s,s′ = max[log(x3,s,s′)], s, s
′ ∈ S = {H,L} (3.62)
where s is the state that realized in period two and s
′
the
state that realized in period three. The budget constraints
are as follows
p3x3,s,s′ +
b3,s′
1 + i3
+m3,s,s′ ≤ h3 + b2,s +m2,s + p3k3,sγs′
(3.63)
m3,s,s′ ≥ p3k3,sγs′ (3.64)
m3,s,s′ + b3,s′ ≥ 0 (3.65)
We will assume that the cash constraints will always bind,
constraint (64). The only choice variable for entrepreneurs
is to choose b3,s′ in order to decide the optimal consumption
in the last period. At an optimum solution, constraints
(63), (65) should bind. As a result the value function in
(62) becomes
V3,s,s′ = log
(
h3 + b2,s +m2,s +
p3k3,s
1 + i3
γs′
)
− log(p3)
(3.66)
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At period two, the problem becomes
V2,s = max
b2,s,k3,s
[
log
(
w2 − b2,s
1 + i2
− p2k3,s
)
− log(p2)+
µV3,s,H + (1− µ)V3,s,L
]
(3.67)
where
V3,s,H = log
(
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1 + i3
γH
)
− log(p3)
V3,s,L = log
(
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1 + i3
γL
)
− log(p3)
w2 = h2 + b1 + p1k1
w˜3,s = h3 + p2k2γs
The FOCs with respect to b2,s, k3,s respectively, are as fol-
lows
1
w2 − b2,s1+i2 − p2k3,s
=
µ(1 + i2)
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1+i3
γH
+
(1− µ)(1 + i2)
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1+i3
γL
(3.68)
1
w2 − b2,s1+i2 − p2k3,s
=
µp3p2
γH
1+i3
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1+i3
γH
+
(1− µ)p3p2
γL
1+i3
w˜3,s + b2,s +
p3k3,s
1+i3
γL
(3.69)
Combining (68),(69) we get
b2,s + w˜3,s =
p3k3,s
1 + i3
ζ2 (3.70)
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where
ζ2 =
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)A− γHγLp3p2
p3
p2
− (1 + i2)(1 + i3)
A = µγL + (1− µ)γH
The optimal demands for bonds and capital are as follows:
b2,s =
1 + i2
1 + i3
Φ2ζ2
(
w2 +
w˜3,s
1 + i2
)
− w˜3,s (3.71)
k3,s =
1 + i2
p3
Φ2
(
w2 +
w˜3,s
1 + i2
)
(3.72)
where
Φ2 =
ζ2 + A
(ζ2+γH)(ζ2+γL)
1+i3
+ ( 1+i2p3/p2 +
ζ2
1+i3
)(ζ2 + A)
The optimal value of V2,s is as follows
V2,s =
{
log
(
1− Φ2(1 + i2)
p3/p2
− Φ2ζ2
1 + i3
)
− log(p2)− log(p3)+
µ log
(
(ζ2 + γH)
Φ2(1 + i2)
1 + i3
)
+
(1− µ) log
(
(ζ2 + γL)
Φ2(1 + i2)
1 + i3
)}
+
2 log
(
w2 +
w˜3,s
1 + i2
)
It can be rewritten as
V2,s = B + 2 log
(
w˜2 + b1 +
p2k2
1 + i2
γs
)
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where B is the term in brackets and
w˜2 = p1k1 + h2 +
h3
1 + i2
Since in period one entrepreneurs are identical, we assume
that everybody is endowed with one unit of the good. As a
consequence, we get the following initial condition: k1 = 1.
In period one the problem is as follows:
V1 = max
b1,k2
[
log
(
w1 − p1k2 − b1
1 + i1
)
− log(p1)+
µV2,H + (1− µ)V2,L
]
and w1 = h1.
The FOCs with respect to b1, k2 respectively, are as fol-
lows
1
w1 − p1k2 − b11+i1
=
2µ(1 + i1)
w˜2 + b1 +
p2k2
1+i2
γH
+
2(1− µ)(1 + i1)
w˜2 + b1 +
p2k2
1+i2
γL
(3.73)
1
w1 − p1k2 − b11+i1
=
2µp2p1
γH
1+i2
w˜2 + b1 +
p2k2
1+i2
γH
+
2(1− µ)p2p1
γL
1+i2
w˜2 + b1 +
p2k2
1+i2
γL
(3.74)
Combining (73),(74) we get
b1 + w˜2 =
p2k2
1 + i2
ζ1 (3.75)
where
ζ1 =
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)A− γHγLp2p1
p2
p1
− (1 + i1)(1 + i2)
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The optimal demands for bonds and capital are as follows:
b1 =
1 + i1
1 + i2
Φ1ζ1
(
w1 +
w˜2
1 + i1
)
− w˜2 (3.76)
k2 =
1 + i1
p2
Φ1
(
w1 +
w˜2
1 + i1
)
(3.77)
and
Φ1 =
2(ζ1 + A)
(ζ1+γH)(ζ1+γL)
1+i2
+ 2( 1+i1p2/p1 +
ζ1
1+i2
)(ζ1 + A)
The optimal V1 is as follows
V1 = B + log
(
1− 1 + i1
p2/p1
Φ1 − Φζ1
1 + i2
)
+
2µ log
(1 + i1
1 + i2
Φ1(ζ1 + γH)
)
+
2(1− µ) log
(1 + i1
1 + i2
Φ1(ζ1 + γL)
)
+
3 log
(
w1 +
w˜2
1 + i1
)
− log(p1)
3.4.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium conditions are as follows
x1 + k2 = 1 (3.78)
µx2,H + (1− µ)x2,L +K3 = K2 (3.79)
µ(µx3,H,H + (1− µ)x3,H,L)+
(1− µ)(µx3,L,H + (1− µ)x3,L,L) = K3 (3.80)
h1 =
i1
1 + i1
p1, h2 =
i2
1 + i2
p2K2, h3 =
i3
1 + i3
p3K3
K2 = µγHk2 + (1− µ)γLk2 = k2, K3 = µk3,H + (1− µ)k3,L
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We will use only (78),(79) because (80) clears as a residual.
Equilibrium conditions (78),(79) simplify as follows
b1 = −p1 (3.81)
i2
1 + i2
K2 − 1
p2(1 + i2)
(µb2,H + (1− µ)b2,L) = K2 (3.82)
Optimality conditions (71),(72),(76),(77) respectively, can
be written as follows
k3,s =
1 + i2
p3
[ i2
1 + i2
p2K2 +
i3
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
p3K3+
p2K2
1 + i2
γs
]
Φ2 (3.83)
b2,s =
1 + i2
1 + i3
Φ2ζ2
[ i2
1 + i2
p2K2 +
i3
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
p3K3+
p2K2
1 + i2
γs
]
−
i3
1 + i3
p3K3 − p2K2γs (3.84)
K2 =
1 + i1
p2
Φ1
[ i1
1 + i1
p1 +
p1
1 + i1
+
i2p2K2
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)
+
i3p3K3
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
]
(3.85)
i2
1 + i2
p2K2 +
i3
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
p3K3 =
1 + i1
1 + i2
Φ1ζ1
[ i1
1 + i1
p1 +
p1
1 + i1
+
i2p2K2
(1 + i1)(1 + i1)
+
i3p3K3
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
]
(3.86)
Aggregating (83),(84) respectively, we get
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K3
(
1− i3
1 + i3
Φ2
)
=
(1 + i2)K2Φ2
p3/p2
(3.87)
µ
b2,H
p2
+ (1− µ)b2,L
p2
=
1 + i2
1 + i3
[
K2 +
i3
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)
p3
p2
K3
]
Φ2ζ2−
i3
1 + i3
p3
p2
K3 −K2 (3.88)
Substitute (91) in (92) and again substitute the resulting
relation in equilibrium condition (86) to solve for the equi-
librium inflation rate from period two to period three,
p3
p2
= (1 + i2)(1 + i3)
(
1 +
σ2γ
γHγL + i3
)
(3.89)
To compute the inflation rate from period one to period
two, divide (85),(86) and use also (87). We get
p2
p1
= (1 + i1)(1 + i2)
(
1 +
σ2γ
Γ + γHγL
)
(3.90)
where
Γ = i2 +
i3
1 + i3
(1 + i2)Φ2
1− i31+i3Φ2
Φ2 =
(1 + i3)(σ
2
γ + γHγL + i3)
2γHγL(1 + i3) + 2i3(1 + σ2γ) + 2i
2
3
The equilibrium value of K2 is as follows
K2 =
2(Γ + γHγL)
Γ2 + γHγLΓ + 3γHγL + σ2γΓ + 3Γ
(3.91)
and the equilibrium value of K3 is computed from (92).
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3.4.2 Optimal monetary policy
Let us start with the simplest case of uniform interest rate
policies across periods. The monetary authority sets the
same value for the nominal rate in every period2.
Consider the following proposition
Proposition 11. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rate at positive values, i > 0, in
order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider again the derivative of V1 with respect to i,
evaluated at i¯ > 0. This expression is rather complicated.
Consider the limit from above as i¯→ 0,
dV1
di
=
σ2γ + 4γHγL
γ2Hγ
2
L
σ2γ
Consider the more interesting situation where monetary
policy is different across periods. The following proposition
argues that optimal monetary policy should set at least one
of {i2, i3} at positive values,
Proposition 12. Given σ2γ > 0, optimal monetary policy
should set the nominal rates, {i2, i3}, at positive values in
order to maximize aggregate welfare.
Proof. Consider the total derivative of V1,
dV1 =
∂V1
∂i2
di2 +
∂V1
∂i3
di3
where the all derivatives are evaluated at i¯2, i¯3 > 0. Con-
sider the case where i¯2, i¯3 → 0,
2A useful simplification to consider.
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∂V1
∂i2
=
2σ2γ
γHγL
,
∂V1
∂i3
=
σ2γ + 2γHγL
γ2Hγ
2
L
σ2γ
The total derivative of V1 becomes
dV1 =
2σ2γ
γHγL
di2 +
σ2γ + 2γHγL
γ2Hγ
2
L
σ2γdi3 (3.92)
The previous propositions established the fact that the
monetary-authority should have an active role in the pres-
ence of entrepreneurial risk. In the analysis that follows we
will characterize the behavior of optimal monetary policy
intertemporally.
3.4.2.1 Characterization of optimal monetary policy
In this section we want to characterize optimal policy in a
global fashion. The following statement describes optimal
policy in that case
Optimal monetary policy rule I. Given σ2γ > 0, the
monetary-authority should pursue the following policy in
order to maximize aggregate welfare: set i∗2, i
∗
3 > 0 and i
∗
3 >
i∗2.
In order to show that the above policy prescription is
valid, consider first the following numerical examples where
we compute the optimal policy by fixing the prob. distribu-
tion and playing with the realization of productivity shocks.
Consider the cases where µ = 0.5, µ = 0.4, µ = 0.6 re-
spectively,
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(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.3, 0.7) (0.12,0.1)
(1.4, 0.6) (0.12,0.3)
(1.5, 0.5) (0.2,0.35)
(1.6, 0.4) (0.25,0.4)
(1.7, 0.3) (0.25,0.5)
(1.8, 0.2) (0.28,0.6)
(1.9, 0.1) (0.35,0.7)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.45, 0.7) (0.12,0.2)
(1.6, 0.6) (0.16,0.3)
(1.75, 0.5) (0.21,0.4)
(1.9, 0.4) (0.23,0.5)
(2.05, 0.3) (0.27,0.6)
(2.2, 0.2) (0.31,0.7)
(2.35, 0.1) (0.36,0.8)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.2, 0.7) (0,0.1)
(1.2667, 0.6) (0.12,0.2)
(1.33, 0.5) (0.15,0.3)
(1.4, 0.4) (0.2,0.3)
(1.466, 0.3) (0.24,0.4)
(1.533, 0.2) (0.27,0.5)
(1.6, 0.1) (0.3,0.7)
Consider also the cases where µ = 0.3, µ = 0.2, µ = 0.1
respectively,
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.7, 0.7) (0.15,0.2)
(1.9333, 0.6) (0.2,0.3)
(2.1666, 0.5) (0.24,0.4)
(2.4, 0.4) (0.27,0.5)
(2.6333, 0.3) (0.29,0.6)
(2.8666, 0.2) (0.31,0.7)
(3.1, 0.1) (0.4,1)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(2.2, 0.7) (0.16,0.3)
(2.6, 0.6) (0.25,0.3)
(3, 0.5) (0.24,0.5)
(3.4, 0.4) (0.3,0.5)
(3.8, 0.3) (0.3,0.6)
(4.2, 0.2) (0.3,0.8)
(4.6, 0.1) (0.4,1.1)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(3.7, 0.7) (0.21,0.3)
(4.6, 0.6) (0.24,0.4)
(5.5, 0.5) (0.25,0.5)
(6.4, 0.4) (0.27,0.5)
(7.3, 0.3) (0.21,0.6)
(8.2, 0.2) (0.21,0.7)
(9.1, 0.1) (0.27,1)
The above numerical examples confirm, roughly speak-
ing, the previous discussion about optimal policy rules.
3.4.2.2 Discussion
Let us understand the intuition of the previous rule. We
saw from the previous numerical analysis that the optimal
nominal rate at period three should be higher than that of
period two. The reason is that at period three there are 4
different types of entrepreneurs. There are entrepreneurs
that had received a bad shock in period two and three.
If heterogeneity is sufficiently high, the monetary author-
ity should provide enough insurance to these entrepreneurs
at period three. This means that i3 should be sufficiently
high in order for seignorage transfers in period three to be
sufficiently high. The monetary-authority effectively taxes
rich entrepreneurs by increasing the inflation rate from pe-
riod two to period three in order to provide insurance to
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poor entrepreneurs. Given this effect, setting i2 sufficiently
higher than i3 means that the monetary-authority taxes
rich entrepreneurs suboptimally high because it increases
even more the inflation rate from period two to period three
and makes money balances expensive to hold at period two.
The optimal policy is to use i3 to provide enough insurance
at period three to poor entrepreneurs and keeping the cost
of borrowing money balances at period two at relatively
lower levels.
3.4.3 Shocks to labor and capital productivity
Let us go back to section 2.11. Suppose that idiosyncratic
shocks affect the productivity of capital and that of labor.
Assume for simplicity that the same shock hits both cap-
ital and labor productivity. The three-period argument is
analogous to the previous one.
In period three, the value function is as follows
V3,s,s′ = log
[
v˜3,s,s′ + b2,s +
q3k3,s
1 + i3
γs′
]
− log(p3)
where
v˜3,s,s′ = h3 + w2γs +
w3
1 + i3
γs′ + q2k2γs
In period two, the problem is as follows
max
b2,s,k3,s
{
log
(
v2 − b2,s
1 + i2
− p2k3,s
)
− log(p2)+
µV3,s,H + (1− µ)V3,s,L
}
where
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v2 = h2 + b1 + p1
From the FOC we get
b2,s + v3,s = ζ2
(
w3
1 + i3
+
q3k3,s
1 + i3
)
q3k3,s = (1 + i2)Φ2
(
v2 +
v3,s
1 + i2
)
− w3
1 + i3
Z2
b2,s = ζ2Φ2
1 + i2
1 + i3
(
w3
q3/p2
+ v2 +
v3,s
1 + i2
)
− v3,s
where
v3,s = h3 + w2γs + q2k2γs
ζ2 =
(1 + i2)(1 + i3)A− γHγL q3p2
q3
p2
− (1 + i2)(1 + i3)
Φ2 =
ζ2 + A
(ζ2+γH)(ζ2+γL)
1+i3
+ ( 1+i2q3/p2 +
ζ2
1+i3
)(ζ2 + A)
Z2 =
(ζ2 + γH)(ζ2 + γL) + ζ2(ζ + A)
(ζ2+γH)(ζ2+γL)
1+i3
+ ( 1+i2q3/p2 +
ζ2
1+i3
)(ζ2 + A)
The value function becomes
V2,s =
{
log
(
1− ζ2Φ2
1 + i3
− (1 + i2)Φ2
q3/p2
)
− log(p2)− log(p3)+
µ log
((1 + i2)
1 + i3
Φ2(ζ2 + γH)
)
+
(1− µ) log
((1 + i2)
1 + i3
Φ2(ζ2 + γL)
)}
+
2 log
(
v2 +
v3,s
1 + i2
+
w3
q3/p2
)
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Equivalently, it can be written as
V2,s = B + 2 log
(
v˜2,s + b1 +
q2k2
1 + i2
γs
)
where
v˜2,s = h2 + p1 +
h3
1 + i2
+
w2
1 + i2
γs +
w3
q3/p2
In period one the problem is as follows
max
b1,k2
{
log
(
h1 − b1
1 + i1
− p1k2
)
− log(p1)+
µV2,H + (1− µ)V2,L
}
From the FOC we get
b1 + v˜2 = ζ1
( q2k2
1 + i2
+
w2
1 + i2
)
q2k2 = (1 + i1)Φ1
(
h1 +
v˜2
1 + i1
)
− w2
1 + i2
Z1
b1 = ζ1Φ1
1 + i1
1 + i2
( w2
q2/p1
+ h1 +
v˜2
1 + i1
)
− v˜2
where
v˜2 = h2 + p1 +
h3
1 + i2
+
w3
q3/p2
ζ1 =
(1 + i1)(1 + i2)A− γHγL q2p1
q2
p1
− (1 + i1)(1 + i2)
Φ1 =
2(ζ1 + A)
(ζ1+γH)(ζ1+γL)
1+i2
+ 2( 1+i1q2/p1 +
ζ1
1+i2
)(ζ1 + A)
Z1 =
(ζ1 + γH)(ζ1 + γL) + 2ζ1(ζ1 + A)
(ζ1+γH)(ζ1+γL)
1+i1
+ 2( 1+i1q2/p1 +
ζ1
1+i2
)(ζ1 + A)
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The optimal value function in period one is as follows
V1 =
{
B − log(p1) + log
(
1− (1 + i1)Φ1
q2/p1
− ζ1Φ1
1 + i2
)
+
2µ log
(
Φ1
1 + i1
1 + i2
(ζ1 + γH)
)
+
2(1− µ) log
(
Φ1
1 + i1
1 + i2
(ζ1 + γL)
)}
+
3 log
(
h1 +
v˜2
1 + i1
+
w2
q2/p1
)
3.4.3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium return from investing in capital from pe-
riod two to period three is
q3
p2
= (1 + i2)(1 + i3)
(
1 +
σ2γ
i3 + γHγL
)
and the equilibrium return from investing in capital from
period one to period two is
q2
p1
= (1 + i1)(1 + i2)
(
1 +
σ2γ
Γ + γHγL
)
where
Γ = i2 +
Φ∗2(1 + i2)
∆
[
2i3
1 + i3
+
i3 + γHγL
(1 + i3)(i3 + γHγL + σ2γ)
]
∆ = 2− Φ∗2
[
2i3
1 + i3
+
i3 + γHγL
(1 + i3)(i3 + γHγL + σ2γ)
]
and Φ∗2 is the equilibrium value of Φ2.
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3.4.3.2 Characterization of optimal monetary policy
Consider the following optimal policy rule where we exclude
the case of extreme heterogeneity, γL = 0, γH =
1
µ ,
Optimal monetary policy rule II. Given σ2γ > 0, the
monetary-authority should pursue the following policy in
order to maximize aggregate welfare: set i∗2 = 0 and i
∗
3 ≥ 0.
The equality with zero or strict inequality for i∗3 depends on
the volatility of risk.
In order to show that the above policy prescription is
valid, consider first the following numerical examples where
we compute the optimal policy by fixing the prob. distribu-
tion and playing with the realization of productivity shocks.
Consider the cases where µ = 0.5, µ = 0.4, µ = 0.3 re-
spectively,
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.3, 0.7) .
(1.4, 0.6) .
(1.5, 0.5) .
(1.6, 0.4) (0,0)
(1.7, 0.3) (0,0.1)
(1.8, 0.2) (0,0.2)
(1.9, 0.1) (0,0.5)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.45, 0.7) .
(1.6, 0.6) .
(1.75, 0.5) .
(1.9, 0.4) (0,0)
(2.05, 0.3) (0,0.1)
(2.2, 0.2) (0,0.3)
(2.35, 0.1) (0,0.6)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(1.7, 0.7) .
(1.9333, 0.6) .
(2.1666, 0.5) (0,0)
(2.4, 0.4) (0,0.1)
(2.6333, 0.3) (0,0.2)
(2.8666, 0.2) (0,0.4)
(3.1, 0.1) (0.05,0.7)
Consider also the cases where µ = 0.2, µ = 0.1, respectively,
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(2.2, 0.7) .
(2.6, 0.6) .
(3, 0.5) (0,0)
(3.4, 0.4) (0,0.1)
(3.8, 0.3) (0,0.2)
(4.2, 0.2) (0,0.4)
(4.6, 0.1) (0.07,0.8)
(γH , γL) (i
∗
2, i
∗
3)
(3.7, 0.7) .
(4.6, 0.6) .
(5.5, 0.5) (0,0)
(6.4, 0.4) (0,0.1)
(7.3, 0.3) (0,0.2)
(8.2, 0.2) (0,0.3)
(9.1, 0.1) (0,0.5)
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§ 3.5 Conclusions
In this paper we argued that idiosyncratic risk and credit
frictions implied from the cash-in-advance structure im-
ply that optimal monetary policy is characterized by pos-
itive nominal rates and positive seignorage. Credit fric-
tions in the asset market create an insurance problem un-
der idiosyncratic risk. As a consequence seignorage can
provide insurance to individuals that have received a bad
shock. Positive seigniorage transfers require positive nomi-
nal rates. Moving to money-supply rules the picture changes
abruptly because we get a multiplicity of equilibria. Under
the previous construction, optimal monetary policy, opti-
mal money growth rate, can achieve a second-best solution
but the same optimal rule can give also an allocation that
is very far from the second-best. Lastly, in a three period
economy optimal policy calls for higher nominal rates in
period three than period two.
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